314 U.S. 160 (1941)
In December 1939, Edwards, a resident of Marysville, California, traveled to Spur, Texas, intending to bring his wife’s brother, Frank Duncan, back to California.1
Upon arrival, Edwards learned that Duncan had last been employed by the Works Progress Administration and was an indigent person.2 The two men agreed that Edwards would transport Duncan in his automobile, and they left Spur on January 1, 1940, entering California via Arizona on January 3 and reaching Marysville on January 5.3
When he left Texas, Duncan had about $20, which was spent by the time he arrived in Marysville.4 Duncan lived with Edwards for about ten days until he obtained financial assistance from the Farm Security Administration, during which time he had no employment.5
A complaint was filed against Edwards in Justice Court under section 2615 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.6 On demurrer, Edwards challenged the constitutionality of the section, but the demurrer was overruled.7 Edwards was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment in the county jail, with the sentence suspended.8
On appeal to the Superior Court of Yuba County, the facts were stipulated, and the court affirmed the conviction.9 No appeal to a higher state court was available.10 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and later ordered reargument.11
The Attorney General of California submitted the history of similar statutes in effect since 1860.12 The term “indigent person” was assigned a narrow meaning.13 It includes only persons presently destitute of property and without resources to obtain the necessities of life, and who have no relatives or friends able and willing to support them.14
Whether § 2615 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which prohibits bringing or assisting in bringing an indigent non-resident into the state, is within the police power of the State or instead imposes an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce?15
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution delegates to the Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. The transportation of persons is commerce within the meaning of that provision.16 States are not wholly precluded from exercising their police power in matters of local concern even though they may thereby affect interstate commerce. However, the prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its borders is absolute.17
No. Section 2615 prohibits the transportation of indigent persons across the California border, and its express purpose and inevitable effect is to bar such movement.18 Edwards transported Duncan, whom he knew to be indigent, from Texas into California in his automobile, and the statute was applied directly to that interstate journey. The burden upon interstate commerce is intended and immediate.19 The statute cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power because it erects an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce.20
The theory that each community should care only for its own indigent no longer fits the facts.21 In an industrial society relief has become a national concern, as shown by federal-state cooperation under the Social Security laws and the Farm Security Administration that actually assisted Duncan after his arrival.
Section 2615 is not a valid exercise of the police power of California; it imposes an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce, and the conviction under it cannot be sustained.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice Black And Mr. Justice Murphy
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment but declined to rest the decision on the commerce clause.23 He concluded that the right of persons to move freely from State to State is a privilege of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 That right was recognized before the Fourteenth Amendment in Crandall v. Nevada and was carried forward as an attribute of national citizenship when the Amendment was adopted.25
Because the California statute obstructs the free movement of indigent citizens, it abridges a right that rises to a higher constitutional dignity than the protection afforded by state citizenship under Article IV, § 2.26
Justice Jackson concurred in the result but preferred to ground the decision on the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the commerce clause.27 He concluded that it is a privilege of United States citizenship, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state for temporary sojourn or permanent residence.28 A state may not use a citizen’s mere property status or indigence as a basis for restricting that freedom, any more than it may use race, creed, or color.29
California therefore had no right to make the condition of Duncan’s purse the ground for punishing Edwards for extending him aid.30