Concept
Time, Place, and Manner Rules
Content-neutral regulation of protected expression
Time, Place, and Manner Rules
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC supplies the standard for every content-neutral law: the government must show that the regulation advances important interests unrelated to the suppression of speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary. The preceding section took that standard apart element by element. This section follows it into streets, sidewalks, and parks, where most content-neutral disputes arise and where the same inquiry goes by an older name. A time, place, or manner restriction limits when, where, or how a speech or assembly may occur without limiting what the speaker says, and if it is narrowly tailored to a legitimate governmental interest, it does not violate the First Amendment.1 The First Amendment names Congress, but since 1925 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has protected expression against the states as well, so the same test reaches city ordinances and state statutes.2
Neutrality decides which track a law travels. A content-based law meets strict scrutiny and a presumption of invalidity; a content-neutral law meets a form of balancing.3 The line falls at the message because courts do not claim authority to rank protected speech by its worth. As one concurring Justice put it, the Justices are not free to decide, on the basis of content, which protected speech is most valuable and deserves the most protection.4
A regulation of expression in a public forum must meet three requirements: it must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and open to ample alternative channels of communication.5 Each requirement answers a different danger. Neutrality guards against a law that uses the vocabulary of noise or traffic to suppress an idea. Tailoring keeps the government from burdening more speech than its interest requires. The alternative-channels requirement keeps the speaker’s route to an audience from being closed. A list of other ways to speak satisfies that last requirement only if those ways work. Ladue defended its ban on residential signs as a mere time, place, or manner rule because residents could still use handbills, letters, and bumper stickers, and the Court was not persuaded that adequate substitutes existed for the medium the city had closed off.6
The test reads like ordinary intermediate scrutiny, but it bites harder in a traditional public forum. There the Court often gives speech enhanced protection, in effect placing a thumb on the First Amendment side of the scale, so content-neutral restrictions are more likely to be invalidated. It takes a similar approach to door-to-door canvassing, which it also regards as a time-honored and valuable method of communication.7 Sidewalks and parks are the paradigm public forums, and the government may regulate speech there only if the regulation is content-neutral, reasonable in time, place, and manner, and leaves open adequate alternative places for speech.8 Much of this extra protection has since been absorbed into the general First Amendment test, and the test for time, place, and manner regulations is now nearly the same as the general test for content-neutral laws.9
Whether the test has real force or merely recites a standard the government nearly always meets is the practical question. The closely related O’Brien test looks highly protective of speech on its face, yet at the Supreme Court level it has seldom protected expressive conduct, because the Court reads its elements deferentially; O’Brien’s own conviction for burning a draft card was upheld.10 The time, place, and manner cases run from easy upholdings to clear invalidations. A ban on amplifiers on residential streets at 2:00 a.m. serves the interest in letting people sleep, an interest that exists whatever the speaker says, and the speaker can deliver the message at 2:00 p.m.11 A rule that closes a traditional public forum to expression altogether is also content-neutral, yet it is hard to call narrowly tailored or to say that it leaves ample alternative channels.12 The rules that survive come first below, then those that fail, and then the abortion-clinic buffer zones, where neutrality and tailoring both came under pressure in the same dispute.
Regulations That Survive
A content-neutral rule survives when it targets a harm that comes from how, where, or when speech occurs, reaches little beyond the activity that causes the harm, and leaves speakers another route to their audience.13 Four questions make the upheld rules comparable: Is the rule neutral as to message? What interest does it serve? How closely does it fit that interest? What does the speaker keep? Every regulation below answered all four.
Noise rules show the pattern most simply, because excessive volume harms listeners whatever the music says. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, New York City required performers at the Central Park bandshell to use the city’s sound equipment and a city technician. The Court treated noise control as a content-neutral justification and found alternative channels intact, because the guidelines did not restrict access to the bandshell but merely reduced volume.14 The city’s technician controlled volume directly while performers kept control of the sound mix. The performers argued that the city could have monitored concerts and fined violators instead. That argument fails under intermediate scrutiny, because a regulation need not be the least restrictive means; it is enough that the government’s interest would be achieved less effectively without it.15 Kovacs v. Cooper reached the same result for a ban on amplification devices that emit loud and raucous noises, a ban justified by the interest in protecting traffic and residents’ quiet. Both rules regulate a physical quality of speech, its loudness, and leave what is said to the speaker.
Crowd management supplies a second harm that comes from circumstances rather than message. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, a state fair required everyone who sold, distributed, or solicited to work from a fixed location, and a Krishna society objected that its ritual requires members to approach people. The Court treated a state fair on public property as a limited public forum, designed to present the products and views of many exhibitors to many people in a limited area efficiently. It held that the rule, applied even-handedly to all distributors, was content-neutral.16 The harder question was whether exempting the Krishna society alone would noticeably worsen congestion. The Court answered that the test is facial: it asks whether the restriction on its face significantly advances the state’s goal, not whether applying it to one speaker does.17 It also rejected selective access, because other religious and nonreligious groups were equally entitled to an exemption.18 The structure of the rule explains why. An exemption would force the state to choose which groups may roam the grounds, and a choice among speakers is the discretion the neutrality requirement exists to remove. Alternatives remained ample, since the rule neither denied access to the forum nor prevented the Krishnas from pursuing personal encounters outside the fairgrounds.19
Public property itself can be the interest the government protects. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court upheld a Park Service rule that barred sleeping in the symbolic tent cities that demonstrators erected in Lafayette Park and on the Mall to dramatize homelessness. National Park regulations permit camping only in designated campgrounds, and none had been designated in those parks.20 The Court assumed that sleeping was expressive and still treated the ban as a limit on the manner of demonstrating. The prohibition on camping and sleeping was content-neutral and was not applied out of disagreement with the message.21 It focused narrowly on the government’s substantial interest in keeping the parks in the heart of the capital attractive, intact, and available to the millions who wish to enjoy them, and permitting camping would be totally inimical to those purposes.22 And the rule left the demonstration otherwise intact, with its symbolic city, its signs, and a day-and-night vigil by those awake. The demonstrators identified no barrier to delivering their message to the media or the public by other means.23
The home presents the clearest harm that comes from where speech is aimed. Frisby v. Schultz sustained an ordinance that reached only picketing focused on and taking place in front of a particular residence. The Court treated the ordinance as content-neutral, aimed at residential privacy, and tailored to unwilling recipients, and picketers stayed free to march through the neighborhood, go door to door, and distribute literature. The tailoring held because the banned activity was itself the evil: a complete ban can be narrowly tailored when each activity within it is an appropriately targeted evil.
Carey v. Brown shows the opposite result. An Illinois statute prohibited picketing in or around a residence unless the dwelling was a place of employment involved in a labor dispute, and the Court struck it down.24 The home was the setting in both cases, so the labor exception is the fact that changed the outcome: it made the line depend on subject matter. Frisby’s ordinance worked the same way whatever the picketers said. A law adopted in response to one group’s protest does not become content-based for that reason alone if its terms reach every message. The analysis turns on whether the text and its justification sort speech by what is said.
Permit systems are the remaining form of upheld regulation. A permit system in a public forum must serve an important purpose, give the licensing authority clear criteria that leave almost no discretion, and provide procedural safeguards such as prompt decisions and judicial review.25 In Thomas v. Chicago Park District, the Court upheld Chicago’s content-neutral permit system for parks. Its thirteen grounds for denial served to preserve and coordinate multiple uses of public space, to prevent dangerous and unlawful uses, and to ensure compensation for damage, and they were specific, definite, and objective enough that decisions did not rest on an administrator’s whim, with judicial review available.26 Cox v. New Hampshire is the early example: a parade permit that could be denied only when the area was already in use by another group. The harm in both is conflict among competing uses of one place, which is neutral to message. A permit also puts an official’s judgment between speaker and audience, so these schemes survive only with the safeguards that the later section on permit systems develops.
The speakers in these cases each lost something real: the Krishna society lost roving solicitation, the demonstrators lost sleeping, and the performers lost control of their own amplification. Each loss was a preferred method rather than access to the audience, and the outcomes show that a speaker who can still reach the audience another way has not been denied alternative channels.27 The cases where the government lost, taken up next, turn on a different fact: the rule swept in speech that did nothing to cause the harm.
Regulations That Fail
A content-neutral law can lose even when the government’s reason for it is genuine and unrelated to the message. In United States v. Grace, the Court restated the test: a public-forum restriction must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and open to ample alternative channels of communication. It then invalidated a portion of a federal statute that prohibited picketing on the public sidewalks around the Supreme Court building. The sidewalks are a traditional public forum, and the government could not present the strong justification needed to restrict one; it had no evidence, for example, that the picketing obstructed access to the building.29 Grace joins four other decisions below. In each, the government invoked an objective no one disputed: litter, access to the Supreme Court building, visual clutter, fraud, or the safety of children. Each rule lost for one of two related reasons. Either it reached far more protected speech than the objective required, so tailoring failed, or it closed a traditional or essential channel, so the alternatives left to speakers were inadequate.
The oldest of these decisions is Schneider v. State, which overturned laws forbidding the distribution of leaflets in public places. The government may prohibit littering, but it may not prohibit the expressive activity of leafleting.30 The defect lies in where litter comes from. Paper reaches the pavement because some recipients drop it, so a leaflet that is accepted and kept contributes nothing to the harm, and a ban on distribution burdens all that harmless speech in order to reach the few who litter. The narrower tool is close at hand: a law punishing the person who litters advances the city’s goal at substantially less cost to expression. The interest survived in Schneider, and the ban fell because the harm could be reached through the conduct that produced it.
Grace shows the same defect on a federal sidewalk. With no evidence that the picketing obstructed access, the statute’s burden fell on speech that did nothing to cause the harm the government invoked. The setting sharpens the result, because in a traditional public forum the Court often tips the balance toward speech, which makes content-neutral restrictions there more likely to fail.31
City of Ladue v. Gilleo shows the second defect, where the trouble lies in what the rule shuts down more than in how widely it sweeps. Ladue banned almost all residential signs to curb visual clutter, and the Court held that the ban violates the First Amendment.32 The city defended its ordinance as a mere time, place, or manner regulation because residents could still use hand-held signs, letters, handbills, flyers, telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper stickers, speeches, and neighborhood meetings.33 The Court was not persuaded that adequate substitutes existed for the important medium the city had closed off. A sign displayed at one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct from the same sign placed elsewhere, or from the same text conveyed by other means.34 The decision did not leave the city powerless, because more temperate measures could in large part satisfy Ladue’s regulatory needs without harm to residents’ First Amendment rights.35 Justice O’Connor, concurring, would have decided first whether the ordinance was content-based.36
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton carries the point to door-to-door advocacy. The Court found the village’s ordinance regulating canvassers too broad. Justice Stevens observed that an ordinance construed to reach only commercial activities and the solicitation of funds would arguably have been tailored to the village’s interests in protecting residents’ privacy and preventing fraud. But the ordinance applied to a significant number of noncommercial canvassers promoting a wide variety of causes, religious and political alike.37 The privacy interest, moreover, was adequately protected by a less restrictive alternative: enforceable “No Solicitation” signs, coupled with the resident’s unquestioned right to refuse to talk with unwelcome visitors.38 A rule that looks light on its face can still fail when it covers so much speech unrelated to the village’s interests that the fit collapses.
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the same defect appeared in a new medium. North Carolina barred registered sex offenders from commercial social-networking sites. Assuming the law was content-neutral and tested by intermediate scrutiny, the Court held it invalid because it burdened substantially more speech than necessary. Its broad wording could deny access to websites as varied as Amazon.com, Washington Post.com, and Webmd.com, and it created a “prohibition unprecedented in the scope of the First Amendment speech it burdens.”39 Keeping convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims is a legitimate objective, but the state had not shown that so sweeping a law was necessary to achieve it, and the government may not “suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.” The Court added that states remain free to enact more specific laws, so a narrow measure aimed at the conduct that actually threatens victims remains available.40 Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, agreed that the law was too broad because it could reach websites that are not social media, but he objected to the majority’s comparison of the internet to public streets and parks.41
Each failed rule has a narrower counterpart that would have served the interest about as well:
- Schneider: a ban on all leafleting, where a law punishing those who litter would reach the harm.
- Grace: a ban on all picketing on the sidewalks around the Court, where a rule aimed at picketing that obstructs access would reach the harm.
- Ladue: a near-total ban on residential signs, where more temperate measures could address the particular ills of signs.
- Watchtower: a permit requirement for all door-to-door advocacy, where posted “No Solicitation” signs and a rule confined to commercial and fundraising activity would serve the village’s interests.
- Packingham: a ban on commercial social-networking sites, where more specific laws could target the conduct that threatens victims.
The comparison is the mechanism behind the tailoring element. A narrower alternative that would work about as well exposes the surplus in the challenged rule, because the speech the rule reaches beyond the alternative contributes nothing to the interest. The comparison does not turn intermediate scrutiny into a least-restrictive-means test: an imaginable but only marginally gentler measure leaves a rule standing, while a substantially narrower measure that would work shows the rule to be overbroad. The second defect has its own logic. Where a rule closes a medium that is traditional, such as leafleting, door-to-door canvassing, or a window sign, or that has become essential, such as social media, the listed substitutes count only if they can reach the same audience at a cost the speaker can bear. An exam stem that stresses that the rule is neutral and the interest important describes only where the analysis begins, and the outcome turns on identifying the narrower tool or the closed channel.
Abortion-Clinic Buffer Zones
Abortion-clinic buffer zones put the content-neutral track to work in two stages, and the two defining decisions part ways on the second. Neutrality matters first because it decides the track: a content-based law meets strict scrutiny and a presumption of invalidity, while a content-neutral law meets a form of balancing.43 In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld, 6 to 3, a Colorado statute that made it unlawful, within 100 feet of the entrance to a health care facility, to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person without consent to pass a leaflet, display a sign, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling. Justice Stevens’s opinion treated the statute as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, narrowly tailored to interests in privacy and access, with adequate alternatives left to protesters. In McCullen v. Coakley, the Court likewise found a clinic buffer-zone law content-neutral, and then struck it down unanimously because it burdened substantially more speech than necessary. Neutrality therefore opens the review of such a law without ending it.
Hill rested its neutrality finding on three points. The statute regulated where some speech may occur, not the speech itself; it was not adopted out of disagreement with any message; and the state’s interests in access, privacy, and clear police guidelines were unrelated to the content of what demonstrators said. The statute applied to protest, education, and counseling on any subject and from any side, which separated it from Carey, where the Court invalidated a law that prohibited all picketing except picketing of a place of employment in a labor dispute and thereby preferred expression on one subject.44
The challengers’ strongest objection was that the statute reached only protest, education, and counseling, so a friendly greeting fell outside it and an official would have to hear what a speaker said to apply the law. The Court answered that this language was not a content restriction. It merely confined the statute to the speech activity most likely to cause the harm the state sought to prevent, the in-your-face harassment of patients and health care workers.45 Officials, moreover, would seldom need a speaker’s exact words to tell sidewalk counselors from people in casual conversation.
Hill’s tailoring holding rested on how little the statute took from the speaker. The eight-foot interval left the speaker at a normal conversational distance, allowed the speaker to stand still while others passed within eight feet, set no limit on the number of speakers, the noise level, or the size and text of signs, and applied only to a knowing approach. A leafletter could stand near the path of oncoming pedestrians and offer material that they remained free to decline. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Justice Kennedy’s separate dissent accused the majority of denying these protesters, in the face of what they consider one of life’s gravest moral crises, even the opportunity to try to offer a fellow citizen a little pamphlet.46 The majority read the phrase “protest, education, or counseling” as a way of confining the statute to the harmful kind of encounter, while the dissenters read it as a line between favored and unfavored kinds of message.
The Massachusetts statute in McCullen went further than Colorado’s. A 2007 amendment made it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to a facility, other than a hospital, where abortions are offered or performed. The Act exempted people entering or leaving the facility, clinic employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment, municipal workers acting within the scope of their employment, and people passing through to other destinations. The legislature had tried a narrower rule in 2000, a six-foot approach limit inside an 18-foot radius, but found it hard to enforce, so it adopted a bright-line zone that spared police from judging who had approached whom. The petitioners were sidewalk counselors who approached women near clinics to offer information about alternatives to abortion, and the zones displaced them from the positions they had held.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for five Justices, found the Act content-neutral. It drew no content-based distinction on its face, and whether a person violated it depended on where the person stood, not on what the person said: a counselor could violate the Act by standing in the zone silently, with no sign. Limiting the zones to abortion clinics did not change the result, because a facially neutral law does not become content-based merely because it may disproportionately affect speech on certain topics. A location test works as a neutrality test because it gives the enforcing officer a tape measure and nothing to read. The employee exemption passed for a similar reason: the Court saw nothing inherently suspect in letting clinic workers enter or remain in the zone, since the exemption covered a maintenance worker shoveling snow as well as an escort. It left open an as-applied challenge if a clinic directed its escorts to speak about abortion in the zone.
The classification divided the Court 5 to 4. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, concurred only in the judgment. In his view every objective indication showed that the provision’s primary purpose was to restrict speech opposing abortion, and he stressed that the Act covered every abortion clinic in the state although the trouble had centered on a single clinic in Boston.47 Justice Alito, also concurring only in the judgment, found viewpoint discrimination in the employee exemption: a counselor who tells an approaching woman that the clinic will not give her good information violates the Act, while an employee who invites the same woman inside for honest answers does not. One provision can thus look like a job accommodation to one Justice and a viewpoint preference to another, which is why the preserved as-applied challenge matters. Because both decisions rest on neutrality but part ways on tailoring, a clinic buffer-zone problem is safest analyzed in the two stages McCullen used.
Neutrality moved the Massachusetts law onto the intermediate track, where it had to be narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest.48 The sidewalks and public ways it regulated are paradigm public forums.49 The tailoring requirement checks two temptations: the government may want to silence a message, and it may want to silence speech for convenience when that speech is associated with a problem. The demand for a close fit keeps it from trading speech for administrative efficiency. A content-neutral rule need not be the least restrictive means of serving its interest, but it may not regulate expression so that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does nothing to advance the government’s goals.50
No one disputed the significance of the Commonwealth’s interests in public safety, patient access to health care, and unobstructed sidewalks and roadways, so the contest was over burden and fit. The zones carved away a significant part of the sidewalks at the clinics where the petitioners worked, pushing counselors well back from entrances and driveways and compromising the close, personal conversations they regarded as essential. Counselors reported reaching far fewer women than before the amendment. The Commonwealth replied that counselors could still chant slogans and display signs outside the zones, and the Court said that reply missed the point, because the petitioners were not protesters. Their method was a personal, consensual conversation, and it is easier to ignore a strained voice or a waving hand than a direct greeting or an outstretched arm. The alternative-channels inquiry therefore asks about the speaker’s actual way of reaching the audience, and a remaining channel counts only if it can carry the same message in the same way.
The Act was also exceptional: respondents identified no other state with fixed buffer zones around abortion clinics, which raised the concern that Massachusetts had too readily forgone options that would serve its interests just as well. Those options were at hand. The statute already made it a separate offense to obstruct access to a facility, the legislature could follow federal law by criminalizing intimidation of or interference with people seeking reproductive health services, and an anti-harassment provision together with injunctive relief against repeated obstruction offered more narrowly tailored tools.51 The legislature chose a bright-line zone because the narrower rule had been hard to enforce, which shows the problem that tailoring addresses: a rule that is simpler for the police to apply still fails if a substantial portion of its burden falls on peaceful conversation that contributed nothing to the crowding.
The purpose clause in the second state’s law differs from the one the Court accepted in Hill, because Hill’s clause covered all protest, education, and counseling on any subject and from any side. A purpose clause is neutral when it sorts by kind of encounter and content-based when it sorts by direction of message.
An injunction can create the same kind of buffer zone, as in Madsen v. Women's Health Center. Because an injunction comes from a court acting on a record of particular conduct, the standard differs, and the later section on content-neutral injunctions takes it up.