Concept
Testimonial Statements
Right to confront witnesses
Testimonial Statements
Every absent-declarant problem under Crawford v. Washington turns on one classification. The Confrontation Clause bars the prosecution from offering a testimonial out-of-court statement against a criminal defendant when the declarant does not testify, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford gave the category a core and a few examples but declined to define it comprehensively, so later cases drew its boundaries. This section follows those cases in the order the Court decided them.
The classification sorts each problem onto one of two tracks. A testimonial statement is excluded unless the prosecution proves both unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, and neither a hearsay exception nor a judge’s finding of reliability can stand in for either. A nontestimonial statement raises no confrontation question at all, so the ordinary hearsay rules decide whether it comes in. The sorting follows the history covered earlier. The Clause targeted ex parte examinations used against the accused, so the more closely a statement resembles an accusation made to government officers for use at trial, the more likely it is testimonial. Davis v. Washington applied that logic to police questioning: statements made to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial, and statements whose primary purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later prosecution are testimonial.
The subsections that follow move from easy cases to hard ones. Crawford’s core class covers formal accusations that everyone agrees are testimonial. The primary purpose test then sorts police questioning that may be protective, investigative, or both. The Court next applied the same inquiry to a wounded man who named his shooter, refined how courts read purpose objectively and what formality adds, and finally extended the inquiry to a three-year-old’s answers to his teachers.
Crawford’s Core Class
The Clause reaches the “witnesses” against the accused, and Crawford reasoned from that word that a witness is one who bears testimony. Testimony is typically “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” so an accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony, while a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.1 The line tracks the history covered earlier. The Framers aimed the Clause at ex parte examinations used as evidence against the accused. An off-hand, overheard remark may be unreliable enough to deserve exclusion under the hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to those abuses.2
Crawford declined to adopt a single definition, for a practical reason. Sylvia Crawford’s recorded police statement was testimonial under any conceivable definition, so the case could be decided without choosing among them.3 The Court instead set out three formulations and observed that they share a common nucleus, each marking the Clause’s coverage at a different level of abstraction around it.4 Each came from a different source:
- The petitioner’s brief described ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent, such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony the defendant had no chance to cross-examine, and similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.5
- Justice Thomas, concurring in White v. Illinois, described extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.6
- An amicus brief for criminal defense lawyers described statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.7
The third formulation asks what an objective person in the declarant’s position would expect. It tests circumstances rather than form, and it anticipates the primary-purpose inquiry that the later cases develop.8
Some statements qualify under all three formulations, and Crawford named them as the minimum: prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and police interrogations.9 Prior testimony from a formal proceeding is an account given to the state for use in deciding a case. Police interrogations resemble the examinations that English justices of the peace conducted. Those justices had an essentially investigative and prosecutorial function, and England had no professional police force until the nineteenth century, so other government officers did the work police do now. Their involvement produces the same risk of testimonial evidence whether they are police or justices of the peace.10
Davis later added that the Clause cannot be evaded by having a note-taking officer recite the declarant’s unsworn account in place of a signed deposition. It also held that an oral declaration of past fact to an investigating officer carries enough solemnity, because a deliberate falsehood to officers can itself bring severe consequences.11 In Crawford itself, the recorded statement was made in police custody, after Miranda warnings, by a declarant who was a possible suspect, which is why no definition could leave it out.12
The other side of the definition matters as much on an exam, because a nontestimonial statement does not engage the Clause at all. Davis called “testimonial statements” the critical portion of Crawford’s holding. Only such statements make the declarant a witness within the meaning of the Clause, and testimonial character is what separates them from other hearsay, which stays subject to the ordinary limits of hearsay law but not to the Clause.13 The earlier cases bear this out. Even under the old reliability approach, the Court dispensed with unavailability and prior cross-examination only for statements that were clearly nontestimonial, such as statements made unwittingly to a government informant in Bourjaily v. United States and statements from one prisoner to another in Dutton v. Evans.14 A conspirator who describes the defendant’s role to someone he believes is a partner expects no trial use of his words, and no officer is questioning anyone, so the setting has none of the features of a formal examination. The Court later confirmed in Whorton v. Bockting that the Clause has no application to nontestimonial hearsay, which leaves the States free to regulate such statements through their own hearsay law.15
Courts classify a statement by the circumstances in which it was made, and the label on the record that preserves it settles nothing. Business and public records are generally admissible without confrontation not because they fit a hearsay exception, but because they are created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not to prove some fact at trial, so they are not testimonial. A statement prepared specifically for use at trial is testimony whether or not it would qualify as a business or official record.16 Once a court finds a statement testimonial and finds no chance to cross-examine, the violation follows. In one post-Crawford case, a court of appeals held a declarant’s statement testimonial, held that the defendant’s right to confront her was violated because he never had an opportunity to do so, and vacated the conviction because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17
The Clause is also concerned with statements offered for their truth, so even a testimonial statement may be used for another purpose. In Tennessee v. Street, the defendant testified that police had told him to copy his accomplice Peele’s confession, and the prosecution answered by offering Peele’s confession to show that it differed from the defendant’s in several respects. The Court found no violation because the confession was not offered for its truth.18 Crawford approved that result and confirmed that the Clause does not bar testimonial statements used for a purpose other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.19
Police interrogation sits in the core class, yet the Court has since held that statements made to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial.20 The next subsection takes up the test that sorts the two kinds of police questioning. Until then, the classification question on an exam is who received the statement, why it was made, and whether the declarant would reasonably expect it to be used at trial. Whether the statement seems reliable or fits a hearsay exception has no place in that classification.
The Primary Purpose Test
Davis, decided together with its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, supplied the rule that sorts police questioning into testimonial and nontestimonial. Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such emergency and that the primary purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.23 The Court offered the rule as enough to decide the two cases before it and did not attempt an exhaustive classification, which is why later cases keep refining it.24 The two halves are one question answered from opposite sides: what was the exchange objectively for?
Davis, like Crawford before it, declined to offer a comprehensive definition of “testimonial.” It has been read to imply that a statement whose primary purpose does not relate to prosecuting a past criminal event is nontestimonial even when made to a government official. On that reading, a 911 call describing an ongoing emergency is nontestimonial, while statements made once the emergency has ceased are testimonial, because the government’s primary purpose has shifted to proving past events.25
The test follows from what Crawford identified as the Clause’s target. A person who tells an investigating officer how a crime happened, in order to establish who committed it, does what a witness does on direct examination. The Court treated the product of that questioning as testimonial whether it ends up in a signed writing or only in the officer’s memory and notes. It gave weight even to an unsworn oral account, because a deliberate falsehood told to an investigating officer can bring severe consequences.26 A call for help differs in kind. A 911 call, and at least its initial questioning, is ordinarily designed to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance, not to establish a past fact.27 The caller wants the danger to end, and the words are tied to what is happening and to what responders must know. No witness goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help, so the call is no substitute for live testimony.28 Sorting exchanges by objective purpose keeps the Clause aimed at accusations the government gathers and leaves cries for help to the hearsay rules.
In Davis, an operator who answered Michelle McCottry’s 911 call learned that her former boyfriend, Adrian Davis, was beating her. The operator asked about the location, weapons, and whether Davis had been drinking, obtained his full name and middle initial, and heard McCottry report that he had just run out the door.29 Police arrived within four minutes and found fresh injuries and her frantic efforts to gather her children and belongings.30 McCottry did not appear at Davis’s trial for violating a no-contact order, and the recording of her call came in over his confrontation objection.31 The Court identified four differences between that call and Sylvia Crawford’s station-house interview:32
- McCottry spoke about events as they were actually happening, while Sylvia Crawford described events that had ended hours earlier.
- Any reasonable listener would have recognized a bona fide physical threat, so the call was a plea for help and not a narrative report of a crime.
- The questions and answers were necessary to resolve the present emergency, even the operator’s effort to learn the assailant’s identity so that officers would know whether they faced a violent felon.
- Crawford answered calmly at the station house while an officer taped and took notes, but McCottry gave frantic answers by phone in a setting that was neither tranquil nor, as far as the operator could tell, safe.
The identification of the assailant shows how the test cuts against first instinct. Naming the person who is beating you is an accusation, and a reflex may say that an accusation made to police must be testimonial. The Court reasoned otherwise because the operator needed the name for a present purpose: so that dispatched officers could judge the danger they were about to meet.33 Whether a statement happens to hurt the defendant plays no part in the classification. McCottry was not acting as a witness, and her emergency statement had no courtroom counterpart.34
Hammon v. Indiana involved the same kind of offense and produced the opposite result. Officers responding to a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon found Amy alone on the front porch looking somewhat frightened but saying nothing was the matter, and they entered with her permission.35 Inside, one officer kept Hershel away from Amy while another questioned her in a separate room, so her replies went to the officer for use in his investigation.36 Amy described how the argument began and progressed, and the officer then had her sign a battery affidavit to establish what had occurred earlier.37 The Court held her statements testimonial. McCottry was alone, unprotected, and apparently in immediate danger. Amy was protected by the officers and narrated past events at some remove from the danger she described.38 Her statements were neither a cry for help nor information that would let officers immediately end a threatening situation, and they closely resembled what a witness says on direct examination.39 The station-house features of Crawford, such as Miranda warnings and a recording, made the testimonial character of that statement more apparent without being essential to it.40
The pairing also answers the argument that questions asked at the scene are mere initial inquiries and so cannot be testimonial. Officers called to a domestic dispute need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and the danger to the potential victim, and those exigencies may often make initial inquiries produce nontestimonial answers. The Court did not accept that virtually any initial inquiry at a crime scene yields nontestimonial answers, and it did not hold the opposite either. Where the answers were neither a cry for help nor information enabling officers to end a threatening situation, the labels crime scene and initial inquiry made no difference.41 In both cases the hinge was what the exchange was for when it occurred, and neither the setting nor the relationship between the parties moved the answer.
Because the test looks at purpose moment by moment, a single conversation can cross the line. Once the operator in Davis had the information needed to address the exigency, the emergency appeared to end when Davis drove away. The operator then told McCottry to be quiet and posed a battery of questions, so it could readily be maintained that her statements from that point were testimonial.42 The Court left the sorting to trial courts, which can redact or exclude the portions of a recording that have become testimonial, and it classified only McCottry’s early statements identifying Davis.43
The prosecutors and the United States as amicus in these cases urged greater flexibility for domestic violence, because victims of that offense are often intimidated into silence and the Clause then hands the defendant a windfall. The Court declined to loosen the rule on that ground, reasoning that constitutional guarantees may not be vitiated merely because they allow the guilty to go free.44 It pointed instead to forfeiture by wrongdoing: one who obtains a witness’s absence by wrongdoing forfeits the right to confront that witness.45 The remedy for a silenced victim therefore lies in a doctrine that turns on the defendant’s conduct, which a later section takes up, and the classification of the victim’s statement stays tied to its purpose.
Because the test depends on an objective reading of context, results come case by case. Justice Thomas, dissenting from the Hammon result, called the standard unworkable, and a bright-line alternative such as treating every statement to law enforcement as testimonial would sweep in many more statements than the Court’s approach does.46 Trial judges carry much of the burden of deciding whether an emergency was ongoing or had concluded.47 Davis framed the inquiry around the primary purpose of the interrogation, and the next subsections show how the emergency concept stretches beyond the first victim and how courts decide whose purposes count.48
Ongoing Emergencies
Davis supplied the emergency half of the primary purpose test, and Michigan v. Bryant shows how far that half reaches when the emergency involves a gun and a perpetrator no one can find. Whether an emergency exists depends on context: whether the dispute is public or private, whether the perpetrator is still at large, how far the threat extends to the victim and to the public, and what kind of weapon is involved. Detroit police found Anthony Covington mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot with a gunshot wound to the abdomen. They asked what had happened, who had shot him, and where. He answered that “Rick” had shot him through the back door of a house, after which he drove to the gas station. The questioning lasted five to ten minutes, until paramedics arrived, and Covington died within hours.50 The Court held that his identification and description of the shooter and of the place of the shooting were nontestimonial, so admitting them did not violate the Clause.51
An emergency matters because a live threat changes what the participants are trying to do. A frightened victim and an officer who does not yet know how much danger remains are both focused on ending the danger, so the exchange looks little like the preparation of testimony for trial, and the opportunity for calculated fabrication shrinks. Statements made to help police address an ongoing emergency therefore presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would trigger the requirement of confrontation.52 The presumption has limits. The existence of an emergency is one factor, an important one, that informs the ultimate question of primary purpose. It is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry, because other circumstances can also show that a statement was not procured to create a substitute for trial testimony.53 A court that finds an emergency still has to weigh the surrounding circumstances, and a court that finds none has not yet decided the case. The emergency facts are evidence on one question: whether the encounter was about stopping danger or about building a record.
The most important step in Bryant was to refuse to confine the emergency to the first victim’s own safety. In Davis, the danger to the caller appeared to end when her attacker drove away, and the Court treated the later part of that call accordingly.54 Bryant widened the lens, holding that the existence and duration of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public.55 A court assessing whether an emergency is ongoing cannot ask only whether the threat to the first victim has been neutralized, because the threat to first responders and to the public may continue.56 Covington had been shot about 25 minutes before officers reached him, at a different location.57 The Court still found an emergency in progress. Covington did not know where the shooter was, the shooter had fired at him twice, and nothing Covington said gave a reason to think the shooter would not return.58 An answer that asks only whether the victim is safe now stops one step too soon, because the threat to officers and bystanders can outlast the threat to the person who was shot.
The factors from Bryant are evidence on a single question, what the exchange was for, and a court reads them together instead of scoring them one by one. The weapon matters because it determines how much danger survives the first confrontation. In the domestic violence cases, the emergency was narrower because the perpetrator was unarmed and had targeted a particular victim. In Bryant, a gun the assailant still held, together with an unknown motive, made questions about who the shooter was and where he had gone pertinent to the emergency and to public safety.59 A quarrel confined to two people puts few others at risk, while a shooting with no known motive endangers anyone nearby. The Court also treated the declarant’s serious medical condition and the informality of the encounter as pertinent.60 Informality counted because the scene resembled the harried 911 call in Davis more than the structured station-house interview in Crawford, and nothing in its formality would have focused Covington on future prosecutorial use of his words.61 Because several considerations feed one judgment, the approach gives trial judges wide discretion, and the expected effect is that more statements will be ruled nontestimonial, especially where the perpetrator is armed and unidentified.62
Hammon, decided with Davis, shows the same considerations producing the opposite result. Officers questioned Amy Hammon about a domestic disturbance in a separate room after separating her from her husband, Hershel, and the Court held her account testimonial because no emergency was in progress and the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct.63 The two cases differ in the danger left standing. Hershel was unarmed and the officers had physically separated him from his wife, so once the couple were apart nothing extended the emergency beyond the victim’s own safety, and that safety was already secured. Covington’s shooter was armed, unaccounted for, and unexplained, and each of those facts kept the threat alive for the officers and for the public.
The same context decides when an emergency ends, and it can end in the middle of a single encounter. In Davis, the operator’s early questions served the emergency, but after the attacker drove away and the operator began a battery of further questions, the later statements could readily be treated as testimonial, and trial courts were told to redact or exclude those portions.64 Bryant found no comparable break in Covington’s few minutes of questioning, because nothing he said told the officers the danger had passed and everything left the shooter’s whereabouts open.65 An exam fact pattern that describes quick questioning of a shot or stabbed victim therefore turns on one inquiry: did the officers still have an armed, unaccounted-for person to worry about when the words were spoken?
Justice Scalia, who wrote Crawford and Davis, dissented in Bryant, and his objections mark where the majority’s reading is most open to attack. He called the majority’s account of five officers questioning a dying man to protect everyone from a killer on the loose transparently false, and he said the opinion left the Court’s Confrontation Clause law in a shambles.66 On his reading of the record, Covington knew the threat had ended six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier.67 The five officers questioned him primarily to investigate past criminal events. They drew no weapons, did not immediately search the gas station, questioned him before investigating the scene, and never opened by asking where the shooter was.68
His structural complaint was that the majority’s definition lets an emergency persist whenever an armed shooter of unknown motive and location has wounded someone nearby. Police can plausibly claim a lingering threat in the first hours after almost any violent crime, so defendants would lose the right to exclude uncross-examined accusations. He called it “a dangerous definition of emergency.”69 The dissent and the majority also differed on whose purpose controls. The majority read the statements and actions of both the declarant and the officers, while Scalia looked to the declarant’s intent alone, a disagreement the next subsection takes up.70
For exam purposes the majority’s view controls and the dissent supplies the counterargument. When the facts show an armed assailant at large, an unknown motive, a public setting, a wounded declarant, and hurried, informal questions, argue that the emergency was ongoing and the statements nontestimonial. When the facts show the assailant arrested or unarmed and separated, the victim safe, and calm questioning aimed at what happened, argue that the emergency was over and the statements testimonial. In either case, say that the emergency is one factor weighed with the others and not the whole test.
Objective Purpose and Formality
The test that sorts testimonial from nontestimonial statements asks one question, and the Court’s fullest recent statement of it shows how to answer. In Ohio v. Clark, the Court framed the inquiry as whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the primary purpose of the conversation was to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.72 Two commitments sit inside that sentence. The court weighs all the relevant circumstances, so no single fact, whether an emergency, a station house, or an officer’s badge, settles the matter. And the court reads those circumstances objectively, asking what the encounter was for as a reasonable participant would see it. The last subsection applied the test to one kind of fact, the emergency. This one covers how courts reach a conclusion about purpose, what formality adds, and where the Justices still disagree.
Bryant explained that the relevant purpose is the one reasonable participants would have had, ascertained from their statements and actions and the circumstances of the encounter.73 The plurality in Williams v. Illinois described the same search as looking for the purpose a reasonable person would ascribe to the statement, given all the surrounding circumstances.74 A subjective standard would force a court to reconstruct the private motives of an officer and a declarant. Those motives are hard to verify, often mixed, and unobtainable when the declarant is dead or badly hurt, and an officer who wants a statement admitted could describe a protective purpose the circumstances never showed. Davis anticipated the problem: police cannot make an emergency exist by declaring one, and police conduct cannot govern the Clause either, because testimonial statements are what they are.75 An objective test also gives officers and prosecutors a standard they can apply while the questioning is under way. The price is judicial discretion, a cost Justice Scalia’s dissent in Bryant pressed hard and a later paragraph returns to.
Objectivity does not say whose statements and actions supply the evidence. Bryant answered that those of both the declarant and the interrogators count, because each can reveal what the exchange was for.76 The Court gave an extreme example. When officers tell a victim to name the culprit so that the person can be arrested and prosecuted, the victim’s reply is purely accusatory, because the phrasing of the question leaves the victim with prosecution necessarily in mind.77 Reading both sides responds to mixed motives. Officers at a scene may be protecting people and collecting information at the same moment, so the content of both the questions and the answers corrects the distortion that comes from watching a single participant.78 Justice Scalia’s dissent recounts two reasons the majority gave for the combined approach: a domestic violence victim who wants an abuser arrested but not prosecuted, and a severely injured victim who answers reflexively and may form no purpose at all.79 One lower court facing an interview with dual medical and forensic goals sorted its contents, treating statements made for medical purposes as nontestimonial and statements made for forensic purposes as testimonial.80
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Bryant, would have asked only about the declarant. His argument starts from what testimony is: a solemn declaration made in the course of a criminal trial. An out-of-court statement qualifies only if the declarant intended a solemn declaration and understood that it might be used to invoke the State’s coercive machinery against the accused.81 On that view an interrogator’s hidden purpose cannot stand in for the declarant’s intent, and the declarant-focused inquiry works even when a declarant blurts out an accusation before any question is asked, a situation with no interrogator purpose to examine. He did not treat the questioner as irrelevant, since the questioner’s identity and the content and tenor of the questions can shape what the declarant believes the statement is for.82 The majority’s combined approach controls, so an answer should weigh the declarant’s words and conduct together with the officers’ questions and name the declarant-only view as the main competing position.
Formality enters the analysis as evidence of purpose. Clark lists the informality of the situation and the interrogation as one additional factor. A formal station-house interrogation, like the one in Crawford, is more likely to produce testimonial statements, and less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a purpose of obtaining evidence against the accused.83 Structure signals what an encounter is for. Calm, organized, recorded questioning by an officer with no immediate danger to manage invites a witness to build an account for later use, while a fluid, public, disorganized exchange keeps both sides focused on the crisis in front of them. In Bryant, officers reached a shot man in a gas station lot and questioned him in that exposed and disorganized setting, and the Court counted the informality, along with his medical condition and the emergency, in treating his answers as nontestimonial.84 Crawford sits at the other pole, because that interview followed a Miranda warning, was tape-recorded, and took place at the station house.85
Those features strengthened Crawford’s testimonial character without being essential, and Hammon shows why. The Hammon questioning took place in a home, yet the officer separated Amy Hammon from her husband and received her replies for use in his investigation, which was formal enough to give her statement a striking resemblance to a civil-law ex parte examination.86 The Court reasoned that questioning by police officers carries enough formality because lies to them are criminal offenses, and that confining the Clause to the precise forms it first targeted would be a recipe for its extinction.87 The inference runs in one direction only. Formality suggests that no emergency exists, but informality does not by itself show an emergency or a lack of testimonial intent.88 The Court’s later decision on forensic certifications, Bullcoming, added in a footnote that formality is primarily an indicator of testimonial purpose rather than of reliability, and that it cannot be the sole indicator because it is too easily evaded.89 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in that case treated an analyst’s signed certification as formal, and so as pointing toward an evidentiary purpose, even without notarization.90 The later section on forensic reports takes up that case.
A narrower view makes formality the center of the test instead of one factor. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in Bryant, would not try to reconstruct the participants’ primary purpose. He would ask how closely the interrogation resembles the historical examinations the Clause targeted, and he found the informal questioning of a man bleeding from a fatal wound too far removed to count.91 He took the same position in Williams, reasoning that the Clause reaches formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits and depositions, and statements resulting from formalized dialogue such as custodial interrogation.92 A plurality in Williams described the abuses behind the Clause as involving statements with the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual and formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.93 Five Justices rejected the plurality’s reasoning, and Justice Thomas agreed with its result only on his solemnity ground, so the targeted-individual idea is a position to recognize and not a rule to apply.94 Justices Thomas and Alito hold a more exacting view of formality than the Court’s usual approach, and that difference helps explain the sharp divisions in the later cases.95 The Court revisited the fractured Williams decision in Smith v. Arizona, a case about experts who relay absent analysts’ statements, and a later section on experts and report bases takes it up.
Clark and Bryant also say that the standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant in deciding whether a statement is testimonial.96 One plausible reading, which the opinions do not spell out, is modest: hearsay categories are a guide to statements made for reasons other than litigation. A business record is admissible because it is made for business reasons, and an excited utterance is admissible partly because an excited speaker is not thinking about a lawsuit.97 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Bullcoming applies the idea this way. Business and public records are generally admissible without confrontation because they were created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not to prove a fact at trial, whereas a regularly conducted activity whose business is producing evidence for trial falls outside the business-records exception and is testimonial for the same reason.98
Justice Scalia read the same language differently, and the disagreement is a live feature of current doctrine, not a settled point. His Bryant dissent charged that treating the emergency inquiry as a search for reliability imports the excited-utterance exception into the Constitution, and that reliability tells us nothing about whether a statement is testimonial.99 He added that the majority’s list of considerations, including the weapon, the crime, the declarant’s medical condition, whether the scene was secured, the formality of the exchange, and whether the statement seems reliable, is no better than the nine-factor balancing test that Crawford rejected.100 The majority’s answer, given in a Bullcoming footnote, is that Bryant called reliability relevant and not essential, and that the hearsay rules are the tool for policing reliability while the Clause asks which statements are testimonial.101 Whether the reference to hearsay rules signals a drift back toward reliability remains an open question.102 The safe exam position uses fit with a hearsay category as one clue about purpose and says that purpose, not trustworthiness, is what the Clause asks about.
Statements Beyond the Police
Every statement classified so far was made to a police officer or a 911 operator, so the primary purpose test grew up around questioning by government agents. Ohio v. Clark applied it to a different questioner. Darius Clark had been caring for his girlfriend’s three-year-old son, L.P., when a preschool teacher noticed a bloodshot eye and, in the brighter light of a classroom, red marks on the boy’s face. A lead teacher asked who had done this and what had happened, and L.P. answered with the name “Dee,” which was Clark’s nickname.104 L.P. did not testify, because the trial court found him incompetent under an Ohio rule that disqualifies young children who cannot relate facts truly, and the court admitted his statements to the teachers under Ohio’s hearsay exception for reliable statements by child abuse victims.105 The Supreme Court held that the statements did not implicate the Confrontation Clause, because neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in Clark’s prosecution.106
The decision answered a question the Court had repeatedly reserved: whether statements to persons other than law enforcement officers are subject to the Clause at all.107 The opinion makes three separable moves, each answering a different question. Do non-police questioners fall outside the Clause? How much does the questioner’s identity count when they do not? What does the declarant’s age add? The judgment was unanimous, but Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote separately and concurred only in the judgment.108
The first move refuses to draw a categorical line around police. The Court declined to adopt a rule excluding statements to non-law-enforcement questioners from the Sixth Amendment, because at least some of those statements could conceivably raise confrontation concerns.109 The reason follows from what the primary purpose test measures. The test asks whether an exchange was meant to create a substitute for trial testimony, and a person who is not an officer could in some circumstances be gathering exactly that, as when a private questioner is doing an investigator’s work. Declining to exclude these statements categorically does not put them on the footing of police interrogation, though. The Court added that such statements are “much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers.”110 Justice Scalia’s concurrence likewise left open whether a mandatory-reporting law could make a private party a state actor and whether a more permissive test should govern interrogations by private actors.111
The second move makes the questioner’s identity a strong factor within the whole-context inquiry. Courts evaluate challenged statements in context, and part of that context is who asked. A statement made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior is significantly less likely to be testimonial than one made to an officer.112 The Court also observed that the relationship between a student and a teacher is very different from the one between a citizen and the police.113 Identity matters because the listener is evidence of what the speaker meant the words to accomplish. A person who wants a statement used in a prosecution will ordinarily say it to someone able to start one, so an accusation made to a teacher, relative, or caregiver usually looks like a request for help or ordinary conversation and not like the ex parte examination the Clause was written to stop.114
The teachers’ own questions show how identity combines with the other circumstances. They needed to know whether it was safe to send L.P. home to his guardian at the end of the day, which meant finding out who might be abusing him. They did not know who the abuser was, how best to secure the boy’s safety, or whether other children were at risk.115 That put the exchange close to the emergency in Davis and far from Hammon, where the police already knew the assailant and questioned the victim after shielding her from harm.116 The setting was informal. The teachers asked immediately, in a lunchroom and a classroom, as any concerned citizen would speak to a child who might have been abused. They never told L.P. that his answers would be used to arrest or punish anyone, and he never hinted that he meant them for police or prosecutors.117
Clark tried to erase the questioner’s identity by pointing to Ohio’s mandatory reporting law, which required the teachers to report suspected abuse to the authorities. The Court answered that the teachers’ pressing concern was to protect L.P. and that they would have acted with the same purpose whether or not a statute required a report. A reporting statute alone therefore cannot turn a conversation between a concerned teacher and a student into a law enforcement mission aimed at gathering evidence.118 Purpose is read from what the participants were doing, and a duty to pass on a worrying fact is different from a mission to build a case. It was also irrelevant that the questions and the duty to report naturally tended to lead to a prosecution, because the statements in Davis and Bryant supported convictions too, and police must always ask questions to resolve emergencies.119 The safe reading is that a reporting duty alone does not suffice. Justice Scalia would have left open what effect such a law could have when combined with other facts.120
The pair shows that the identity of the listener works together with purpose and does not replace it. Because there is no categorical exclusion, a nurse or social worker who is in fact collecting an account for prosecutors stays subject to the same inquiry, and one court dealing with an interview that served both medical and forensic goals treated the medical content as nontestimonial and the forensic content as testimonial.121
Clark also argued that fairness forbids using the statements of a child whom Ohio law deems too young to testify. The Court observed that in every Confrontation Clause case the declarant is unavailable as a witness, so the fact that a different rule of evidence produced the unavailability changes nothing.122
The third move rests on L.P.’s age and operates independently of who asked the questions. The Court said that statements by very young children will “rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”123 The reasoning runs through the objective test. A statement is testimonial only when the circumstances show a purpose to create a substitute for trial testimony, and forming that purpose requires some grasp that words can be used to prosecute someone. Few preschoolers understand the criminal justice system, and research cited by the Court finds that young children have little understanding of prosecution. A three-year-old in L.P.’s position would therefore be extremely unlikely to intend a statement as a substitute for testimony and would more likely want the abuse to end, want to protect other victims, or have no discernible purpose.124 Justice Scalia agreed that L.P.’s age refutes the notion that he could form such a purpose.125 The factor draws its force from the declarant’s limited understanding, so it supplies less help as declarants grow older and understand more. The phrase “rarely, if ever” also leaves formally open whether any statement by a three-year-old could be testimonial, although the Court’s language points toward no.126
The Court added a historical observation that produced the most contested sentence in the opinion. Statements made in circumstances like L.P.’s were admissible at common law. An eighteenth-century London court tolerated hearsay in prosecutions involving a child too young to be sworn, and when courts excluded such statements, they appeared to do so because the child should have been ruled competent to testify and not because the statements were otherwise inadmissible.127 From that history the Court concluded that the primary-purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for excluding out-of-court statements, because the Clause does not bar statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding.128 Justice Scalia, who wrote Crawford, objected to that statement. He argued that the prosecutor, not the defendant, must bear the burden of proving a long-established practice such as dying declarations, and he suspected the dictum was a first step toward smuggling the old reliability approach back into the Clause.129 The case itself did not depend on the dictum, since L.P.’s statements were found nontestimonial, and the later section on dying declarations takes up the dispute.
Justice Thomas also concurred only in the judgment, and he did not adopt the majority’s test. He agreed that Ohio’s mandatory reporters are not agents of law enforcement, that statements made to private persons or by very young children will rarely implicate the Clause, and that admitting L.P.’s statements did not implicate it, but he could not join the majority’s analysis.130 He would ask instead whether the statements bear sufficient indicia of solemnity. L.P.’s answers were neither contained in formalized testimonial materials nor obtained through a formalized dialogue initiated by police.131 An exam answer should attribute the primary-purpose analysis to the Court and the solemnity approach to Justice Thomas as a separate view that reaches the same result here.