567 U.S. 50 (2012)
On February 10, 2000, in Chicago, Illinois, a young woman named L. J. was abducted while walking home from work.1 The perpetrator forced her into his car, raped her, robbed her of money and other personal items, and pushed her out into the street.2
L. J. ran home and reported the attack to her mother, who called the police.3 An ambulance took L. J. to the hospital, where doctors treated her wounds and took a blood sample and vaginal swabs for a sexual-assault kit.4 A Chicago Police detective collected the kit, labeled it with an inventory number, and sent it under seal to the Illinois State Police (ISP) lab.5
At the ISP lab, a forensic scientist received the sealed kit.6 He conducted a chemical test that confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs, and he then resealed the kit and placed it in a secure evidence freezer.7 During the period in question, the ISP lab often sent biological samples to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory in Germantown, Maryland, for DNA testing.8 There was evidence that the ISP lab sent L. J.’s vaginal swabs to Cellmark for testing and that Cellmark sent back a report containing a male DNA profile produced from semen taken from those swabs.9 At this time, petitioner was not under suspicion for L. J.’s rape.10
Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the ISP lab, conducted a computer search to see if the Cellmark profile matched any of the entries in the state DNA database.11 The computer showed a match to a profile produced by the lab from a sample of petitioner’s blood that had been taken after he was arrested on unrelated charges on August 3, 2000.12 On April 17, 2001, the police conducted a lineup at which L. J. identified petitioner as her assailant.13 Petitioner was then indicted for aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated robbery.14
Petitioner’s bench trial began in April 2006.15 In open court, L. J. again identified petitioner as her attacker.16 The State also offered three expert forensic witnesses to link petitioner to the crime through his DNA.17 First, Brian Hapack, an ISP forensic scientist, testified that he had confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs taken from L. J. by performing an acid phosphatase test.18 Second, Karen Abbinanti, a state forensic analyst, testified that she had used Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Short Tandem Repeat (STR) techniques to develop a DNA profile from a blood sample that had been drawn from petitioner after he was arrested in August 2000.19 Third, the State offered Sandra Lambatos as an expert witness in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis.20
Lambatos testified that, based on her own comparison of the two DNA profiles, she concluded that petitioner cannot be excluded as a possible source of the semen identified in the vaginal swabs, and that the probability of the profile’s appearing in the general population was 1 in 8.7 quadrillion black, 1 in 390 quadrillion white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals.21 The Cellmark report itself was neither admitted into evidence nor shown to the factfinder.22 Lambatos did not quote or read from the report; nor did she identify it as the source of any of the opinions she expressed.23 The trial court found petitioner guilty of the charges against him.24 The state court of appeals affirmed in relevant part, concluding that Lambatos’ testimony did not violate petitioner’s confrontation rights because the Cellmark report was not offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter it asserted.25 The Supreme Court of Illinois also affirmed.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.27
Whether the Confrontation Clause permits an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by a non-testifying analyst at an outside laboratory?28
Before Crawford, this Court took the view that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of an out-of-court statement that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.29 In Crawford, the Court adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right, holding that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial can be admitted only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.30
No. Sandra Lambatos testified that she compared the DNA profile produced by Cellmark to the profile produced by the state laboratory from a sample of Williams's blood.31 Lambatos performed her own independent analysis by comparing the Cellmark profile to the profile generated from the petitioner’s blood sample in the state laboratory.32 She testified based on her own expertise and conclusions.33 The Cellmark report itself was neither admitted into evidence nor shown to the factfinder, and Lambatos performed none of the Cellmark testing.34
The admission of her testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the expert was not a mere conduit for the out-of-court statements contained in the Cellmark report.35
The admission of Lambatos's testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause.36
Related opinions on this issue
I agree with the judgment of the Court that the petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated, but I reach that conclusion for different reasons.37 In my view, the Cellmark report was not testimonial because it lacked the requisite formality.38 The report was not sworn or certified, and it was not the kind of formalized statement that the Confrontation Clause was designed to address.39
The Confrontation Clause is limited to witnesses who bear testimony, and testimony is a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.40
I join the plurality's opinion in substantial part.41 The use of DNA evidence in modern criminal trials presents unique issues under the Confrontation Clause.42 The plurality correctly concludes that the expert testimony in this case did not run afoul of the Clause.43
The reality of modern forensic science is that DNA testing often involves multiple analysts performing discrete tasks.44 Requiring every analyst involved in the chain of custody or testing process to testify would impose enormous burdens on the justice system without providing significant additional protection to defendants.45
Joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, And Justice Sotomayor
The Court today allows the State to introduce the substance of a forensic laboratory report through the testimony of an expert who had no involvement in the actual testing.46 This decision represents a serious departure from the principles established in Crawford v. Washington and subsequent cases.47 The Cellmark report was clearly testimonial.48
It was prepared at the request of the police in connection with the investigation of a specific crime.49 The analysts at Cellmark knew that the results would be used to help identify and prosecute a suspect.50 The primary purpose of the report was to establish a fact—the identity of the DNA donor—for use in a criminal prosecution.51
Whether out-of-court statements in a forensic laboratory report are offered for their truth when an expert relies on them to form an opinion about a DNA match?52
The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted, as reaffirmed in Crawford v. Washington.53
No. The references to Cellmark in the trial record either were not hearsay or were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.54 Under Illinois law, such facts are not admitted for their truth but only to explain the basis of the expert's opinion.55 The trial judge understood that the testimony was not admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is unlikely that the judge took the testimony as providing chain-of-custody evidence.56 The out-of-court statements in the forensic laboratory report were not offered for their truth.57
The out-of-court statements in the forensic laboratory report were not offered for their truth.
Whether a DNA report prepared by an outside laboratory before any suspect was identified is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes?58
A statement is testimonial if it has the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct or if it is a formalized statement such as an affidavit, deposition, prior testimony, or confession.59
No. In this case, the Cellmark report was not testimonial.60 When the report was created, the analysts who performed the DNA testing did not have the petitioner in mind as a particular suspect.61 The testing was performed as part of a routine process to generate a DNA profile from the evidence sample.62 The report was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.63
Instead, it was produced before any suspect had been identified.64 The DNA report is not testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.65
The DNA report is not testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.