530 U.S. 703 (2000)
In 1993, the Colorado General Assembly enacted a statute regulating speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility.1 The challenged provision makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person.2
Five months after the statute was enacted, petitioners filed a complaint in the District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado.3 Petitioners, who had engaged in sidewalk counseling on public ways and sidewalks within 100 feet of entrances to facilities where abortions are performed, alleged that their fear of prosecution under the statute chilled the exercise of their constitutional rights.4 They sought a declaration that the statute was facially invalid and an injunction against its enforcement.5
The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, treating it as a facial challenge.6 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.7 After the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., the Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment upholding the statute.8 The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.10
The record before the courts included a transcript of hearings preceding the enactment of the statute, which showed that demonstrations in front of abortion clinics impeded access and were often confrontational.11 Evidence indicated that it was common practice to provide escorts for persons entering and leaving the clinics to ensure access and provide protection from aggressive counselors, and that emotional confrontations may adversely affect a patient's medical care.12 There was no evidence that the sidewalk counseling conducted by petitioners was ever abusive or confrontational.13
Whether Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3) is a content-based restriction on speech?14
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.15
The statute does not regulate speech on the basis of its content.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices O'connor, Ginsburg, And Breyer
The key to determining whether the statute makes a content-based distinction lies in understanding that content-based discriminations are subject to strict scrutiny because they place the weight of government behind the disparagement or suppression of some messages.19 The statute addresses not the content of speech but the circumstances of its delivery.20 The validity of a time, place, or manner restriction does not depend on showing that the particular behavior has no association with a particular subject or opinion.21
The facts overwhelmingly demonstrate the validity of the provision as a content-neutral regulation imposed solely to regulate the manner in which speakers may conduct themselves within 100 feet of the entrance of a health care facility.22
Joined by Justice Thomas
The regulation as it applies to oral communications is obviously and undeniably content based because a speaker wishing to approach another for the purpose of communicating any message except one of protest, education, or counseling may do so without first securing the other's consent.23 The vice of content-based legislation is that it lends itself to use for invidious thought-control purposes.24 A restriction that operates only on speech that communicates a message of protest, education, or counseling presents exactly this risk.25
When applied at the entrance to medical facilities, it is a means of impeding speech against abortion.26
The statute is content based for an additional reason because it restricts speech on particular topics.27 The enactment restricts oral protest, education, or counseling on any subject, but a statute of broad application is not content neutral if its terms control the substance of a speaker's message.28 By confining the law's application to the specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State has made a content-based determination.29
The statute applies only to medical facilities, a convenient yet obvious mask for the legislature's true purpose and for the prohibition's true effect.30
Whether the statute is a valid time, place, and manner restriction?31
A content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation must serve significant government interests, be narrowly tailored, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication.32
Yes. The statute serves the significant government interests of protecting the health and safety of patients, ensuring the peaceful and orderly functioning of health care facilities, and protecting the privacy and dignity of patients.33 It is narrowly tailored because it burdens no more speech than necessary.34 It leaves open ample alternative channels because petitioners may stand outside the buffer zone and display signs, distribute literature, and speak to persons entering the facility.35
The statute is a valid time, place, and manner restriction.36
Whether the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad?37
The overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine that should be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, and a statute is overbroad only if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.38
No. The statute does not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech because its plain language is easily susceptible to a narrowing construction that avoids constitutional problems.39 It prohibits only knowing approaches for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with a person.40
The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.41
Related opinions on this issue
The statute is overbroad because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech including peaceful pamphleteering and other forms of expression that are at the core of the First Amendment.42 The Court's holding contradicts more than a half century of well-established First Amendment principles.43
For the first time, the Court approves a law which bars a private citizen from passing a message, in a peaceful manner and on a profound moral issue, to a fellow citizen on a public sidewalk.44
Whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague?45
A statute can be impermissibly vague if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits or if it authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.46
No. The statute provides adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited because it contains a scienter requirement that applies only to a person who knowingly approaches within eight feet of another without consent for the purpose of engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.47 The likelihood that anyone would not understand any of those common words seems quite remote.48
The statute is not unconstitutionally vague.49
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
The statute is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and is so vague that it chills a substantial amount of protected speech.50 The operative terms and phrases of the statute are not defined.51 The criminal statute is subject to manipulation by police, prosecutors, and juries.52
Its substantial imprecisions will chill speech, so the statute violates the First Amendment.53
Whether the statute imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech?54
A statute is an unconstitutional prior restraint if it authorizes the issuance of a license or permit that gives a government official unbounded discretion to suppress speech or conditions the exercise of speech rights on the prior approval of a government official.55
No. The statute does not authorize the issuance of a license or permit that gives a government official unbounded discretion to suppress speech.56 It does not condition the exercise of speech rights on the prior approval of a government official.57 The restrictions apply only if the pedestrian does not consent to the approach.58
The statute does not impose an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.59
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
The Court today upholds a statute that is a classic example of viewpoint discrimination, applying only to those who wish to communicate a message of protest, education, or counseling regarding abortion.60 The statute applies only to those who wish to communicate a message of protest, education, or counseling regarding abortion.61 This approach is in stark contradiction of the constitutional principles applied in all other contexts.62