582 U.S. 98 (2017)
In 2008 North Carolina enacted a statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to gain access to commercial social networking Web sites, including commonplace social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter.1 The statute defined a commercial social networking Web site by four criteria including operation for revenue, facilitation of social introductions, allowance of personal profiles, and provision of communication mechanisms, while exempting sites limited to photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat rooms and those primarily facilitating commercial transactions.2 According to sources cited to the Court, the statute applies to about 20,000 people in North Carolina and the State has prosecuted over 1,000 people for violating it.3
In 2002 petitioner Lester Gerard Packingham, then 21, pleaded guilty to taking indecent liberties with a child after having sex with a 13-year-old girl.4 Because the offense qualifies as an offense against a minor, he was required to register as a sex offender and was therefore barred under the 2008 statute from gaining access to commercial social networking sites.5
In 2010 a state court dismissed a traffic ticket against Packingham. In response, he posted on his personal Facebook profile a statement celebrating the dismissal.6 A Durham Police Department officer investigating potential violations of the statute noticed the post, made inquiries, and obtained evidence by search warrant confirming the poster's identity.7 Packingham was indicted for violating the statute. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and he was convicted and given a suspended prison sentence.8 At no point did the State allege that Packingham had contacted a minor or committed any other illicit act on the Internet.9
On appeal, a North Carolina Court of Appeals struck down the statute. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed.10 Two justices dissented. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reviews the case.11
Whether North Carolina's statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to access commercial social networking websites is permissible under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?12
Even assuming the statute is content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision cannot stand. Under intermediate scrutiny a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and must not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.13
No. The statute enacts a prohibition unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens by barring access to social media sites like Facebook where Packingham posted about his traffic ticket dismissal.14 The State has not met its burden to show that this sweeping law is necessary, as it applies to about 20,000 people in North Carolina and has led to over 1,000 prosecutions while covering sites unlikely to facilitate abuse.15 No case of this Court has approved a statute as broad in reach, unlike the narrow restriction upheld in Burson v. Freeman.16
The North Carolina statute violates the First Amendment.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Alito agreed that the law violates the First Amendment due to its staggering reach covering many websites with no realistic opportunity for communications facilitating abuse, such as Amazon, the Washington Post website, and WebMD.18 He could not join the majority opinion, however, because it contains unnecessary and undisciplined dicta equating the Internet with public streets and parks that could be interpreted to limit state power over dangerous predators on sites where minors discuss personal problems.19 Given the limits of current understanding of the Cyber Age, the Court should proceed circumspectly and avoid broad pronouncements about the constitutional treatment of the Internet.20