Concept
Challenges to Smith
Free exercise
Challenges to Smith
The first words of the First Amendment concern religion, not speech: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 The framers may have thought the matter simple, but the history is one of complexity, change, and ongoing controversy, even though the basic principle of religious liberty emerged in the founding period and has prevailed, in one form or another, ever since.2 Today the controversy is sharpest over Employment Division v. Smith.
Smith holds that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve individuals of the duty to obey neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religious practice only incidentally.3 Oregon could therefore deny unemployment benefits to workers dismissed for using peyote in religious ceremonies, because the state criminally prohibited the drug and the Constitution required no special religious exemption absent targeting of religion.4 The workers had been found ineligible for benefits because they were discharged for work-related “misconduct,” and the Oregon Court of Appeals had held that denying the benefits violated their free exercise rights.5 Together with Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, Smith held that the strict scrutiny approach of the earlier cases did not apply to a generally applicable and otherwise valid law, even though the law imposed a substantial burden on free exercise. Observers feared that the two cases heralded a radical change, with strict scrutiny abandoned for religiously neutral laws that burden free exercise only incidentally.6
Much of the modern doctrine in this chapter runs around Smith rather than through it. A law that gives government officials discretion to grant exemptions is not generally applicable, and a law that is not generally applicable falls outside Smith, as Fulton v. City of Philadelphia held.7 Hybrid claims offer a second route. Smith itself explained the earlier decisions that barred application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action as cases involving the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press or the right of parents to direct their children’s education.8 The ministerial exemption, treated earlier in this chapter, marks a third limit.
Smith nonetheless stands under pressure from two directions. Inside the Court, it has come under more intense scrutiny from a Court that is now more protective of religious exercise than it once was; some wonder whether the Court will one day overrule it, but it remains good law.9 Outside the Court, legislative enactments such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, together with comparable approaches under state constitutional law, protect religious conduct even from nondiscriminatory burdens.10 The next two subsections take the two pressures in that order. Until the Court changes course, a sound answer applies Smith together with the exceptions just listed and treats the prospect of overruling as context, not as law.
Calls to Overrule Smith
The most direct challenge came in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, and it ended without an answer. CSS, a religious foster-care agency, urged the Court to overrule Smith, and concurring Justices argued for doing so, but the majority said it need not revisit the decision. The case fell outside Smith because the City had burdened CSS’s religious exercise through policies that did not meet the requirement of being neutral and generally applicable.11 The lower courts had reached the opposite conclusion, holding the City’s contract provision and ordinance neutral and generally applicable under Smith.12
The majority’s ground was the contract’s exceptions clause. The Commissioner could grant exceptions to the nondiscrimination requirement in the Commissioner’s “sole discretion,” and the creation of a formal mechanism for granting exceptions makes a policy not generally applicable, whether or not any exception was ever granted, because the mechanism invites the government to decide which reasons for noncompliance are worthy of solicitude.13 A discretionary exemption power thus took the City outside Smith, and CSS prevailed because the contract and ordinance failed the threshold requirements for neutral and generally applicable rules, without any ruling on whether Smith was right.14
A victory that rests on drafting is fragile, and a concurrence said as much. Justice Gorsuch objected that the majority relied on contract provisions and state-law interpretations the parties had not fully briefed, and that state courts or the City could alter the law or the contract to evade the decision.15 If a city deletes its exceptions clause, the next claimant will meet Smith on its own terms, and the question the Court avoided is likely to return.
The separate opinions show where the Justices stand. Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch urged that Smith be overruled, while Barrett and Kavanaugh questioned it but did not join that call.16 Justice Gorsuch, relying on Justice Alito’s opinion, described Smith as inconsistent with precedent, mistaken as to the Constitution’s original meaning, and unworkable.17 Justice Barrett found the textual and structural arguments against Smith compelling and acknowledged the vigor of the debate, yet she agreed with the Court’s disposition and did not resolve whether Smith should be overruled.18 That division explains why the question remains open.
The critics’ deepest disagreement with Smith concerns what “neutrality” requires. Justice Souter, concurring in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, distinguished formal neutrality, which as a free-exercise requirement would bar only laws with an object to discriminate against religion, from substantive neutrality, which also demands a secular object and generally requires government to accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws.19 Smith assumes the formal kind. It places within the Clause only laws whose object is to prohibit religious exercise and subjects laws that merely have that effect to no free-exercise scrutiny at all.20 The four Justices who rejected Smith’s rule read the Clause to embrace substantive neutrality, so that enforcing a law neutral on its face can offend the Clause if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.21
Justice O’Connor, writing separately in Smith, set out the alternative. The freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute, but government must justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve it.22 In her view there is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability, because laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate religious conscience or intrude upon religious duties as effectively as laws aimed at religion. The First Amendment, she added, makes freedom of religion a constitutional norm, not an anomaly.23
Other critics attacked what Smith ignored and how it was decided. The Clause itself, Justice Souter observed in Lukumi, draws no distinction between laws whose object is to prohibit religious exercise and laws with that effect, and on its face seemingly applies to both.24 Smith did not consider the Clause’s original meaning, and apart from a handful of passing remarks the Court has not explored the history of the Clause since its early attempts in 1879 and 1890.25 In City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Souter added that the Court had never had briefing and argument on the merits of the Smith rule, even in Smith itself, and that the case should be set down for reargument. Without it, he said, free-exercise law remains marked by an “intolerable tension.”26 Justice O’Connor, dissenting in Boerne, argued that Smith may be reexamined consistently with stare decisis, the principle that courts ordinarily follow their own earlier decisions. The rule was announced without “full-dress argument,” and as a recent decision it had not engendered the kind of reliance that would militate against overruling it.27 She also pointed out that lower courts applying Smith no longer found necessary a searching judicial inquiry into the possibility of reasonably accommodating religious practice.28
Defenders of Smith answer with history of their own. Responding to the dissent in Boerne, Justice Scalia noted that the early “free exercise” enactments the dissent cited protect only against action taken “for” or “in respect of” religion, action taken “on account of” religion, or “discriminat[ory]” action.29 Had the founding generation understood accommodations to be constitutionally required, he reasoned, it would be surprising to find no single state or federal case refusing to enforce a generally applicable statute for failure to accommodate, and the dissent cited none.30
Overruling Smith would not guarantee claimants a win. Under the Sherbert-Yoder test, the question was the cost of exempting this claimant and others similarly situated, not the cost of disregarding the law in general; if government can grant the exemption without serious harm, the exemption is a less restrictive means.31 Government still sometimes prevailed. In one Social Security case the Court held that government had a compelling interest in forcing the claimants into the system, apparently on the theory that allowing any exemptions would unravel the entire system.32
The formal-versus-substantive divide also explains why the Court’s aid cases look so different from its exemption cases. Everson narrowly approved New Jersey’s reimbursement of bus fares for children at Catholic schools while announcing a broad and strongly separationist reading of the Establishment Clause.33 The Court’s later, increasing emphasis on formal religious equality is more benign in the aid setting, because formally nondiscriminatory programs do not give recipients an incentive to modify their beliefs or practices in order to qualify, and including religious beneficiaries on equal terms furthers substantive equality and religious voluntarism as well.34 In an exemption case, by contrast, formal neutrality of the Smith kind protects a claimant only against laws aimed at religion.35
Whatever the Court ultimately does, Smith leaves every claimant one important question: is the law neutral? Lukumi answers by looking past the text. The minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face, but words such as “sacrifice” and “ritual,” though religious in origin, also have secular meanings, and facial neutrality is not determinative, because the Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility that is masked as well as overt.36
On an exam, a stem that presents a uniform rule burdening a sincere religious practice calls for the Smith answer, followed by a brief acknowledgment that three Justices have urged overruling it and the Court has not done so. The usual error is to treat the separate opinions in Fulton as the holding. The holding is narrower: a law that gives officials discretion to grant exemptions is not generally applicable. Work in sequence, testing neutrality first, then general applicability, then the recognized exceptions, and apply Smith to whatever remains.
Statutory Responses
Congress’s best-known response to Smith is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which forms a second layer of protection beside the constitutional doctrine. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, even when the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless government shows that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.39 In effect, RFRA supplies strict scrutiny by statute for burdens that Smith leaves unscrutinized.40
Whether Congress could impose that test on the states was the question in City of Boerne v. Flores, and the Court held that RFRA exceeds Congress’s power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Section 5 gives Congress the power “to enforce” the Amendment, and legislation that alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to enforce the Clause.42 Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is, and it has the power to enforce, not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.43
RFRA’s breadth made the problem plain. Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise, so the statute substantively altered Smith’s holding and did not remedy violations of it.44 Requiring a state to show a compelling interest pursued by the least restrictive means is, in the Court’s words, “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” Even if RFRA were read to mandate some lesser test, such as intermediate scrutiny, it would still require searching judicial scrutiny of state law, with the attendant likelihood of invalidation.45
Boerne rested on §5, which is directed to the states and localities, so it did not invalidate RFRA’s application to the federal government.46 In Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, the Court concluded that the UDV had effectively demonstrated that the federal government’s action substantially burdened its sincere exercise of religion.47 The Court then refused to let the government rely on the general characteristics of Schedule I substances. Those substances are exceptionally dangerous, but nothing indicated that Congress had considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue, the circumscribed sacramental use of hoasca.48 The case shows that RFRA applies to the federal government and that the Court approves a rigorous application of strict scrutiny under the statute.49 The Court again applied RFRA against a federal regulation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
Congress also legislated more narrowly. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) prohibits placing a substantial burden on religious exercise in 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a), and it also prohibits discrimination and exclusion.50 The Court has decided prisoner cases involving the statute, including Cutter v. Wilkinson and Holt v. Hobbs.
The states have responded as well. After the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Hershberger and remanded for reconsideration in light of Smith, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its judgment for the Amish on state constitutional grounds. It reasoned that Minnesotans enjoy greater protection for religious liberty under the state constitution than under the First Amendment, and it applied strict scrutiny, which the government could not satisfy, even though the challenged law was neutral and generally applicable.51 More than twenty states have enacted RFRAs modeled on the federal statute, and although they vary, they generally adopt the same basic approach.52
These protections matter, but they are incomplete. Statutes protecting religious freedom, including RFRA, RLUIPA, and their state analogues, are subject to legislative repeal or modification, and state lawmaking, whether statutory or constitutional, does not offer comprehensive national protection. These sources are extremely important, but they are not a complete response to Smith.53 They shield religious exercise from nondiscriminatory burdens without changing what the Free Exercise Clause itself requires, which is why the constitutional analysis in this chapter remains the starting point for any claim against a state or local government.54 A question asking whether Congress could restore the pre-Smith test by statute therefore has three parts: RFRA cannot be enforced against the states, it still binds the federal government, and RLUIPA and state law supply further claims in their own settings.