Concept
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Privileges and Immunities Clauses
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment makes every person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, a citizen of the United States and of the state where that person resides.1 Its next sentence then limits the states: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”2 That sentence is the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Its name differs from Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause by a single conjunction, and the near-match tempts students to merge two provisions that work differently.
Article IV, § 2 promises that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”3 As the earlier sections showed, it works as a comparison and reaches the outsider whom a state treats worse than its own people. The Fourteenth Amendment clause is a flat command to the states, and it protects citizens of the United States, a class that includes a state's own residents. That difference explains why the Fourteenth Amendment mattered where Article IV ran out. A newcomer who already lives in the burdening state cannot invoke Article IV, which protects citizens of other states, but she can invoke the Fourteenth Amendment clause, which protects the interests of all persons, including citizens of the state in question.4
The Amendment's text does not say what the privileges or immunities of national citizenship are. Do both clauses protect the same fundamental rights, or did the Amendment create a new category to match its new definition of United States citizenship? The text, standing alone, does not answer.5 The Supreme Court answered in 1873, and its answer was narrow enough that the clause did almost no work for more than a century, until Saenz v. Roe revived the long-dormant provision in 1999.6 This section follows that arc: Slaughter-House, the equal protection cases that carried the right to travel in the meantime, the three components of that right, the holding in Saenz, and the questions the majority and the dissenters left open. A later section sets the clause beside Article IV so that you can choose between them on a fact pattern.
Slaughter-House and National Citizenship
In the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the Court turned firmly away from reading the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause as a source of general rights against the states.7 Louisiana had given one corporation a monopoly over all slaughtering and butchering in New Orleans, and the monopoly kept independent butchers out of their trade.8 The butchers argued that Section 1 had absorbed the privileges Article IV protects, among them the right to engage in a common calling, so that the monopoly abridged a privilege of United States citizens.9 The Court rejected that premise, and the definition it supplied explains why the clause lay unused for so long.
Justice Miller's majority opinion began with the text. The Amendment's first sentence distinguishes citizens of the United States from citizens of a state, and the clause that follows names only the first group.10 The Court found it too clear for argument that this change in phrasing was adopted understandingly and with a purpose.11 Only the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States stand under the clause's protection; the privileges of state citizenship, whatever they may be, receive no additional protection from it.12
The Court also read the three Reconstruction Amendments as sharing one pervading purpose: the freedom of the slave race, the firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.13 A reading of the clause that carried far beyond that purpose would change the relation of the state and federal governments to the people. The Court said such a reading required language expressing that purpose too clearly to admit of doubt, and it was convinced that neither Congress nor the ratifying legislatures had intended it.14
Having narrowed the clause, the majority excused itself from defining the national privileges until a case made it necessary, but it ventured several rights that owe their existence to the federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws:15
- The right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim, transact business, seek protection, or share in administering its functions, with free access to its seaports, subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several states.16
- The right to demand the care and protection of the federal government over life, liberty, and property on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government.17
- The right to assemble peaceably and to petition for redress of grievances.
- The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.18
- The right to use the navigable waters of the United States.
- All rights secured to citizens by treaties with foreign nations.19
Every item on the list depends on the national government for its existence. Later summaries of the national privileges add the right to travel throughout the United States, which anticipates Saenz.20
The protection these rights receive is absolute. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any abridgment of a national privilege, whether or not the state discriminates against citizens of other states.21 Article IV, by contrast, protects the privileges of state citizenship only against discrimination, and the right to pursue a trade is one of those privileges.22 The Louisiana monopoly therefore fell outside both clauses. The trade is a privilege of state citizenship, which the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach, and Article IV did not apply because the monopoly burdened all independent butchers whatever their state of citizenship.23 The Court also rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment had removed Article IV's discrimination requirement.24 Do not treat the Fourteenth Amendment clause as Article IV's list in stronger form; it covers different rights in a different way.
The monopoly and the petition ban both apply to everyone alike, yet that feature decides different questions. Equal application defeated the butchers' Article IV theory, because no one was singled out. It does nothing to weaken the traveler's Fourteenth Amendment claim, which asks only whether the right belongs to national citizenship. The butchers' trade belonged to state citizenship; the right to reach the national government belongs to the national kind.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Slaughter-House held fundamentally different views of what the clause covers.25 The majority's reading also meant that the clause did not incorporate any part of the Bill of Rights.26 Justice Black, concurring in Duncan v. Louisiana, rejected that result. Any reading of the clause that excludes the Bill of Rights' safeguards, he argued, renders its words meaningless, and Senator Howard, who introduced the Amendment in the Senate, read them the other way.27 Black's view lost. Most Bill of Rights provisions now bind the states through the Due Process Clause under the incorporation doctrine, and most of the national privileges on Miller's list are protected by other parts of the Constitution, so the clause has seldom mattered.28
The clause's later history shows how complete the narrowing was. Colgate v. Harvey (1935) briefly gave the clause independent force by striking down a state tax provision, and Madden v. Kentucky (1940) overruled it. The clause then did no work until Saenz, and the Court has since declined an invitation to reconsider the 1873 reading in McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).29
Right to Travel Before Saenz
The Equal Protection Clause carried the right to travel until Saenz, beginning with Shapiro v. Thompson. Connecticut denied Thompson's application for aid to families with dependent children solely because she had not lived in the state for a year before applying, and a three-judge court, one judge dissenting, declared the waiting period unconstitutional.31 The Supreme Court held the waiting period unconstitutional, reasoning that any classification penalizing the exercise of the constitutional right to travel is invalid unless a compelling state interest justifies it.32 A year without aid imposes a substantial burden on needy people who want to migrate, and that burden made the waiting period a penalty.33 Saenz later described the holding as one under the Equal Protection Clause.34
Shapiro did not name a textual home for the right. The Court said it had no occasion to ascribe the source of the right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision, and it relied on Chief Justice Taney's statement in the Passenger Cases that “we are one people, with one common country,” with the right “to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.”35 Justice Stewart, concurring, stressed that the Court was not picking human activities to label fundamental; it was recognizing an established constitutional right and giving it the protection the Constitution itself demands.36 Two supports for such a right lie in the structure of the Union: the individual's freedom to move, and a federal system in which barriers to movement, like trade barriers, would cause friction among the states.37 Article IV could not have served the claimant, because it protects citizens of other states and not residents of the burdening state.38 The Court therefore applied a demanding standard to a right whose place in the text it left unassigned, and that gap explains why a later decision took a different route.
The analysis has two stages, and the first can end the case before any interest is weighed. The Court accepted that the one-year device was well suited to discourage poor families from coming, since an indigent who wants to resettle will hesitate if he must risk the move with no state aid during the first year, when his need may be most acute. It then held that “the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible.”39 Because the law's success was the harm, no justification remained for that aim, and narrowing it did not help, since a state may no more fence out indigents who seek higher benefits than it may fence out indigents generally.40
Once deterrence was excluded, the states offered other justifications, and each failed for a different reason:
- The aim of excluding only those who come for higher benefits failed on fit. The statutes barred every newcomer, so they enacted nonrebuttable presumptions that each applicant had come solely for higher benefits, and nothing in the records supported the presumption. The aim also assumed that people who weigh benefit levels are less deserving than other indigents.41
- The aim of apportioning benefits by past tax contributions failed on logic, because the same reasoning would let a state bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection, and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment.42
- The aims of planning the welfare budget, preventing fraud, and encouraging early entry into the job market failed on proof and weight. The records did not support them, and even legitimate interests of that kind would not be compelling enough to justify a penalty on the right to travel.43
The three failures show what strict scrutiny demands: a classification drawn closely around the stated aim, a justification that does not prove too much, and a factual record behind the claimed interest.
The later cases kept Shapiro's trigger, a penalty on the right to travel, and applied it to other waiting periods. A durational residency requirement makes a person live in a jurisdiction for a set period before receiving a benefit or exercising a right, and the Court has invalidated a variety of such requirements, among them waiting periods for voting in Dunn v. Blumstein and for nonemergency hospital care in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.44 The principle never reached every waiting period, however. The Court has repeatedly sanctioned durational requirements for in-state tuition, upholding a one-year requirement in Starns v. Malkerson, and Vlandis v. Kline said that a state may set reasonable criteria that make virtually certain that students who came solely for educational purposes cannot claim the in-state rate.45
In Sosna v. Iowa, the Court upheld a one-year residence requirement for filing for divorce, reasoning that Iowa could quite reasonably decline to become a divorce mill for unhappy spouses who had lived there only briefly.46 One important factor in these cases may have been whether the requirement was reasonably aimed at determining whether people seeking a benefit had really moved there, as opposed to staying only long enough to obtain a benefit such as permissive divorce laws.47 Justice Marshall, dissenting, would have begun elsewhere, with whether the right to a divorce is important enough that denying it to recent arrivals penalizes interstate travel, and in his view it clearly is.48 The standard that survives these cases is less than clear. The Court has said that a waiting period for basic welfare benefits must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, but it has also indicated that waiting periods that do not deter migration may be upheld, either because they do not impair the right to travel or because they survive some form of intermediate scrutiny.49 Marshall's question is the one the Shapiro line asks first.
The decisions also separate two kinds of residency rule. A bona fide residency requirement limits a benefit to people who actually live in the state, and a person who arrives and in good faith asserts residence for the indefinite future qualifies at once. A durational requirement adds a waiting period, and the waiting period is what burdens the right to travel.50 The Court has accordingly applied no strict scrutiny to laws that encourage people to remain in a state, such as limiting government jobs to residents, because they deter no one from entering.51
The route through equal protection had a weakness, and Saenz exposed it. Equal protection analysis asks whether a law impinges on the right to travel, so treatment that falls too incidentally on migration may escape strict scrutiny.52 California's later scheme looked incidental in that sense: newcomers were never cut off from aid, they received the benefits they had received or would have received in their home states, and housing assistance and food stamp allowances partly offset the gap.53 California argued that it had merely declined to reward newcomers and had not penalized them.54 The Court avoided that argument by resting Saenz on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which has no similar impingement requirement.55 A litigant would almost always prefer that clause, and the equal protection line of right-to-travel cases may fall into desuetude.56
Three Components of Travel
The word “travel” appears nowhere in the Constitution's text, yet the “constitutional right to travel from one State to another” is firmly embedded in the Court's decisions.58 Because the Court has found different pieces of that right in different places, Saenz v. Roe sorted it into at least three components: a citizen's right to enter and to leave another state, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien while temporarily present there, and, for travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like that state's other citizens.59 The text supports each component differently:
- The right to enter and to leave another state has no particular clause assigned to it.60
- The right to be treated as a welcome visitor is expressly protected by Article IV, § 2, through the traveler's status as a citizen of another state.61
- The right of a newly arrived permanent resident to be treated like other citizens rests on state citizenship and on the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.62
The first component concerns barriers at the border. Edwards v. California struck down a law that prohibited the transport of any indigent person into California, a classic barrier to travel or migration.63 The Court later reaffirmed the component in United States v. Guest, which protected the right to travel freely to and from Georgia and to use its highways and the other instrumentalities of interstate commerce there.64 The right does not bar every charge: in Evansville–Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, the Court sustained a one-dollar tax on commercial airline passengers, over Justice Douglas's dissent that doing so required overruling Crandall, because nominal charges that reimburse the state for a public facility that aids transportation are permissible.65 Saenz did not identify the textual source of this component. California imposed no obstacle to the respondents' entry, so the State was right that its statute did not directly impair free interstate movement, and the Court added only that the free ingress and regress the Articles of Confederation expressly mentioned may have been “conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.”66 The first component asks whether a person can cross the line at all, and the other two ask how the person is treated after arrival. A law that admits newcomers and then pays them less therefore does not belong here.
The second component protects the traveler who leaves home for a time. A citizen of one state who is temporarily present in another is entitled, through Article IV, § 2, to be treated as a welcome visitor.67 The protection is qualified, because the clause bars discrimination against citizens of other states only where there is no substantial reason for it beyond their out-of-state citizenship. A substantial reason may support charging a nonresident more for a hunting license, as in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, or requiring a nonresident to pay higher tuition at the state university, as in Vlandis v. Kline.68 The visitor's right is a right to equality with the host state's citizens, and a justified difference survives.
The third component protects the traveler who stays. A person who completes the move and elects to settle becomes a citizen of the new state, and the visitor's clause no longer fits, because Article IV compares a host state's treatment of outsiders with its treatment of its own citizens and the newcomer is now one of its own.69 The newcomer's right to the same privileges and immunities as the state's other citizens rests on that state citizenship and also on United States citizenship, the additional source identified in the opening words of the Fourteenth Amendment.70 Justices who held fundamentally different views of the clause in the Slaughter-House Cases agreed on this point. Justice Miller's majority opinion counted among the privileges of national citizenship that “a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bonâ fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State,” and Justice Bradley, dissenting, made the same point in even stronger language.71 Because both sides accepted that protection, the right fits within the clause as the 1873 majority read it. The right to travel itself is grounded both in the individual's freedom to move and in federalism, since barriers to movement, like trade barriers, would damage the Union.72
The newcomer's claim differs from the visitor's in a way that decides outcomes. A visitor's equal treatment can be limited for a substantial reason, but the Court's cases have identified no acceptable reason for qualifying the protection of the citizen of one state who goes to another to settle and establish a home. The justifications that support treating residents and nonresidents differently have nothing to say about a nonresident's decision to become a resident.73 A newcomer also holds two political capacities, one state and one federal, which adds force to her claim to the same rights as others who share her citizenship.74 Edwards and Saenz mark the two ends of the range: California shut the door on indigent newcomers in one, and in the other let families in and then paid them less.
Both travelers start in the same state and arrive in the same state, and the intent to return home separates them. A visitor treated as a stranger invokes the second component, and a settler treated as a second-class citizen invokes the third.
Saenz v. Roe
In Saenz v. Roe (1999), the Court held that a newly arrived citizen has the right to the same privileges and immunities as other citizens of her state, and it struck down a California statute that limited a family's welfare benefits during its first twelve months in the state to the amount the family would have received in its prior state.76 The Court rested that right on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on equal protection, and it described the protection as common ground even among the opposing opinions in Slaughter-House.77 The holding unfolds in five moves: the source of the right, the standard of review, the state's fiscal defense, the objection to ranking newcomers by prior state, and the effect of congressional approval.
California's cash benefit for a family of two, a mother and one child, was $456 a month, while in neighboring Arizona it was $275.78 In 1992, to make a relatively modest reduction in its vast welfare budget, the Legislature enacted § 11450.03 of the state Welfare and Institutions Code, which limited new residents, for their first year in California, to the benefits they would have received in the state of their prior residence.79 The statute thus turned on two facts only: how long a family had lived in California and where it had lived before. The state relied on the undisputed fact that the statute would save about $10.9 million a year, an amount the Court called significant though small beside the roughly $2.9 billion the program cost.80 The Court of Appeals affirmed a preliminary injunction against the statute, and the Supreme Court affirmed.81
The parties disagreed about the standard of review. California defended the statute as an appropriate exercise of budgetary authority, so long as the residency requirement did not penalize the right to travel.82 It added that, unlike the laws in Shapiro, the statute merely failed to reward indigent newcomers instead of penalizing them, since newcomers still received the benefits they had received or would have received at home.83 It was further argued that the federal welfare statute let states adopt a “specialized choice-of-law-type provision” subject only to intermediate review.84 The Court answered the dispute over the standard by asking first where the right the respondents invoked comes from.85 The answer fixes how much a claimant must prove, because a right grounded in the equal status of citizens does not depend on showing that a rule deters anyone from moving.
The source the Court identified is the third component of the right to travel, the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same state.86 The Fourteenth Amendment's opening sentence, the Citizenship Clause, makes persons born or naturalized in the United States citizens of the United States and of the state where they reside, and the next sentence forbids a state to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.87 A family that has moved to California and settled there is therefore a family of California citizens, and it holds that status in “two political capacities, one state and one federal.”88
On the standard of review, the Court said that neither mere rationality nor an intermediate standard should be used to judge a state rule that discriminates against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the state for less than a year. The appropriate standard, it added, may be more categorical than the one in Shapiro but is surely no less strict.89 That answer disposes of both positions the parties took. California's claim that the statute burdened travel only incidentally falls away, because the claimants had already completed their travel and the right they hold embraces equal treatment in the new state of residence, which makes the discriminatory classification itself a penalty.90 A partial withholding might count as a lesser incursion if the only question were actual deterrence to migration, yet the question here is whether a state may rank its own citizens by when they arrived.91 A newcomer who can ground her claim in the Privileges or Immunities Clause therefore has an advantage over one who must show, under equal protection, that the burden impinged on travel.92
What would California have had to do to keep its $10.9 million and avoid the problem? The Court described the alternative itself: an evenhanded, across-the-board reduction of about 72 cents per month for every beneficiary would produce the same saving.93 The two plans save identical sums and differ in one variable. The across-the-board cut leaves every needy family in the same position relative to every other, so it sorts no citizen by how long the family has lived in California or by where it came from. The California statute reached the same total by loading the entire cost onto one class of citizens defined by residence history.
The Court granted that saving money is a legitimate purpose and asked whether the state may pursue that end through the discriminatory means it chose. Its negative answer, it said, did not rest on any weakness in the fiscal justification.94 The legitimate interest in saving money simply provides no justification for discriminating among equally eligible citizens, and the Court repeated Shapiro's rejection of any contributory rationale for denying benefits to new residents.95
The statute also failed for a reason independent of how long newcomers waited. By tying a family's grant to its prior state, the scheme created a hierarchy of 45 subclasses of similarly situated citizens based on the location of their prior residence, and the Citizenship Clause does not tolerate that hierarchy.96 The statute was thus doubly vulnerable. Neither the duration of a family's California residence nor the identity of its former state has any relevance to its need for benefits, and neither relates to the state's interest in distributing funds equitably among its needy citizens.97 A family of two arriving from Arizona was held to the Arizona figure of $275, while a family of the same size that had lived in California for years received $456.98 Equally poor families living in the same California city would receive different amounts for reasons that have nothing to do with need.
Congressional approval did not rescue the statute. The Court called the question readily answered, because it has consistently held that Congress may not authorize the states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The protection the Citizenship Clause gives a citizen limits the national government as well as the states.99 Section 5 lets Congress enforce the Amendment's guarantees, but it grants no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute them.100
The first step carries a limit that the next subsection develops: the Court reserved what weight a length-of-residence requirement might carry if a claimant's bona fides were questioned.101
Limits and Dissents in Saenz
The holding in Saenz rests on a fact no party contested: the plaintiffs were California citizens. The Court observed that they and their class were undisputedly citizens of California and that their need for benefits was unrelated to how long they had lived there, so it had “no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen's length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned.”103 A state keeps a legitimate interest in separating genuine residents from people who only say they live there, and that interest never came into play. A state might also defend a relatively short durational requirement as necessary to assure that a newcomer has in fact become a bona fide resident, a possibility the Court expressly alluded to.104
The second reservation concerns what the newcomer receives. The Court observed that the welfare benefits before it would be consumed in California while the recipients remained there, so recognizing their claim posed no danger of encouraging citizens of other states to establish residency “for just long enough to acquire some readily portable benefit, such as a divorce or a college education, that will be enjoyed after they return to their original domicile.”105 A divorce decree or a degree stays with its holder after the holder leaves, so an outsider entitled to the benefit on arrival could move in only to collect it and then go home. The Court named the concern but did not decide how it bears on a waiting period for such a benefit. It remains to be seen whether the portability argument will let states salvage some durational requirements even though those requirements face strict scrutiny under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.106 A further boundary is unsettled. The basic principle appears to be that every citizen may change her state of citizenship by establishing residence and then be treated equally with the state's other citizens, which raises potential problems whenever a state keys eligibility for any state benefit to the length of time one has been a citizen.107
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, and he accepted much of the majority's account. He agreed that the right to travel forbids a state to impede free interstate passage, as in Edwards, and that a citizen of the United States can become a citizen of any state by bona fide residence, with the same rights as other citizens of that state.108 His objections were these:
- The right to become a citizen of a new state is distinct from the right to travel, because a person who has finished the journey is no longer traveling, and neither right is a component of the other.109
- A state needs an objective way to confirm that a newcomer is a bona fide resident. Physical presence is easy to police, but intent to remain is not, so states rely on proxies such as durational residence requirements, which the Court has repeatedly sanctioned for in-state tuition, divorce, and party registration.110
- Congress's express approval of durational residence requirements for welfare recipients confirms that California's requirement was reasonable.111
The majority had already answered the third objection: Congress may not authorize the states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.112 The second objection carries the practical weight, and it is narrower than it first appears. The Chief Justice accepted that a bona fide new resident is entitled to the same rights as other citizens, and his quarrel concerned how a state may find out whether a newcomer is bona fide. The majority treated the families' residence as established and so never weighed that state interest.
Justice Thomas wrote separately because, in his view, the majority attributed to the clause a meaning that likely was unintended when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and ratified.113 He looked to Corfield v. Coryell, in which a Pennsylvania citizen challenged a New Jersey law that barred anyone who was not an “actual inhabitant and resident” of New Jersey from harvesting oysters from its waters.114 Members of the 39th Congress referred repeatedly to Corfield, and from those references and the historical understanding of the clause's operative terms he inferred that people at the time of adoption understood “privileges or immunities of citizens” to mean fundamental rights, not every public benefit established by positive law.115 The majority's holding that a state violates the clause by treating recent arrivals differently in distributing welfare therefore appeared to him contrary to the original understanding and dubious at best.116 He did not urge that the clause stay dormant. He believed that its demise had contributed in no small part to the current disarray of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, and he said he would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case, asking whether it should displace rather than augment parts of equal protection and substantive due process doctrine.117 He warned that using the clause without that inquiry could make it a convenient tool for inventing new rights.118
The two dissents do different work. The Chief Justice worked within the proposition the majority relied on and disputed how a state may test for bona fide residence, so his objection would lose force if a state's test were tailored to genuine residence. Justice Thomas questioned what the clause protects at all, and his objection would survive even a perfectly tailored test. Neither dissent commanded a majority, and the holding that remains is a narrow one: California paid undisputed bona fide residents less for twelve months, ranking genuine citizens by the length of their residence, and that classification fell.119
State K's rule survives because a bona fide residency requirement separates residents from nonresidents and penalizes no one for moving, whereas California's rule sorted residents against one another by when they arrived. A state may require an individual to be a bona fide resident to receive government benefits, and a simple residency requirement lets the benefit begin as soon as a person enters the state and in good faith claims to be a resident there for the indefinite future.120 A state also need not pay welfare to people who are not bona fide residents.121 The common error is to treat every residency condition as a Saenz problem, when Saenz reaches only classifications among citizens whose residence is genuine.