488 U.S. 227 (1988)
James Olden and his friend Charlie Ray Harris, both of whom are black, were indicted for kidnaping, rape, and forcible sodomy of Starla Matthews, a young white woman.1
Matthews testified at trial that she and Regina Patton had driven to Princeton, Kentucky, to exchange Christmas gifts with Bill Russell, Olden’s half brother.2 After meeting Russell at a local car wash, Matthews and Patton stopped at J.R.’s bar, where Matthews consumed several glasses of beer, became increasingly nervous as the bar grew crowded with a predominantly black clientele, lost track of Patton, and became somewhat intoxicated.3 She left the bar with Olden and Harris after being told that Patton had been in a car accident.4 She was driven to another location where Olden raped and sodomized her while threatening her with a knife and Harris held her arms.5 Later she was driven to a dump where two other men joined the group before the men dropped her off near Russell’s house.6
On cross-examination Matthews’ various accounts revealed inconsistencies, including her original statement to police that she had been raped by four men, her later claim that she had been raped by only Olden and Harris, and her trial testimony that Olden alone was the rapist; she had also not previously alleged that Olden had been armed with a knife.7 Russell, appearing as a State’s witness, testified that he heard a noise outside his home, went out to investigate, saw Matthews get out of Harris’ car, and heard her immediately state that she had just been raped by Olden and Harris.8
Olden and Harris asserted a defense of consent, testifying that Matthews propositioned Olden at the bar, that the two engaged in sexual acts behind the tavern, and that Matthews later suggested they drive in search of cocaine and then to a local dump so she and Olden could have sex again.9 Defense witnesses Taylor and Hickey corroborated the defendants’ account that Matthews did not appear upset, and Hickey further testified that Matthews had approached him earlier at J.R.’s and told him she was looking for a black man with whom to have sex; an independent witness also testified that he had seen Matthews, Harris, and Olden at a store called Big O’s where a policeman was present and that Matthews, who appeared alert, made no attempt to signal for assistance.10
Although Matthews and Russell were both married to and living with other people at the time of the incident, they were apparently involved in an extramarital relationship.11 By the time of trial the two were living together, having separated from their respective spouses.12 The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion in limine to keep all evidence of Matthews’ and Russell’s living arrangement from the jury.13 When the defense attempted to cross-examine Matthews about her living arrangements after she claimed on direct examination that she was living with her mother, the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection.14
Based on the evidence admitted at trial the jury acquitted Harris of all charges, acquitted Olden of kidnaping and rape, and convicted Olden alone of forcible sodomy, resulting in a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.15 Olden appealed, the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that the complaining witness was living with a key prosecution witness at the time of trial violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him?17
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to conduct reasonable cross-examination to expose a witness's motivation in testifying and to impeach for bias.18
Yes. The evidence that Matthews and Russell were living together at the time of trial directly supported Olden's consent defense.19 This evidence also backed his theory that Matthews fabricated the rape claim to protect her relationship with Russell after he saw her exit Harris's car.20 Matthews testified on direct examination that she lived with her mother.21 Defense counsel sought to cross-examine her on this point after the trial court had granted the prosecutor's motion in limine excluding all evidence of the cohabitation.22 The Kentucky Court of Appeals acknowledged the relevance of the evidence to show motive to lie but excluded it on the ground that its probative value was outweighed by possible racial prejudice to Matthews.23
This limitation prevented the jury from receiving a significantly different impression of Matthews's credibility and went beyond the trial court's discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination.24
The trial court's exclusion of the evidence violated Olden's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall filed a dissent in which he objected to the Court's use of a summary disposition to reverse the decision below.26 He continues to believe that summary dispositions deprive litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits of their cases.27 In addition, such dispositions create a significant risk that the Court is rendering an erroneous or ill-advised decision that may confuse the lower courts.28
Marshall referenced several of his previous dissenting opinions to illustrate his consistent position on this procedural issue.29 Accordingly, he dissented from the Court's decision to reverse summarily the Kentucky Court of Appeals' judgment in this case.30