512 U.S. 43 (1994)
In 1990, the City of Ladue, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis with a population of almost 9,000 and an area of about 8.5 square miles of which only 3 percent is zoned for commercial or industrial use, maintained an ordinance that prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs on their property except residence identification signs, for sale signs, and signs warning of safety hazards.1
The ordinance permitted commercial establishments, churches, and nonprofit organizations to erect signs for churches, religious institutions, and schools as well as commercial signs in commercially zoned districts that were not allowed at residences.2 Margaret P. Gilleo owns one of the 57 single-family homes in the Willow Hill subdivision of Ladue.3 On December 8, 1990, she placed on her front lawn a 24- by 36-inch sign printed with the words "Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now."4
After that sign disappeared, Gilleo put up another but it was knocked to the ground.5 When Gilleo reported these incidents to the police, they advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue.6 The city council denied her petition for a variance.7 Gilleo then filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, the mayor, and members of the city council.8
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance.9 Gilleo then placed an 8.5- by 11-inch sign in the second story window of her home stating "For Peace in the Gulf."10 The Ladue City Council responded to the injunction by repealing its ordinance and enacting a replacement.11 The new ordinance contained a general prohibition of signs and defined that term broadly.12 The new ordinance prohibited all signs except those that fall within one of ten exemptions.13 Gilleo amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.14
The District Court held the ordinance unconstitutional, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.15 The Supreme Court granted the City of Ladue's petition for certiorari.16
Whether the City of Ladue's sign ordinance violates a Ladue resident's right to free speech?17
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, and this limitation applies to the States and their political subdivisions through the Fourteenth Amendment.18 While signs are a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause, they pose distinctive problems that are subject to municipalities' police powers, allowing regulation of their physical characteristics within reasonable bounds and absent censorial purpose.19 However, a municipal ordinance that prohibits too much protected speech by foreclosing an entire medium of expression, such as residential signs, violates the First Amendment.20
Yes. In this case, the City of Ladue maintained an ordinance that prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs on their property except residence identification signs, for sale signs, and signs warning of safety hazards, while permitting commercial establishments, churches, and nonprofit organizations to erect certain signs that were not allowed at residences. Margaret P. Gilleo, who owns one of the 57 single-family homes in the Willow Hill subdivision of Ladue, was advised by police that her signs protesting the war in the Persian Gulf were prohibited, and the city council denied her petition for a variance.21
Although the City's interest in minimizing visual clutter is valid, it is not sufficiently compelling to support the near-total ban, which has a manifestly greater impact on free communication than narrower prohibitions upheld in prior cases, as it totally forecloses political, religious, or personal messages from residential property, a unique and important medium that is cheap, convenient, and identifies the speaker to neighbors.22 The ordinance abridges the First Amendment rights of Ladue's citizens.23
The City of Ladue's sign ordinance violates a Ladue resident's right to free speech.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor noted that it is unusual for the Court to assume arguendo the validity of the City's submission that the exemptions from Ladue's sign ordinance are free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination.25 Content discrimination in regulations of the speech of private citizens on private property or in a traditional public forum is presumptively impermissible, and this presumption is a very strong one.26 She would have preferred to apply the normal analytical structure to determine whether a regulation is content based or content neutral and then to apply the proper level of scrutiny based on the answer to that question.27
Nevertheless, she joined the Court's opinion because she agreed with its conclusion in Part IV that even if the restriction were content neutral, it would still be invalid.28