Concept
Limits on the Consent Rule
Citizenship
Limits on the Consent Rule
Afroyim v. Rusk holds that Congress may not strip a citizen of citizenship, native-born or naturalized, without the citizen's consent, so a statute that ends citizenship automatically when a citizen votes in a foreign election is unconstitutional. The rule is firm, and its firmness invites over-reading. It does not say that no government act can ever condition, reduce, or reverse citizenship without the holder's say. It protects citizenship that the Constitution itself recognizes, and it protects that citizenship from a loss that Congress imposes on the holder. Each half of that description marks a boundary.
Four situations test the boundaries. In the first two, the rule does not reach the facts: one citizen's status rests on a statute alone, and another's naturalization was unlawfully procured, so neither holds a status the rule protects. In the last two, the rule may well apply, but a separate limit on Congress applies whether or not it does. One forbids penalties that fall only on naturalized citizens, and the other forbids using loss of nationality as punishment. Both of those limits predate Afroyim and do not depend on it.
Every loss-of-citizenship problem therefore starts with a classification question: how did this person come to hold citizenship? The answer decides whether the consent rule applies at all, and when it does not, the analysis moves on to ask which other limit does.
Citizenship Acquired Abroad
Rogers v. Bellei tests the consent rule against a citizen whose status Congress created and then conditioned. Bellei acquired citizenship by birth outside the United States, under a statute that tied the continuation of that status to residence in the United States. He left the United States and was notified that he had lost his citizenship. He sought to enjoin the statute, claiming that it violated due process and imposed cruel and unusual punishment.1
The Supreme Court reversed in another five-to-four decision. It held that citizenship acquired by birth abroad is not constitutionally conferred and is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, whose first sentence refers to “persons born or naturalized in the United States.”2 Bellei's citizenship was a mere creation of statute, so it was subject to congressional restrictions, and the Court found it perfectly reasonable for Congress to impose a “condition subsequent” on the grant.3 A condition subsequent operates after a grant has taken effect and ends the grant if it goes unmet; a condition precedent must be met before the grant takes effect at all. Bellei's citizenship was complete upon his birth abroad, and the statute made keeping it depend on what he did afterward.
The reasoning tracks what Afroyim protected. The consent rule shields the status that the Citizenship Clause defines, and the Clause defines it through two routes, birth or naturalization in the United States. Bellei came in by neither route, so the statute, not the Constitution, was the source of his status, and the statute could set its terms. When Bellei lost his citizenship, Congress was not reaching into a status the Constitution had placed beyond its power. The statute was operating on the terms on which it had granted the status. The result fits a general pattern: the connections a person must have with the nation vary with how the person acquired citizenship.4
A child born in the United States stands differently even when the facts look the same. Almost all persons born in the United States acquire citizenship automatically and cannot lose it involuntarily, even if they leave the United States immediately after birth and never return.5 Their absence matches Bellei's or exceeds it, and the result reverses. A residence requirement cannot reach the birthright citizen because the Constitution is the source of that status, while it can reach the person born abroad because the status comes from the statute that carries the requirement.
Justice Black's dissent attacks the majority's line itself. He saw no distinction among forms of citizenship that justified second-class treatment of citizens born abroad, and he wrote: “I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans and not others.”6 The majority reads the words “in the United States” as marking the edge of the protected status, and the dissent reads the Amendment to protect every citizen alike. Because the vote was five to four, an answer that presents the dissent as controlling reverses the law, but an answer that notes the objection shows awareness of how contested the line is.
Congress has since repealed the statute at issue in Bellei.7 The repeal removes that residence requirement and leaves the constitutional distinction intact: a person who holds citizenship only because a statute granted it at birth abroad remains outside the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a condition Congress attaches to that status falls under Bellei. On an exam, locate the birth first. A person born or naturalized in the United States falls under the consent rule. A person whose citizenship exists only because a statute granted it abroad falls under Bellei, and the question becomes what condition the statute attached. The remaining parts turn from the source of citizenship to what Congress is doing to it.
Unlawfully Procured Naturalization
The consent rule protects citizenship that a person lawfully holds, and Afroyim itself marked that boundary in a footnote observing that naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside. The footnote cites Knauer v. United States, Baumgartner v. United States, and Schneiderman v. United States as examples.9
The footnote fits the rule because of what the rule protects. A certificate obtained by deceiving the Government never rested on a lawful application of the naturalization rule, so cancelling it takes away no status that the Constitution had placed beyond Congress's reach. Cancellation undoes a defective grant and leaves untouched the honest citizen whom the consent rule shields.
Congress derives the power to revoke wrongfully procured certificates from its authority under Article I, § 8 to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause.10 Article I vests in Congress the legislative powers that the Constitution enumerates and delegates, and the naturalization power is one of them.11 A power to set the terms of admission would mean little if the terms bound only the applicants who chose to obey them, because concealing a disqualifying fact would then be the winning strategy. The Necessary and Proper Clause supplies the means of enforcing those terms, and cancelling a certificate obtained by deception is one such means.
In Costello v. United States the Court sustained the 1952 version of the denaturalization statute as applied to certificates procured “by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” The statute is section 340 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1451.12
The Government enforces the power by suing, and the earlier grant does not bar the suit. The original naturalization order has no res judicata effect against this independent attack by the United States, as Johannessen v. United States held, even though the same order is immune from collateral attack, as Tutun v. United States held.13 Res judicata means that an earlier judgment ordinarily bars relitigation of the same question; here the earlier approval does not. The two rules fit together through the nature of the defect. A fraud works by keeping the Government from seeing the problem when it first decides, so if that first decision barred a later suit, the deception would protect itself.
The Government also cannot do this administratively. In Gorbach v. Reno the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Attorney General lacked authority to revoke citizenship administratively, and the court then permanently enjoined the INS from enforcing its administrative denaturalization procedure.14 Loss of citizenship is among the gravest outcomes the law imposes, and a judicial forum puts a decisionmaker outside the agency between the Government's accusation and the citizen's status. Because Gorbach is a Ninth Circuit decision, describe it as that court's holding and not as a ruling of the Supreme Court.
Congress's power to prescribe grounds for revocation has been repeatedly upheld, but the Court has struck down provisions it found arbitrary or discriminatory. In Schneider v. Rusk, for example, the Court invalidated a provision that took nationality from a naturalized citizen who lived in a foreign state for three years or more, a penalty that native-born citizens did not face.15 That limit reaches denaturalization grounds as well, and the next part takes it up.
Equal Treatment of Naturalized Citizens
Afroyim settles who decides whether a citizen's status continues, and it leaves open whether Congress may lay a penalty on naturalized citizens that falls on no one else. Schneider v. Rusk, decided three years before Afroyim, says it may not. The Court invalidated a provision under which a naturalized citizen lost nationality by residing in a foreign state for three years or more, a penalty that native-born citizens never faced.17
Congress's power in matters touching nationality is broad, and its breadth cannot be measured by the enumerated clauses alone. The case law suggests that not all federal powers depend on affirmative grants of the Constitution, that some areas of governance are inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality, and that Congress holds some of those powers as the nation's primary law-giving agency.18 Breadth of source answers a different question from the one Schneider answers, which is how far the power may be used against one class of citizens.
The Court held that the provision discriminated against naturalized citizens in violation of due process, creating a “second-class citizenship” without a rational justification. The Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, but it does forbid discrimination that is “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”19 The objection is short. A rule that burdens naturalized citizens and no one else makes the way a person became a citizen the only difference between the citizen who loses nationality and the citizen who keeps it, because native-born citizens who spent the same time abroad faced no penalty at all.
How does Schneider differ from the residence requirements Congress sets for people who want to naturalize? Both attach consequences to time spent outside the United States, but they reach people in different positions. A person seeking naturalization generally must reside in the United States for three or five years after being granted permanent residence, demonstrate good moral character, and meet other requirements.20 An absence of one year or more breaks the continuity of residence as a matter of law, and the applicant must complete a new period of residence after returning.21 Those are conditions of admission. They apply to everyone who asks, they take nothing from a person who already holds citizenship, and they say nothing about naturalized citizens as a class, because applicants are not yet citizens.
The equal-treatment principle and the consent rule operate independently. The provision in Schneider ended nationality automatically because of residence abroad, without asking whether the citizen meant to give it up, so after Afroyim it would also face the consent rule. The Court has since reaffirmed that expatriation requires specific intent to relinquish citizenship voluntarily, and that the intent may be expressed in words or fairly inferred from proven conduct.22 The equal-treatment principle adds a ground that does not turn on consent at all: Congress may not impose on naturalized citizens, as a class, a penalty that native-born citizens do not face.
That principle connects to the preceding part. Congress's power to prescribe grounds for revoking naturalization has been repeatedly upheld, as with certificates procured by concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation, but the Court has struck down provisions it deemed arbitrary or discriminatory.23 The two kinds of ground look at different things. A fraud ground asks what the individual did to obtain the status. A Schneider-type ground asks only what the individual is, a naturalized citizen, and penalizes that. Finding discrimination against naturalized citizens should not end an exam answer, because a statute that took citizenship from native-born and naturalized citizens alike would avoid the discrimination objection and would still have to satisfy the consent rule.
Expatriation as Punishment
Afroyim was not the first decision to limit Congress's power to end nationality, and one earlier limit keeps working beside the consent rule. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez the Court struck down a statute that stripped nationality from a person who left the United States in wartime to evade military service, holding that the automatic loss was punishment imposed without due process or trial by jury. The consent rule asks whether the citizen agreed to lose the status. The punishment ground asks what the statute does when it ties the loss to misconduct, so a statute of this kind can fail on two independent grounds.
Mendoza-Martinez had already been prosecuted for evading service and had served his sentence. Only afterward did the Government claim that the same act had also cost him his nationality. The prosecution and the claimed loss were two separate consequences of one act, and the Court's holding concerned only the second.
The reasoning starts from what makes a consequence a punishment. A consequence that the law attaches to wrongdoing in order to penalize it is a punishment whatever the statute calls it, and punishment carries the protections that govern criminal sanctions: a charge, a hearing, and a jury that finds the facts before the penalty falls. The statute skipped every one of them. Nationality ended by operation of law at the moment of the act, and no tribunal ever decided that the loss was deserved. A legislature that could avoid those safeguards by describing a penalty as a status loss that happens automatically could impose any sanction without a trial.
Trop v. Dulles supplies a second ground, though only a plurality adopted it. A plurality opinion is one joined by fewer than a majority of the Justices, so its reasoning, however influential, is not a holding of the Court. The Trop plurality held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits Congress from stripping a citizen of citizenship as punishment, and Chief Justice Warren wrote that citizenship is “the right to have rights.” To deprive a citizen of citizenship, he added, is to subject him to a fate worse than death.25 The attribution matters on an exam. The Eighth Amendment ground belongs to the Trop plurality, while Mendoza-Martinez rested on due process and jury trial, so an answer that reports the Eighth Amendment as the holding of Mendoza-Martinez misreports the later case.
The line between the prosecution and the automatic loss is the one to draw in an exam answer. A plea, a conviction, and a sentence for evading service are an ordinary use of the criminal process, and the holding did not reach them. The completed sentence did not rescue the statute, because the automatic loss was a further penalty, and the proceedings that produced the sentence had never been the occasion for deciding it. A conviction after a jury trial can send a draft evader to prison, but a statute that cancels nationality for the same act without any trial cannot do the same work.
The punishment ground survives alongside the consent rule because it asks a different question. The Court has reaffirmed that expatriation requires proof of specific intent to relinquish citizenship voluntarily, in addition to proof that the expatriating act itself was voluntary.26 That is a rule about who decides whether the status continues. The punishment ground asks whether a statute has imposed a sanction for misconduct without the process a sanction requires. A statute that ends nationality because of draft evasion draws both objections, and a fact pattern in which Congress ends nationality because of misconduct, with no charge or trial, should prompt both in an answer. A citizen who signs a formal renunciation presents neither, because the loss then follows from the citizen's own choice and no sanction has been imposed on anyone.