415 U.S. 308 (1974)
On February 16, 1970, the Polar Bar in Anchorage was burglarized and its safe containing well over a thousand dollars in cash and checks was removed from the premises.1 Later that afternoon the safe was discovered pried open near the home of Jess Straight and his family.2 Richard Green, Straight’s stepson, told investigating troopers that at about noon he had seen and spoken with two Negro men standing beside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet sedan near where the safe was later found.3
The next day Green was brought to the police station and identified petitioner’s photograph from six photographs of adult Negro males after examining them for thirty seconds to a minute.4 Petitioner was arrested on February 18.5 On February 19 Green picked petitioner out of a lineup of seven Negro males.6 At trial, paint chips found in the trunk of petitioner’s rented blue Chevrolet could have originated from the surface of the stolen safe.7 The trunk contained particles identified as safe insulation characteristic of that found in Mosler safes.8
Richard Green was a crucial prosecution witness who testified that while on an errand he confronted two men standing beside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet parked near his family’s house, spoke with the man at the rear who asked if Green lived nearby, and later saw that man holding something like a crowbar. Green identified petitioner at trial as the man with the crowbar.9 At the time of the events and of trial Green was sixteen years old and on probation by order of a juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins.10
Before testimony the prosecutor moved for and obtained a protective order preventing any reference to Green’s juvenile record during cross-examination.11 Defense counsel stated he would use the record only to show that Green was on probation when he identified petitioner and might have acted out of fear of probation revocation or undue police pressure.12 On cross-examination Green denied being upset or concerned that police might suspect him and denied ever having been questioned like that before by law enforcement officers.13
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction concluding counsel had been able adequately to question Green concerning possible bias.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether petitioner was denied his right under the Confrontation Clause to adequately cross-examine Green.15
Whether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness’ probationary status as a juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment would conflict with a State’s asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency?16
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses against him through cross-examination that exposes possible bias, prejudice, or ulterior motive; this right prevails over a state policy protecting the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications when the witness is crucial to the prosecution and the excluded inquiry directly bears on the witness's motive to testify falsely.17
Yes. Richard Green was a crucial prosecution witness who identified petitioner from photographs and in a lineup.18 He testified at trial that he saw petitioner near the stolen safe holding something like a crowbar.19 At the time of the identification and trial Green was on probation following a juvenile delinquency adjudication for burglarizing two cabins.20 The trial court granted the prosecutor's motion for a protective order that barred all reference to Green's juvenile record.21 This prevented defense counsel from cross-examining Green about his probationary status even though counsel sought to use the information solely to demonstrate possible bias arising from fear of probation revocation or undue police pressure.22
On cross-examination Green denied any concern that police might suspect him.23 He denied ever having been questioned by law enforcement before.24 Without disclosure of his probation the defense could not make a record from which the jury could infer why Green might have been motivated to make a hasty identification or yield to police suggestion.25 The state's interest in shielding juvenile records therefore yields to the defendant's right to effective cross-examination for bias on these facts.26
Petitioner was denied the right of effective cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause, and the judgment affirming his convictions must be reversed.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart joined the Court's opinion.28 He emphasized that the decision is narrowly confined to the facts of this case.29 The Court does not hold or suggest that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions.30
Instead, the ruling applies only where such cross-examination is necessary to show the existence of possible bias and prejudice on the part of the witness.31