412 U.S. 441 (1973)
Connecticut's Public Act No. 5 took effect in July 1971.1 It amended the state's higher education laws to fix a student's residency status for tuition purposes at the moment of application for admission.2 An unmarried applicant was classified as an out-of-state student if the legal address had been outside Connecticut at any time during the preceding year.3 A married applicant living with a spouse was classified the same way if the address at application was outside the state.4 That classification remained fixed for the student's entire period of attendance at any constituent unit of the state system.5
Margaret Marsh Kline applied to the University of Connecticut from California in May 1971 while engaged to Peter Kline, a lifelong Connecticut resident.6 She was accepted and initially informed she would be treated as an in-state student.7 She married on June 26, 1971, moved to Storrs, obtained a Connecticut driver's license, registered her car in Connecticut, and registered to vote there.8
Patricia Catapano, an unmarried graduate student, applied from Ohio in January 1971, was accepted in February, moved her residence to Connecticut in August 1971, and likewise secured a Connecticut driver's license, car registration, and voter registration.9
Pursuant to the 1971 Act, the Director of Admissions at the University of Connecticut classified both women permanently as out-of-state students.10 As a result, each paid $150 tuition plus a $200 nonresident fee for the first semester and $425 tuition plus another $200 nonresident fee for the second semester, while in-state students paid nothing or $175.11
Kline and Catapano filed suit in the United States District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting they were bona fide Connecticut residents.12 A three-judge district court found that each had become a bona fide resident before the 1972 spring semester, held §§ 126 (a) (2), (a) (3), and (a) (5) of the Act unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, enjoined their enforcement, and ordered refunds of the excess amounts paid for that semester.13 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on December 4, 1972.14
Whether Connecticut's statutory provisions permanently classifying students as nonresidents for tuition and fees based on their legal address at the time of application or during the prior year, without any opportunity to rebut that classification, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?15
Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 In Heiner v. Donnan the Court held that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The same considerations apply when a state purports to be concerned with residency in allocating tuition rates.18 Yet it denies an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence.19 That presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact.20 The state has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.21
Yes. Connecticut's statutory scheme creates a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence by fixing a student's status at the time of application without any opportunity to rebut that classification later.22 The statute commands that the status established at application shall be the student's status for the entire period of attendance.23 Applied to the specific facts, Margaret Marsh Kline applied from California while engaged to a lifelong Connecticut resident, married shortly after acceptance, moved to Storrs, and acquired a Connecticut driver's license, car registration, and voter registration.24 The district court found her a bona fide resident before the 1972 spring semester.25 Yet the statute afforded her no chance to demonstrate that residency for tuition purposes.26
Patricia Catapano likewise applied from Ohio, moved to Connecticut in August 1971, obtained the same indicia of residency, and was found by the district court to be a bona fide resident.27 But the statute permanently barred her from rebutting the nonresident classification.28 The state advanced interests in cost equalization, favoring established residents, and administrative certainty.29 Yet each justification fails when measured against the facts.30 The presumption operates on a criterion wholly unrelated to bona fide residency.31 It makes no distinction between established and new residents on its face.32 It ignores available reasonable alternatives such as the criteria later adopted by the state after the district court's decision.33 The presumption is not universally true in fact.34 Because practicable means exist to determine actual residency, the Due Process Clause forbids the state from denying the appellees the opportunity to prove they are bona fide residents entitled to in-state rates.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall joined the Court's opinion except for its suggestion that a state may impose a one-year residency requirement as a prerequisite to in-state tuition.38 He noted that the question was not presented here because the case involved a permanent irrebuttable presumption based on status at application.39 He expressed serious doubt about the continuing validity of the summary affirmance in Starns v. Malkerson in light of equal protection principles limiting residency requirements for state benefits, citing Dunn v. Blumstein and Shapiro v. Thompson.40
Because the Court resolved the case on due process grounds, he would leave the validity of a one-year requirement for a future case.41 He also rejected the dissent's characterization of the decision as a return to substantive due process, emphasizing that the case concerned only the procedures for determining residency for tuition purposes.42
Justice White concurred in the judgment but declined to join the Court's opinion because he could not distinguish on due process grounds between the Connecticut statute and the Minnesota one-year requirement upheld in Starns v. Malkerson.43 He found that Connecticut invidiously discriminated among three classes of bona fide residents.44 Unmarried students who resided in the state for a year before applying or without attending school paid the lower tuition.45 Married students with a legal address in Connecticut at application also paid the lower tuition.46 Unmarried students whose address had been outside the state during the prior year but who later became residents paid out-of-state tuition despite year-long residency.47 This discrimination among residents, justified solely by administrative convenience, violated the Equal Protection Clause.48
He drew on Bell v. Burson, Carrington v. Rash, and Stanley v. Illinois to show that administrative ease cannot justify denying hearings or opportunities to prove facts when substantial individual interests are at stake, and he concluded that the pattern of discrimination here was invidious.49
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the Court had strayed from established constitutional principles to reach a just result in a hard case.50 He argued that the decision effectively transferred the compelling-state-interest test into the Due Process Clause without explaining why the interest in lower tuition warranted strict scrutiny, unlike voting rights or family integrity in Carrington, Bell, and Stanley.51 He warned that the ruling would pressure states to enact reciprocal statutes and would complicate due process doctrine in ways comparable to the difficulties already encountered under equal protection.52
The statute reasonably supported the legitimate goal of reserving subsidized education for a state's own residents, and the Court should not invalidate it merely because less restrictive alternatives existed or because isolated applications produced unseemly results.53
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Douglas
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the Connecticut scheme was a constitutionally permissible means of addressing the financial pressures on state universities.54 He maintained that the decision rested on repudiated notions of substantive due process.55 The statute rationally distinguished students who had prior connections to the state independent of university attendance from those who came solely to attend, a distinction the Court itself had implicitly approved in Starns v. Malkerson.56
He contended that a classic residency test at the moment of enrollment would be easily circumvented and that the permanent classification was a rational way to protect the subsidy for long-term residents and their children.57 The majority's theoretical analysis, he concluded, was inconsistent with the deference to legislative judgments required by Ferguson v. Skrupa and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.58