138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018)
Minnesota Voters Alliance, a nonprofit organization that seeks better government through election reforms, along with registered voter and executive director Andrew Cilek and former election judge Susan Jeffers, brought a lawsuit challenging Minnesota's political apparel ban.1 The ban, contained in Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1), prohibits wearing a political badge, political button, or other political insignia at or about the polling place on Election Day, with violations subject to civil penalty or petty misdemeanor prosecution.2 Five days before the November 2010 election, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in federal district court after planning to have supporters wear "Please I. D. Me" buttons and a "Tea Party Patriots" shirt.3
In response to the lawsuit, officials distributed an Election Day Policy to election judges throughout the state.4 The Policy identified prohibited items as including those displaying the name of a political party, the name of a candidate, support or opposition to a ballot question, issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting including the "Please I. D. Me" buttons, and material promoting a group with recognizable political views such as the Tea Party.5 On Election Day, Cilek was twice turned away from the polls while wearing the "Please I. D. Me" button and a T-shirt with the words "Don’t Tread on Me" and the Tea Party Patriots logo, and other voters associated with the group were asked to cover up similar items.6
The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the facial challenge. After remand from the Eighth Circuit on the as-applied claim, the district court later granted summary judgment to the state on that claim as well.7 The Eighth Circuit affirmed both the dismissal of the facial challenge and the summary judgment on the as-applied challenge.8 MVA, Cilek, and Jeffers petitioned for review solely of their facial First Amendment claim, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.9
Whether Minnesota’s political apparel ban violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?10
Because the political apparel ban applies only in the interior of a polling place, the Court employs a forum-based approach.11 A polling place qualifies as a nonpublic forum. Content-based restrictions are permissible if they are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view. The State may pursue the permissible objective of setting the polling place apart as an island of calm.12 But the line drawn must be reasonable.13
Yes. The facts establish that the polling place is government-controlled property set aside for voting, making it a nonpublic forum where the ban applies only inside and makes no viewpoint distinction on its face.14 Minnesota pursues a permissible objective, as the historical context of chaotic polling places and the need for an environment free from partisan discord supports excluding political advocacy from the voting area, consistent with the incidents where Cilek and others were turned away or asked to cover apparel bearing political messages. However, the Election Day Policy's categories for prohibited items, such as issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting and material promoting a group with recognizable political views, introduce indeterminacy because they require election judges to track positions of candidates and parties or assess the notoriety of groups' views.15 This lack of objective standards, as applied to the plaintiffs' "Please I. D. Me" buttons and Tea Party apparel, creates the potential for erratic enforcement that undermines the very interest the ban seeks to serve.16
The State's construction limiting the ban to messages about electoral choices at issue fails to provide sensible line-drawing, as it encompasses a wide array of subjects and associations without clear boundaries, rendering the restriction unreasonable in the nonpublic forum.17
Minnesota’s political apparel ban violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Breyer
Justice Sotomayor dissented on the ground that the Court should have certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a definitive interpretation of the statute before invalidating it on its face.19 She argued that federal courts should be hesitant to speculate on the meaning of state law when state courts are willing to address it on certification.20 This promotes cooperative judicial federalism and may obviate the constitutional question.21
Sotomayor noted that the statute has many constitutional applications furthering important interests in order at polling places, and the history of enforcement showed no prohibition of voting or prosecutions, suggesting the law is capable of reasoned application with proper construction by the state court.22