485 U.S. 439 (1988)
The Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest is located in a remote part of northwestern California.1 It has historically been used by members of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes for religious worship.2 This includes prayer, meditation, and the collection of ceremonial herbs and materials at specific sites scattered throughout the forest.3
In 1977, the Forest Service prepared a final environmental impact statement for a proposal to harvest timber in the Chimney Rock area and to construct a six-mile paved road linking two existing roads.4 The environmental impact statement acknowledged that the proposed harvesting and road construction may have an impact on the religious practices of the tribes.5 This is because the proposed project will affect the sanctity of the Blue Creek area, which is considered sacred by the tribes.6 The statement also noted that the proposed road would be difficult to obliterate and that the timber harvesting would remove vegetation which screens the area from the road.7
In 1978, the Forest Service adopted a plan permitting timber harvesting in the area and construction of the road within a 200-foot right-of-way.8 The plan established protective buffer zones prohibiting timber harvesting and road construction within 100 feet of identified religious sites and logging roads within one-quarter mile of those sites.9
Respondents, who are members of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, and others, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the Forest Service decisions.10 After trial, the District Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting construction of the road and timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area.11 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.12
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984.13 This designated much of the property as wilderness and thereby precluded commercial timber harvesting except for a narrow exempted strip coinciding with the proposed road route.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1987.15
Whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the Government from permitting timber harvesting in, and constructing a road through, a portion of a National Forest that has historically been used for religious purposes by members of three Native American tribes?16
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government action that coerces individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or penalizes them for those beliefs by denying rights or benefits.17 It does not require accommodation of religious practices incidentally affected by generally applicable government actions on public land.18 The compelling interest test applies only when the government burdens free exercise by forcing a choice between religious tenets and a penalty or benefit denial.19
No. The Forest Service's plan to harvest timber and construct a road in the Chimney Rock area, with buffer zones around religious sites, will have only an incidental effect on the tribes' religious practices as described in the established facts.20 The government action does not coerce the respondents into violating their beliefs or penalize them by denying benefits.21 The compelling interest test is inapplicable because the action is not an attempt to penalize or burden free exercise directly but rather management of national forest resources under the multiple-use mandate.22
The Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the Government from permitting timber harvesting in the area or constructing the road.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the Free Exercise Clause protects against any governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice, not merely coercion or penalties.24 He explained that Native American religion regards the land itself as sacred and that destruction of the high country would destroy the religion, rendering the practices impossible.25 Brennan argued that the lower courts correctly found the burden substantial.26
He contended that the government's interests in the road and harvesting were not compelling.27 Brennan distinguished the case from internal procedures like those in Bowen v. Roy and applied the impact analysis from Wisconsin v. Yoder.28
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun joined Brennan's dissent and wrote separately to stress the unique character of Native American religion.29 In this faith, religion is inseparable from life and the land serves as the source of spiritual power rather than a mere setting for worship.30 He contended that the majority's approach wrongly equates these beliefs with mainstream religions.31
Blackmun argued that the approach fails to recognize that desecration of the land destroys the religion itself.32 This produces a result insensitive to the religious needs the Constitution should protect.33