372 U.S. 144 (1963)
Frank Martinez Mendoza, a native-born American citizen, registered for the draft in 1949.1 In 1942, while his application for a student deferment was pending, he departed the United States for Mexico and remained there until November 1946 solely to evade military service.2 He returned voluntarily in 1946, pleaded guilty in 1947 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to evasion of service obligations under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and served a sentence of a year and a day.3
After his release, Mendoza resided undisturbed until 1953, when the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings on the ground that he had lost citizenship under § 401(j) of the Nationality Act of 1940 by remaining outside the United States after September 27, 1944, to avoid military service.4 The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal.5 Mendoza then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of California seeking a declaration of citizenship and the unconstitutionality of the statute.6
Joseph Henry Cort, a native-born American citizen born in Boston in 1927, left the United States in 1951 after receiving his M.D. from Yale to accept a research fellowship at Cambridge University.7 He had registered under the Doctors Draft Act.8 After his draft board denied deferment and ordered him to report for physical examinations in 1953 and for induction on September 14, 1953, Cort did not appear and moved to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1954.9
In 1959 his passport application was denied on the ground that he had lost citizenship under § 349(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 by remaining abroad to evade service.10 Cort sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment of citizenship and an injunction against enforcement of the statute.11 The three-judge district court held the statute unconstitutional.12 Both cases reached the Supreme Court after direct appeals, remands, and reargument.13
Whether the proceeding in Mendoza-Martinez' case should have been heard by a three-judge District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2282?
28 U.S.C. § 2282 requires a three-judge district court for any interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds.14
No. The amended complaint contained a prayer for injunctive relief, but the parties' approved trial stipulation framed the issues solely in terms of collateral estoppel and a declaration of unconstitutionality, with no contemplation of injunctive relief.15 The district court's memorandum opinion, findings, and judgment granted only declaratory relief that § 401(j) was unconstitutional and that Mendoza-Martinez remained a citizen.16 Because the relief sought and obtained was noncoercive and left the Government free to continue applying the statute pending appeal, the congressional policy underlying § 2282 was not implicated.17
The case was properly heard by a single district judge.18
Whether the Government was collaterally estopped from denying Mendoza-Martinez' citizenship based on his 1947 draft-evasion conviction?19
Collateral estoppel applies only to matters actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior proceeding.20
No. The 1947 indictment and judgment charged Mendoza-Martinez with knowingly departing the United States on or about November 15, 1942, for the purpose of evading service.21 The language concerning his continued presence in Mexico until November 1, 1946, was surplusage not tied to the scienter elements.22 Because the Selective Training and Service Act applied to both citizens and resident aliens, the conviction entailed no actual or necessary finding that Mendoza-Martinez remained a citizen after September 27, 1944, when § 401(j) took effect.23
The Government was not collaterally estopped from denying citizenship in the declaratory judgment action.24
Whether §§ 401(j) and 349(a)(10) of the Nationality Act are unconstitutional because they impose punishment without the procedural safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?25
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that punishment for crime be imposed only after indictment, notice, confrontation, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process.26
Yes. Sections 401(j) and 349(a)(10) automatically divest citizenship upon departure or remaining abroad with intent to evade military service, the identical conduct criminalized under the Selective Service laws, without any prior judicial determination.27 Legislative history from the 1865 Act through the 1944 enactment of § 401(j) demonstrates that Congress viewed loss of citizenship as an additional penalty for draft evasion.28 The statutes satisfy every traditional indicium of punishment, including affirmative disability, historical treatment as punishment, scienter requirement, and retributive purpose.29
Because the sanction is imposed without criminal-trial safeguards, the statutes violate due process.30
Sections 401(j) and 349(a)(10) are unconstitutional.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan joined the majority because the statutes employ expatriation as a penal sanction for behavior inimical to a congressional objective.32 Congress is debarred from using expatriation without the full panoply of procedural safeguards required for penal sanctions.33 He elaborated that expatriation may be employed only where intrinsically and peculiarly appropriate to serious nationality problems.34
It may not be used merely to curb undesirable conduct or exact retribution.35 He found the statutes indistinguishable from the provision invalidated in Trop v. Dulles.36
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court.37 He adhered to the view expressed in his Perez v. Brownell dissent.38 Congress has no power to deprive a person of citizenship granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to native-born citizens.39
This position rests on the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.40 It precludes any congressional authority to impose involuntary expatriation on those born in the United States.41
Joined by Justice Clark
Justice Harlan dissented.42 He contended that the power of Congress to regulate the conditions under which citizenship may be lost is well established under the naturalization power.43 He argued that loss of citizenship under these statutes is a regulation of the conditions of citizenship rather than punishment.44
The administrative procedures provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.45 He would have affirmed the judgments below.46
Joined by Justice White
Justice Stewart dissented.47 He argued that the statutes are not punitive in the constitutional sense.48 They represent a rational exercise of the war power to remove a corrosive influence on wartime morale.49
He found no clear proof that the dominant congressional purpose was vengeance.50 He concluded that the legislation bears a rational relationship to Congress's power to provide for the common defense.51
Whether the evidentiary presumption in § 349(a)(10) is constitutionally valid?52
An evidentiary presumption is constitutionally valid only if there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.53
No. The presumption that failure to comply with any provision of any compulsory service law raises an inference that departure or absence was for the purpose of evading military service lacks a rational connection when applied to technical or insignificant violations unrelated to the expatriating intent.54 The presumption therefore violates due process.55
The evidentiary presumption in § 349(a)(10) is unconstitutional.56
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White
Justice Stewart concluded that the evidentiary presumption in § 349(a)(10) is clearly invalid.57 There is insufficient rational connection between failure to comply with any compulsory service provision and the ultimate fact of expatriating intent.58 He would have vacated the judgment in Cort and remanded for a new administrative hearing free of the presumption.59
Joined by Justice Clark
Justice Harlan concluded that the presumption is constitutionally valid on its face and as applied.60 Similar presumptions have been consistently sustained in criminal statutes where the standard of proof is no less stringent than in denationalization cases.61 The rational-connection requirement is satisfied here.62 He would have upheld the denationalization orders in both cases.63