Concept
Strict Scrutiny in Practice
Content-based regulation of protected expression
Strict Scrutiny in Practice
Boos v. Barry states the test for a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum: the government must show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The two parts test different things. The first asks whether the government's end carries enough weight to justify a burden on speech that the presumption of invalidity treats as suspect. The second asks whether the means fit the end, so that the law reaches the speech that threatens the interest and spares the speech that does not. The government carries the burden on both parts. A court therefore cannot accept a plausible rationale on faith; it must look at what the law covers and what it leaves out.
The earlier cases in this chapter show where the test usually does its work. In Boos, the Court assumed that protecting the dignity of foreign diplomats could be a compelling interest, yet it struck down the display clause because a conduct-based statute against intimidating, coercing, threatening, or harassing foreign officials could serve that interest with less restriction on speech. In R.A.V., the Court did not doubt that St. Paul's interests in protecting groups historically subjected to discrimination were compelling, but the ordinance failed because a content-neutral ban would have served those interests equally well. In both decisions the interest passed inspection and the means did not. Tailoring is where a challenged law is usually won or lost.
Tailoring failures follow patterns. The first subsection takes up the two most common: a law that covers too little of the harm it invokes, and a law that covers too much speech. The second turns to the rare cases in which the government proves both a compelling interest and a close fit, and wins.
Underinclusion and Overinclusion
Two mirror-image defects account for most failures at the fit stage. A law is underinclusive when it leaves unregulated speech that threatens the asserted interest as much as the speech it regulates. It is overinclusive when it burdens speech that the interest does not require it to reach. Reed v. Town of Gilbert models the first defect: the Court assumed, without deciding, that the Town's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety were compelling, and it still held the sign code's distinctions hopelessly underinclusive.1
The Town's own justifications defeated the code. Temporary directional signs are no greater an eyesore than ideological or political ones, yet the code let larger ideological signs multiply while it strictly limited the number, size, and duration of the smaller directional signs. The Town could not call those limits necessary to beautify the Town while it tolerated other signs that create the same problem.2 The traffic-safety rationale failed on parallel terms. The Town offered no reason to think directional signs endanger drivers more than other signs, and a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to distract a driver than a notice of a nearby church meeting.3 The Court stated the consequence in a sentence worth remembering: a “law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”4
Underinclusion hurts the government on two fronts. On necessity, strict scrutiny asks whether the restriction is needed to serve the interest, and a government that tolerates most of the harm has shown that the interest can coexist with it. On explanation, once the stated interest cannot account for why this speech was singled out, the likeliest remaining explanations are hostility or favoritism toward a message. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, discussed below, puts the point in those terms: underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is pursuing the interest it invokes or disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.5 That is the danger the presumption of invalidity guards against, now tested at the level of means. The same reasoning defeated a traffic-safety defense in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, where a city barred drive-in screens visible from the street from showing films with any nudity. Nothing suggested that other scenes, from soap opera to violence, distract passing drivers any less.6
Whether a distinction is permissible or underinclusive depends on whether the interest explains the exemption. Reed itself said that a sign ordinance narrowly tailored to the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers, such as warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers on private houses, well might survive strict scrutiny. It described the political, ideological, and event signs before it as far removed from those purposes.7 A hazard warning differs from a church notice in the one respect the safety interest cares about: it reduces danger. Treating it differently follows the harm, not the message.
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court applied the same questions to a California act that barred the sale or rental of violent video games to minors, and it found three separate defects. The Act reached games in which a player may kill, maim, dismember, or sexually assault an image of a human being, depicted in a manner that a reasonable person would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors; violators faced a civil fine of up to $1,000.8 Video games communicate ideas through familiar devices such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music, so they receive First Amendment protection. The Court refused to add violent depictions to the unprotected categories, because a legislature's judgment that certain speech is too harmful does not create such a category.9 The Act therefore survived only if it passed strict scrutiny, and the Court observed that “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”10
The first defect was proof. California acknowledged that it could not show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors. Its research, nearly all of it correlational and marred by methodological flaws, showed at best small effects, such as children feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in the minutes after play.11 Those effects were indistinguishable from the ones found when children watched cartoons starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner, played games rated suitable for all ages, or viewed a picture of a gun.12 Because the government carries the burden, evidence that speech merely travels alongside a harm does not establish a compelling interest in preventing it. Correlation leaves open that aggressive children simply choose violent games, and small, short-lived effects shared with ordinary entertainment cannot support a rule that singles out one medium.
The second defect was underinclusion, which the Court called alone enough to defeat the Act. California had declined to restrict Saturday morning cartoons, the sale of games rated for young children, or the distribution of pictures of guns. It had singled out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment compared with booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers, without a persuasive reason.13 The Act's parental exception deepened the problem. A child could obtain a game with the say-so of a parent, aunt, or uncle, with no requirement that the relationship be verified, and the Court remarked that this is not how one addresses a serious social problem.14 A legislature that treats the danger as tolerable whenever a relative consents has not treated it as a harm of the highest order. Reed's underinclusion arose inside one code that regulated similar signs differently; Brown's arose across media. In each case the comparison class is the speech that produces the same harm wherever it appears.
The third defect was overinclusion, and it grew out of California's second justification, aiding parental authority. The Court doubted that punishing third parties for conveying protected speech to children, just in case their parents disapprove, is a proper means of aiding parents, and it found no unmet parental need given the industry's voluntary rating system.15 The Act also reached many children whose parents do not care whether they buy violent games, so its effect supported only what the state thinks parents ought to want.16 Having two goals did not help California. Overbreadth in pursuing one goal is not cured by underbreadth in pursuing the other, and the result was legislation that was “neither fish nor fowl.”17 The practical method that follows is to attach each fit problem to one asserted interest and test the law against that interest alone.
Overinclusion appears in its purest form when the interest is undisputed. In Simon & Schuster, the Court accepted that New York has a compelling interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes, and it still held the Son of Sam law not narrowly tailored. The law applied to works on any subject whenever the author expressed thoughts or recollections about a crime, however tangentially.18 The Court's examples were the Confessions of Saint Augustine, which recall the theft of pears from a neighbor's vineyard, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, and Thoreau's Civil Disobedience, which acknowledges a refusal to pay taxes.19 The state also had not shown any greater interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of storytelling than from the criminal's other assets.20 A law that captures Augustine's Confessions burdens speech that has nothing to do with a criminal profiting from a crime, so the burden exceeds what the interest requires.
A single law can fail in both directions. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court rejected the government's interest in protecting dissenting shareholders and added that the electioneering ban was underinclusive: a shareholder is affected by corporate speech in any medium at any time, not only within thirty or sixty days of an election. The ban was also overinclusive, because it covered all corporations, including nonprofits and corporations with a single shareholder.21 The ordinance in City of Ladue v. Gilleo shows how exemptions can undercut a claimed interest. It prohibited so much residential signage that political speech was all but foreclosed, while its exemptions for church, school, and other signs cast doubt on the city's claimed interest in minimizing visual clutter.22
The Court's refusal to expand the unprotected categories keeps the tailoring inquiry alive, because a law that cannot be defended as regulating an unprotected category must satisfy strict scrutiny on its merits. In United States v. Stevens, the government asked the Court to add depictions of animal cruelty through a categorical balancing of the speech's value against its societal costs. The Court called that test “startling and dangerous,” explaining that the First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the government outweigh the costs.23 The statute also proved overbroad. Crush videos and dogfighting depictions were dwarfed by the market for lawful depictions such as hunting magazines and videos, so the presumptively impermissible applications far outnumbered the permissible ones.24 The Court left open whether a statute limited to crush videos or other extreme cruelty would be constitutional.25
United States v. Alvarez shows the least-restrictive-alternative side of tailoring. The Stolen Valor Act made it a crime to lie about receiving military decorations. Applying exacting scrutiny, the plurality found that the government had not shown sufficient harm from such lies and that Congress could have reached its goals in narrower ways, such as publishing a list of recipients so that liars could be quickly exposed.26 The plurality added that the government had not demonstrated a causal connection between the restriction and the injury and had not shown why counterspeech would not satisfy its interest.27 Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment under intermediate scrutiny, reached the same result because a narrower statute, for example one reaching lies told to obtain a tangible benefit, could serve the interest.28 A government that cannot explain why a narrower tool would fail has not shown that the broad one is necessary. That was the move in Boos, where a conduct statute against harassing diplomats displaced the display clause, and in R.A.V., where a general ban displaced St. Paul's ordinance.
Neither defect invalidates a law merely because the law is content based. Each is a finding about fit, and a law whose line follows the harm and reaches little speech beyond it gives a challenger nothing to exploit. The next subsection turns to the rare cases in which the government carried both burdens and the law survived.
When Strict Scrutiny Is Met
Strict scrutiny usually decides a content-based case against the government, but the Court has never treated that outcome as automatic. In Burson v. Freeman, a plurality upheld a Tennessee law that barred soliciting votes, displaying campaign signs, and distributing campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. The plurality agreed that the law was a facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum and so had to meet exacting scrutiny. It called the result the rare case in which a law survives strict scrutiny, and it said this was such a case.35 The surviving cases show what a government must supply to win. In each, the government identified a concrete harm, tied it to a documented history or a specific role, and drew its line close to that harm. In the decisions the government lost despite a weighty interest, the law reached the wrong speech or too much of it, and a compelling interest could not stand in for a showing of fit.
The Burson plurality accepted that Tennessee's interests in letting citizens vote freely and in holding an election with integrity and reliability are compelling; the law served to prevent voter intimidation and election fraud.36 It insisted, though, that a state must do more than assert a compelling interest. The state must demonstrate that the law is necessary to serve it.37 Tennessee made that showing with history. The development of election reform, in this country and abroad, revealed a persistent battle against voter intimidation and election fraud, and after an unsuccessful experiment with unofficial ballots, all fifty States settled on a secret ballot secured in part by a restricted zone around the voting compartments.38 The history carried the necessity showing because of how the harm works. A secret ballot protects a voter only if no one can pressure, watch, or pay the voter at the moment of decision, and the record showed campaign workers intimidating voters around polling places.39 In the plurality's words, the only way to preserve the secrecy of the ballot is to limit access to the area around the voter.40
The ban protected a second fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot free from the taint of intimidation and fraud, so the plurality treated the case as a conflict between two rights. It held that keeping solicitors 100 feet from the entrances was not an unconstitutional compromise.41 The remaining question was how large a zone suffices. The Tennessee Supreme Court had demanded a boundary of 25 feet, but the plurality observed that the extra 75 feet takes about 15 seconds to walk. It concluded that a 100-foot boundary lies on the constitutional side of the line, whatever the exact limit.42 That reasoning shows how fit works at the margin. When the added burden is a short walk and no one can say precisely where the voter's protection ends, the plurality declined to insist on the smallest zone imaginable.
Placing Burson beside Boos v. Barry sharpens the lesson. The plurality's own description of the Tennessee law, core political speech, a quintessential public forum, and a content-based rule, matched the display provision struck down in Boos, and the results still differed.43 The difference lay in the interest and the fit. The Boos display clause served the dignity of foreign diplomats and failed because less restrictive alternatives were available. The Tennessee zone protected a second fundamental right and rested on a settled history showing that a buffer was needed.44 Two laws can share every feature that triggers strict scrutiny and still reach opposite results, because the government's proof of necessity and tailoring decides the case.
The separate opinions show how contested that reconciliation is. Justice Kennedy, who prefers a flat rule against content discrimination, concurred because there is a narrow area in which expression yields to accommodate another constitutional right without engulfing the general rule. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because, if “traditional public forum” is to be an analytical tool and not a conclusory label, it must derive its content from tradition, and the area around a polling place is not a traditional public forum; a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rule sufficed.45 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, dissented. The zone silences all campaign-related speech while allowing speech on any other subject, including political debate about issues or candidates not on that day's ballot, and that selectivity undercuts the law-and-order justification and tends to favor well-resourced candidates over grassroots ones.46 He called the plurality's scrutiny toothless.47 The plurality's account is the one later opinions rely on, but an answer should describe Burson as a plurality decision.
A later decision marks the outer edge of Burson's reasoning. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, the Court struck down, by a vote of 7 to 2, a Minnesota ban on wearing a political badge, button, or insignia inside a polling place, and it treated Burson as the natural starting point for the analysis.48 The Court classified the polling place as a nonpublic forum, where the question is whether the restriction is reasonable, and it still held the ban invalid. Minnesota never defined the word political and left the line to election judges. Would a shirt bearing the name National Rifle Association count? What about one stating that “All Lives Matter”? The ban supplied no objective, workable standard for answering.49 The goal of a calm polling place was a respectable one, but a law pursuing it must be capable of reasoned application.50 The polling-place interest therefore supports a buffer with a definite boundary, and it leaves a vaguely worded ban without support.
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar supplies the second surviving rule, and it also arises in an election. Florida's Canon 7C(1) forbade candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds, although candidates could form committees of responsible persons to raise money for them.51 Lanell Williams-Yulee, a candidate for a county court judgeship, sent county voters a letter asking for contributions and posted it on her campaign website. The Florida Bar disciplined her.52 The Court recognized that the canon is a content-based restriction on speech and held that a State may restrict a judicial candidate's speech only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.53 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a divided Court, found the canon met that standard. He pointed to Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project as another case in which a speech restriction passed, observing that such cases are rare but do arise.54
The interest was public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the judiciary, which the Court called a state interest of the highest order.55 That interest carries special weight for judges because of the job they do. A judge is not supposed to follow the preferences of supporters or give special consideration to campaign donors, so the interest in public confidence in judges extends beyond the interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and executive elections.56 The Chief Justice put the mechanism in one sentence: “Judges, charged with exercising strict neutrality and independence, cannot supplicate campaign donors without diminishing public confidence in judicial integrity.”57 A personal request for money from the person who will decide cases invites the public to wonder whether the donor will be treated differently, which is why the Court could tie the interest to a specific piece of conduct.
On fit, the Court rejected an underinclusiveness attack by observing that a State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop and may focus on its most pressing concerns. The canon aimed squarely at personal requests for money, the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence, and it contained no exceptions to that ban.58 It also left a great deal open. Candidates could discuss any issue with any person at any time, write letters, give speeches, put up billboards, contact supporters in person, by phone, or online, and rely on committees to raise funds.59 The First Amendment requires narrow tailoring, not perfect tailoring, and that limit matters most when the interest is as intangible as public confidence.60 Reed's sign code tolerated the very harm it invoked, while Florida's canon tolerated none of the conduct it targeted. That difference separates a defensible selection of concerns from a suspicious one.
A weighty interest does not rescue a law that reaches too far. The Court accepted in Simon & Schuster that New York's interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes and in compensating victims is compelling, and it still held the Son of Sam law not narrowly tailored. The law covered works on any subject whenever the author expressed thoughts or recollections about a crime, however tangentially, and so it would have reached the Confessions of Saint Augustine.61 Alternative ways of compensating crime victims were also available.62 The decision does not forbid narrower laws, and prosecutors have since written large fines into plea agreements to reach the same goal.63 Tennessee's burden fell on speech within a few steps of the place where the harm occurs. New York's burden fell on a large body of writing that had no connection to any criminal's profit.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White shows a law failing at both parts of the test. Minnesota barred candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority, treated the clause as a content-based burden on speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office, which lies at the core of the First Amendment. He placed on the State the burden of proving that the clause is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.64 The Court then took the word impartiality one meaning at a time. Impartiality as lack of bias for or against a party was barely served, because the clause restricts speech for or against issues and leaves speech for or against parties alone. Impartiality as lack of preconception about legal views is not a compelling interest, because virtually every judge has preconceptions and a judge with none would show a lack of qualification, not a lack of bias. Impartiality as open-mindedness might be desirable, but the clause is woefully underinclusive as a means to that end, since a candidate may say the same thing the day before declaring candidacy and repeatedly after election.65
Williams-Yulee and White both involved elected judges and a state interest in judicial integrity, so the difference in outcome shows what tailoring turns on. The Florida canon aimed at one kind of conduct and left every issue open to discussion. The Minnesota clause silenced candidates on the very subjects an election is about. Justice Scalia made the point for the White majority when he said that the First Amendment does not permit a State to keep elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing what the elections are about.66 In both cases the State carried the burden, and the rule that failed was the one that could not explain why it reached the speech it did.
Both surviving cases drew dissents charging that scrutiny had been relaxed. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Williams-Yulee, argued that a ban on personal solicitation favors incumbent judges over challengers, the well-to-do over those with fewer resources, and the well-connected over outsiders. He also argued that the Court's underinclusiveness analysis blurred selectivity based on content with selectivity on other grounds.67 The ad hoc balancing test borrows its standards from equal protection strict scrutiny, but it gives a judge some leeway in deciding what counts as a compelling interest and what counts as narrow tailoring.68 Dissenters locate the relaxation in that leeway. An exam answer should apply the Court's accounts and, when the facts invite it, note these objections as the places where a challenger will press.
In the cases the government won, steps two and three carried the day. In the cases it lost, steps one, four, and five did. A government that can point to a documented harm and a rule aimed at it has the materials for a rare victory. A government that offers a weighty interest and little else stands where the States stood in Simon & Schuster and White.