400 U.S. 74 (1970)
In April 1964, three police officers were brutally murdered in Gwinnett County, Georgia.1 Their bodies were found a few hours later, handcuffed together in a pine thicket, each with multiple gunshot wounds in the back of the head.2 Georgia authorities charged Alex Evans, Venson Williams, and Wade Truett with the murders.3 Truett was granted immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony, while Evans and Williams were indicted by a grand jury.4
Evans pleaded not guilty and exercised his right under Georgia law to be tried separately.5 At his jury trial the principal prosecution witness was Truett, who described in detail how he, Evans, and Williams had been switching license plates on a stolen car when the three officers approached, leading to the officers being disarmed, handcuffed together, taken into the woods, and killed by multiple close-range gunshots.6 Nineteen other witnesses testified for the prosecution, and defense counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine each of them.7
One prosecution witness named Shaw testified that while he and Williams were fellow prisoners at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Williams returned from arraignment and, in response to Shaw's question about court, stated that if it had not been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans they would not be in this now.8 The testimony was admitted over defense objection under a Georgia statute providing that after the fact of conspiracy is proved, declarations by any conspirator during the pendency of the criminal project are admissible against all.9 Shaw was cross-examined at length by defense counsel.10
Evans was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.11 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.12 Evans then brought a habeas corpus proceeding in federal district court alleging denial of the constitutional right of confrontation.13 The district court denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that Georgia had denied Evans the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.14
Whether the admission of Shaw's testimony regarding Williams' out-of-court statement violated Evans' right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?15
The Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.17 This Court has never equated the two.18 The mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.19 It does so by assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. It is not argued that the constitutional right to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.20 The limited contours of the hearsay exception in federal conspiracy trials are not required by the Sixth Amendment.21
No. The statement by Williams was admitted under Georgia's long-established statute allowing declarations by conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project.22 Evans was prosecuted for the substantive offense of murder rather than conspiracy.23 The principal prosecution witness Truett described all the details of the triple murder and was cross-examined at great length.24 Nineteen other witnesses testified for the prosecution with full opportunity for cross-examination.25
Shaw's testimony concerned a brief conversation and was of peripheral significance at most.26 Defense counsel cross-examined Shaw vigorously and effectively.27 The statement carried on its face a warning against undue weight because it contained no express assertion about past fact.28 Williams' personal knowledge was established by other evidence.29
The possibility of faulty recollection was remote.30 The circumstances indicated reliability because the statement was spontaneous and against Williams' penal interest.31 The possibility that cross-examination of Williams could have shown the statement unreliable was wholly unreal.32 Evans exercised his right to confrontation effectively on the factual question whether Shaw had actually heard the statement.33
The admission of Shaw's testimony did not violate Evans' right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion but added that the single sentence attributed to Williams was harmless error if error at all.35 Shaw's account of speaking in a normal voice through a closed hospital room door containing glass and heavy steel mesh was so incredible that no normal jury could have been influenced by it.36 Trial judges and the district court did not find prejudice.37
Other witnesses provided indisputable confirmation of Evans' role in the car-stealing conspiracy.38 This satisfied Georgia's corroboration rule and rendered Shaw's remark of practical and legal insignificance.39 The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.40
Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the view that the Confrontation Clause regulates the mode of procedure by requiring a cross-examining procedure for testimony given at trial.41 It does not control the scope of the rules of evidence or prohibit broad hearsay exceptions.42 He would test the Georgia statute under the Due Process Clause and sustain it.43
Declarations against penal interest have some likelihood of trustworthiness.44 The jury with defense counsel guidance can assess the dangers.45 Unless hearsay is allowed the facts may remain hidden by the declarant's privilege claim.46
He rejected the assumption that the Clause prevents overly broad exceptions to the hearsay rule.47
Joined by Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, And Mr. Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that admission of the extrajudicial statement attributed to Williams without opportunity for cross-examination violated Evans' confrontation rights under Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton.48 The State did not call Williams though he was available.49 Cross-examination was essential to test what Williams said, what he meant, and whether it was true.50
The statement was crucial because it provided necessary corroboration of accomplice Truett's testimony under Georgia law.51 He rejected the majority's indicia-of-reliability approach as insufficient to satisfy the Clause.52 He would affirm the Court of Appeals.53