504 U.S. 191 (1992)
The State of Tennessee enacted section 2-7-111(b) of its election code, which prohibits the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of votes for or against any person or political party or position on a question within 100 feet of the entrances to a polling place and inside the building where the polling place is located.1 Violation of the provision is a Class C misdemeanor punishable by up to 30 days imprisonment or a fine not to exceed $50, or both.2
Mary Rebecca Freeman has been a candidate for office in Tennessee, has managed local campaigns, and has worked actively in statewide elections.3 In 1987 she served as treasurer for the campaign of a city-council candidate in Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County.4 Asserting that the statutes limited her ability to communicate with voters, Freeman brought a facial challenge to sections 2-7-111(b) and 2-19-119 in Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the provisions were unconstitutional under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and a permanent injunction against their enforcement.5
The Chancellor ruled that the statutes did not violate the United States or Tennessee Constitutions and dismissed Freeman's suit.6 The Chancellor determined that section 2-7-111(b) was a content-neutral and reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, that the 100-foot boundary served a compelling state interest in protecting voters from interference, harassment, and intimidation during the voting process, and that there was an alternative channel for Freeman to exercise her free speech rights outside the 100-foot boundary.7
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed by a 4-to-1 vote.8 The court held that the statute was content based because it regulates a specific subject matter and campaign workers, that the State had not shown a compelling interest in regulating the premises around the polling place, that the 100-foot limit was not narrowly tailored, and that the statute was not the least restrictive means to serve the State's interests.9 The court noted that if the State could show a compelling interest in preventing congestion and disruption at the entrances to polling places, a shorter radius might pass constitutional muster.10
Because of the importance of the issue, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether a provision of the Tennessee Code, which prohibits the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments?12
The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, subjects content-based restrictions on political speech in public forums to strict scrutiny, requiring the State to demonstrate that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.13
No. The Tennessee statute is a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum because it singles out campaign solicitation and materials for prohibition within the 100-foot zone while leaving other forms of speech unregulated.14 Tennessee possesses compelling interests in protecting voters from intimidation and preserving the integrity of elections.15 These interests are rooted in the historical shift from viva voce voting and open ballots to the secret ballot system accompanied by restricted zones around polling places.16 The 100-foot boundary is narrowly tailored.17
The widespread adoption of similar zones across all fifty states and the demonstrated need to prevent undetected interference establish necessity.18 The modest distance imposes only a minor geographic limit that leaves open ample alternative channels for communication beyond the zone.19
The statute therefore survives strict scrutiny and does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.20
The provision of the Tennessee Code does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.22 He explained that the compelling-interest test functions here to verify the accuracy of the State's justification rather than to carve out a general exception to content-based restrictions.23 The statute protects the fundamental right to vote at the polling place itself.24
It accommodates another constitutional right without suppressing legitimate expression.25 This fits within the narrow area where free expression may yield to the extent necessary.26 Kennedy noted that the same use of the compelling-interest test is adopted today not to justify or condemn a category of suppression but to determine the accuracy of the justification the State gives for its law.27
With these observations, he concurred in the opinion of Justice Blackmun and the judgment of the Court.28
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on separate grounds.29 He maintained that the environs of a polling place on election day are not a traditional public forum given the venerable tradition of viewpoint-neutral restrictions on election-day speech within a specified distance.30 He would evaluate the statute under a reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic forums.31
Scalia reasoned that because restrictions on speech around polling places on election day are as venerable a part of the American tradition as the secret ballot, the statute does not restrict speech in a traditional public forum, and the exacting scrutiny that the plurality purports to apply is inappropriate.32 It is doctrinally less confusing to acknowledge that the environs of a polling place, on election day, are simply not a traditional public forum, which means that they are subject to speech restrictions that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.33 For the reasons that the plurality believes the statute survives exacting scrutiny, Scalia believed it is at least reasonable, and respondent does not contend that it is viewpoint discriminatory.34
He therefore agreed with the judgment of the Court that the statute is constitutional.35
Joined by O'connor, J., And Souter, J.
Justice Stevens dissented.36 He argued that Tennessee failed to carry its heavy burden of showing the 100-foot zone is necessary and narrowly tailored.37 The plurality improperly equated longstanding tradition with necessity.38
The statute sweeps too broadly by banning even passive displays such as bumper stickers.39 Its content-based selectivity undermines rather than advances any legitimate interest in orderly access to the polls.40 Stevens maintained that the plurality's analysis confuses history with necessity and mistakes the traditional for the indispensable.41
He noted that the evidence introduced at trial was exceptionally thin and that courts making factual findings have found such zones unnecessary.42 In his view, the plurality's scrutiny is neither exacting nor scrutiny, and the statute trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.43