Concept
Confrontation and Bias
Bias and interest
Confrontation and Bias
The rules of evidence covered so far in this chapter, from the relevance default through Rule 403 and the judge's control of cross-examination, govern impeachment for bias in every kind of case. In a criminal prosecution the Constitution adds a layer above them. The Confrontation Clause guarantees the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and common law judges and lawyers have long treated the opportunity to cross-examine as an essential safeguard of accurate and complete testimony, a right and not a mere privilege.1 When an evidence rule or a state policy would keep the defense from showing that a prosecution witness has a reason to shade his account, that right can require the rule or policy to yield.
Davis v. Alaska is the leading case. The Court there asked whether a defendant must be allowed to impeach a prosecution witness by cross-examination about bias arising from the witness's probationary status as a juvenile delinquent, even though the State had an interest in keeping juvenile adjudications confidential.2 The Court held that he must, because the right of confrontation was paramount to the State's policy.3
The right has a defined shape. It belongs to the accused in a criminal case, it concerns the witnesses who testify against him, and it operates only when the limit would block cross-examination necessary to show possible bias.4 The judge's ordinary power to curb repetitive or marginal questioning survives, so the practical question is where limiting stops being trial management and becomes a denial of a fair chance to expose a motive. Davis states the principle in the setting where the Court announced it. The cases after Davis show how far the principle reaches and where it stops.
Davis v. Alaska
Cross-examination can attack credibility in two ways. A prior conviction is a general attack, because it invites the jury to infer that the witness's character makes him less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to tell the truth. Questions aimed at bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive are a more particular attack, because they connect the witness to the issues and personalities of the case at hand, and a witness's partiality is always relevant to discredit him and to affect the weight of his testimony.5 Davis turned on that difference, and the difference also limits the decision, as the end of this section explains.
The case began with the burglary of the Polar Bar in Anchorage in February 1970, when the bar's safe was carried away.6 Troopers found the safe, pried open and emptied, about 26 miles outside Anchorage, near the home of Jess Straight and his family. Richard Green, Straight's stepson, told them he had seen two men beside a metallic blue Chevrolet near that spot. He later picked Davis out of six photographs and then out of a lineup, and at trial he testified that Davis was the man he had seen holding something like a crowbar.7 Green's testimony was the crucial link in the State's proof.8
What the jury never learned was that Green was on probation. A juvenile court had adjudicated him delinquent for burglarizing two cabins, and he was on probation both when the Polar Bar was burglarized, when he was sixteen, and when he testified, at seventeen.9 Before any testimony, the prosecutor moved for a protective order forbidding any reference to the juvenile record, and the trial court granted it under Alaska's juvenile confidentiality provisions.10 Defense counsel opposed the motion and defined his purpose narrowly. He would not offer the adjudication as a general attack on Green's truthfulness. He would use it to show that while Green was helping police identify Davis, Green was on probation for burglary, and from that fact he would argue that Green acted out of fear for his probation. Green might have made a hasty and faulty identification to shift suspicion away from himself, or he might have yielded to police pressure under the threat of revocation.11
The order left counsel with bare questions. He asked whether Green was upset that the safe had been found on his family's land, whether he felt the police might suspect him, and whether he felt uncomfortable about it. Green said no, or not really, and conceded only that the thought had crossed his mind. Counsel then asked whether Green had ever been questioned like that by law enforcement officers, and Green answered, “No.” The prosecutor objected that the examination was a rehash, and the court sustained the objection.12 The Supreme Court singled out that last answer. Green had probably been questioned by police when he was arrested for the burglaries behind his adjudication, so the answer was highly suspect, and the Court doubted that Green would have answered so boldly unless he believed the trial court's ruling shielded him from traditional cross-examination.13
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. It reasoned that counsel had been able to question Green in considerable detail about possible bias or motive, that the suggestion of bias had reached the jury even though Green denied it, and that jurors could watch his demeanor and judge his credibility.14 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The essential question was whether the Alaska court had correctly evaluated the adequacy of the cross-examination permitted, and the Court disagreed with that court's reading of the Confrontation Clause.15
The center of the Court's analysis is the difference between asking whether a witness is biased and showing why. Counsel could ask Green whether he was biased, but he could not make a record from which to argue why Green might have been.16 A question answerable by yes or no leaves the answer with the witness. Green could disclaim any worry, and without the probation the jury had no fact against which to test the disclaimer. Jurors who heard only the bare questions might have concluded that the defense was pursuing a speculative and baseless attack on an apparently blameless witness.17 The fact of probation turns the insinuation into an argument, because it supplies a concrete vulnerability: a probationer, and a possible suspect, whom the police could pressure. The Court would not speculate whether the jury would have accepted that reasoning. It held that the jurors were entitled to hear the defense theory so they could judge the weight of testimony that was a crucial link in the State's proof.18
The State defended the order with its policy of protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record. The Court held that this policy could not require yielding so vital a constitutional right as effective cross-examination of an adverse witness for bias.19 Alford v. United States supported that result, because it had upheld the defense's right to show that a witness held in federal prison at the time of trial testified under a promise or expectation of immunity or under the coercive effect of his detention.20 The Court then allocated the cost. The State chose to rely on Green, so it could have kept his adjudication private by not using him. It could not, consistent with confrontation, make the defendant bear the full burden of vindicating its interest in secrecy.21
The Court called the denial of effective cross-examination “constitutional error of the first magnitude” that no showing of want of prejudice would cure, and it reversed the convictions and remanded.22 The trial judge keeps broad discretion to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing questioning, but that discretion does not reach a ruling that leaves the defense no way to show why the witness might be biased.23
Justice Stewart's concurrence marks the boundary of the decision. He joined the Court's opinion and emphasized that the Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution gives a right in every case to impeach a witness's general credibility through cross-examination about past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions.24 The cross-examination in Davis was necessary to show possible bias. A defendant who offers a juvenile record for any other purpose gets no help from Davis, and the analysis turns on one question: what does the defense offer the record to prove?
The two scenes use the same kind of record for different purposes. Offered to show a dishonest character, a juvenile record is a general attack that the ordinary rules govern. Offered to show a present vulnerability to the State, it is a bias attack that the Confrontation Clause protects. A juvenile record in a fact pattern does not by itself signal Davis. Ask first whether the defense needs the record to show why the witness might slant testimony in this case, and then whether the limit left the jury with only the bare question and the witness's denial.
Beyond Davis
Davis does not stop at juvenile records. Its reasoning applies wherever a competing interest would shut off cross-examination about motive. In Davis the competing interest was a State's confidentiality policy, and it yielded, because the State could have protected its interest by declining to use the witness.26 Later decisions carry the idea to new kinds of bias and new competing interests, and they also mark where it stops.
In Olden v. Kentucky, a rape defendant argued that the complainant, Matthews, had accused him falsely to protect her relationship with Russell, the man she lived with.27 The theory also explained why she had been driving with the defendant and others after meeting them at a bar, since a rape report would account for that encounter to her boyfriend.28 The trial court refused to let the defense show that Matthews and Russell were living together at the time of trial. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the evidence was relevant and that the state rape shield law did not bar it, yet it upheld the exclusion. Its reasoning was that the probative value was outweighed by the possibility of prejudice, since Matthews was white and Russell was black and disclosure might create extreme prejudice against her.29 The Supreme Court held that blocking the effort to show the cohabitation violated the defendant's confrontation rights.30
The state court's explanation was an evidentiary balancing of probative value against the risk of prejudice. The Supreme Court accepted that a trial court may impose reasonable limits on inquiry into a prosecution witness's bias, but it found this limit beyond reason, because speculation about jurors' racial biases cannot justify excluding cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of the witness's testimony.31 Olden thus supplies a second competing interest that loses. In Davis the interest was a State's confidentiality policy, and in Olden it was a judge's forecast of how jurors would react to the witness. In each case the defense theory tied the witness's account to a concrete reason to slant it, and the competing interest asked the defendant to forgo that proof.
The right begins earlier than motive-laden facts such as probation or cohabitation. It begins with the facts that identify the witness. In Smith v. Illinois, a government witness testified under the pseudonym “James Jordan,” and sustaining an objection to the defense's question about his true identity violated confrontation rights. In Alford v. United States, it was error to disallow a defense question about a government witness's place of residence.32 Davis later described Alford as approving the defense effort to show that a witness held in federal prison testified under a promise or expectation of immunity or under the coercive effect of his detention.33 A cross-examiner who does not know who the witness is, or where he lives or is held, cannot find the ties to police, prosecutors, or parties that make up bias, and a jury given only a name and a denial has nothing to weigh.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall reaffirmed Davis and supplied the working test. A criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a “prototypical form of bias” on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences about the witness's reliability.34 Each half of that phrase has a job. “Otherwise appropriate” leaves the ordinary rules of evidence and trial management in place, so the defense must still ask a proper question in a proper way. “Prototypical form of bias” reserves the constitutional protection for recognized kinds of motive, such as probationary status, a pending charge, or a relationship that supplies a reason to fabricate. A defendant who makes both showings need not prove that the jury would have accepted his theory. Davis refused to speculate about that, and Olden asked only whether a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility had the cross-examination gone forward.35
Every statement of the right carries a ceiling, because the Clause secures reasonable cross-examination and not unlimited cross-examination. Davis acknowledged the trial judge's broad discretion to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, and Van Arsdall lists the grounds on which a court may limit inquiry into a prosecution witness's bias: harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, and questioning that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.36 A judge may also cut off questioning once the point has been made.37 Alford drew the same line from the witness's side. It imposed a duty to protect a witness from questions that go beyond proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate him, and it imposed no obligation to protect a witness from being discredited, apart from the privilege against self-incrimination when properly invoked.38
The floor and the ceiling answer to different concerns. The floor protects the jury's access to the facts that explain a witness's motive. The ceiling protects the trial from harassment, confusion, danger to the witness, and repetition, and it does not shield a witness from the discrediting effect of the truth. Olden shows the two at work. The Kentucky court invoked prejudice, one of the recognized grounds, but the Supreme Court held that speculation about jurors' racial biases could not justify excluding such cross-examination.39 Two rulings make the contrast concrete. A judge who bars the first question about a prosecution witness's pending charge creates a Davis problem. A judge who ends the ninth rewording of that question after the witness has admitted the charge does not, because the jury already has the fact and further questions add delay without adding weight.
The label of bias does not carry evidence through by itself. The defense must identify a fact that links the witness to the case, and a judge who finds no link is trimming marginal inquiry. A judge who finds the link and still bars the question is closing off the proof that Davis protects.
The same fact can be properly excluded for one purpose and constitutionally required for another, as State v. DeLawder shows. DeLawder was convicted of carnal knowledge of a girl under fourteen, and on direct appeal the Maryland court upheld the exclusion of questions about her intercourse with other men, because consent is not an issue in such a prosecution and her sexual history is therefore immaterial as an excuse or justification.40 Davis was decided afterward, and on postconviction review the defense theory was that the girl believed she was pregnant by someone else and accused DeLawder because she was afraid to tell her mother that she had voluntarily had intercourse with others.41 Showing that she believed she was pregnant required establishing the earlier intercourse, so the bias theory could not be presented without the very evidence the general rule excluded. The court held that the bar denied the defendant effective cross-examination, because counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could draw inferences about the witness's reliability.42 Offered to show consent, the prior intercourse was immaterial. Offered to show a motive to accuse falsely, it was evidence the defendant had a constitutional right to present.