350 U.S. 359 (1956)
Frank Costello was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of willfully attempting to evade payment of income taxes due the United States for the years 1947, 1948, and 1949.1 The indictment alleged that Costello had falsely and fraudulently reported less income than he and his wife actually received during those taxable years.2
Prior to trial, Costello filed a motion for inspection of the grand jury minutes and for dismissal of the indictment.3 His motion was based on an affidavit stating that he was firmly convinced there could have been no legal or competent evidence before the grand jury which indicted him since he had reported all his income and paid all taxes due.4
The district court denied the motion.5 At trial the government called and examined 144 witnesses and introduced 368 exhibits, all relating to business transactions and expenditures by Costello and his wife.6 The prosecution concluded its case by calling three government agents whose investigations had produced the evidence used at trial; the agents summarized the evidence and introduced net worth computations.7
On cross-examination the three agents testified that they had been the only witnesses to appear before the grand jury.8 After the government rested, Costello renewed his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the only evidence before the grand jury was hearsay.9 The district court denied the motion, and Costello was convicted.10
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether a defendant may be required to stand trial and a conviction sustained where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury.
Whether a defendant may be required to stand trial and a conviction be sustained where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury which indicated him?12
The Fifth Amendment provides that federal prosecutions for capital or otherwise infamous crimes must be instituted by presentments or indictments of grand juries.13 But neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act.14 An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.15 The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.16
Yes. The grand jury that indicted Costello heard testimony solely from three government agents who had no firsthand knowledge of the financial transactions at issue and who summarized evidence developed from 144 other witnesses and 368 exhibits.17 Despite the hearsay character of that testimony, the indictment was returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury and was valid on its face.18 The Fifth Amendment does not require that the evidence supporting an indictment be competent or adequate.19 A rule permitting challenges on that ground would produce great delay without enhancing the fairness of the eventual trial on the merits.20
Therefore a defendant may be required to stand trial and a conviction may be sustained even when only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury.21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Burton agreed with the denial of the motion to quash the indictment but believed the breadth of the majority's declarations went too far.23 He assumed the Court would not preclude examination of grand-jury action to ascertain bias or prejudice.24 He further stated that if it is shown that the grand jury had before it no substantial or rationally persuasive evidence upon which to base its indictment, that indictment should be quashed.25 An empty indictment would rob the Fifth Amendment of much of its protective value to the private citizen.26
In this case, however, the agents' testimony was rationally persuasive of the crime charged and provided a substantial basis for the indictment even though it was incompetent by circumstances standing alone.27 He therefore concurred in the judgment for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and subject to the limitations expressed there.28