Facts

Petitioner, born in Poland in 1893, immigrated to the United States in 1912 and became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, he traveled to Israel, and in 1951, he voluntarily voted in an election for the Israeli Knesset, Israel's legislative body.

In 1960, when petitioner applied for renewal of his United States passport, the Department of State denied the application solely on the ground that he had lost his American citizenship under § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which provides that a U.S. citizen loses citizenship by voting in a political election in a foreign state.

Petitioner then filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court against the respondent (the Secretary of State), seeking a declaration that § 401(e) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and § 1, cl. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants citizenship to naturalized persons like him. He argued that citizenship can only be lost through voluntary renunciation and that Congress lacks power to involuntarily expatriate citizens. The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected his arguments, holding that Congress has authority to revoke citizenship for foreign voting based on its implied power to regulate foreign affairs, following Perez v. Brownell, and thus petitioner had lost his citizenship regardless of intent. Petitioner sought certiorari, which was granted, urging the Supreme Court to overrule Perez.

Analysis

Issue #1

Issue

Does Congress have an implied power, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, to involuntarily expatriate an American citizen for voting in a foreign election?

Legal Rule

The Constitution grants Congress only enumerated powers, including those necessary and proper to execute them, but no express power to strip citizenship. Any implied power must derive from sovereignty attributes, yet in the U.S., sovereignty resides in the people, limiting government to constitutionally granted powers. Historical legislative debates and judicial dicta, such as in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, indicate Congress lacks authority to deprive citizenship without consent under the Naturalization Clause or other provisions.

Rule Analysis

The opinion rejected the Perez majority's view that Congress possesses an implied power from sovereignty to regulate foreign affairs by expatriating citizens without assent, emphasizing that U.S. sovereignty belongs to the people, not the government, and the Constitution limits Congress to specified powers.

Historical analysis showed that Congress repeatedly rejected bills in 1794, 1797, and 1818 proposing involuntary expatriation, with members arguing no constitutional authority existed for such measures, viewing expatriation as requiring citizen consent. Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Osborn reinforced that once granted, citizenship cannot be abridged by Congress.

These elements, considered in context, demonstrated no pre-Fourteenth Amendment power for involuntary expatriation, undermining any claim of implied authority.

Conclusion

No, Congress lacks any general implied power to take away American citizenship without the citizen's assent.

Issue #2

Issue

Does the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit Congress from enacting a law that involuntarily strips citizenship from a naturalized American for voting in a foreign election?

Legal Rule

The Fourteenth Amendment states: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States... are citizens of the United States....' This establishes a permanent citizenship that a citizen retains unless voluntarily relinquished, beyond governmental power to destroy. The Amendment's purpose, including securing citizenship for freedmen and others, implies protection against arbitrary revocation, supported by legislative history of the 1868 Expatriation Act recognizing citizenship loss only through voluntary renunciation.

Rule Analysis

The Amendment's language was interpreted as defining enduring citizenship, not subject to governmental cancellation, with its framers intending to place citizenship beyond legislative reach to protect vulnerable groups like freedmen.

Legislative history of the 1868 Act confirmed Congress viewed expatriation as requiring voluntary citizen action, rejecting involuntary measures, and United States v. Wong Kim Ark affirmed Congress cannot abridge constitutionally conferred citizenship.

This construction aligned with principles of liberty and equal justice, rejecting Perez's allowance of involuntary expatriation as incongruous with free government, where officials cannot deprive citizens of status without consent.

Thus, § 401(e) violated the Amendment by enabling forcible citizenship loss without voluntary renunciation.

Conclusion

Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such congressional action, rendering § 401(e) unconstitutional as applied here. Perez v. Brownell is overruled, and petitioner retains his citizenship with the judgment reversed.

Additional Opinions

Mr. Justice Harlan: Dissent

Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and White, dissents from the majority's overruling of Perez v. Brownell, which upheld Congress's power under § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 to expatriate citizens for voting in foreign elections. He criticizes the majority's reasoning as circumlocutory, relying on unsubstantiated assertions, inconclusive historical surveys, and a misinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, rather than directly engaging with Perez's logic. Harlan argues that historical evidence prior to the Fourteenth Amendment does not support the majority's view that Congress lacks power to expatriate without consent. He dismisses the majority's reliance on rejected legislation from 1794, 1797, and 1818, and a dictum from Osborn v. Bank of the United States, noting these are inconclusive and based on outdated views of state-federal citizenship relations. Instead, he highlights Congress's passage of the Wade-Davis bill in 1864 and the Enrollment Act of 1865, both expatriating unwilling citizens without constitutional challenge, as evidence of Congress's understood authority. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan contends the Citizenship Clause was intended merely to define citizenship—overruling Dred Scott and establishing federal citizenship independent of states—to protect freedmen, not to prohibit involuntary expatriation. He cites Senator Howard's statements, including an explicit acknowledgment of expatriation by Congress for crimes, and notes the absence of contrary intent in debates on related 1867 and 1868 acts. Bilateral expatriation treaties and administrative practices post-1868 further confirm Congress's ongoing exercise of this power. Harlan proposes no new rule but affirms Perez's holding that Congress has implied power to expatriate citizens for acts prejudicial to foreign relations, indicating diluted allegiance, as a valid exercise of foreign affairs authority. He concludes the Citizenship Clause only declares initial attachment of citizenship, leaving Congress free to regulate expatriation constitutionally, and urges affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment.