326 F. Supp. 234, 401 U.S. 985
The plaintiffs married their husbands in 1968 while their husbands were enrolled in the School of Law of the University of Chicago.1 In June of 1969, plaintiffs moved to Minnesota with their husbands who had obtained employment in Minnesota.2 Neither plaintiffs nor their husbands claim residency in Minnesota for purposes of this action prior to June, 1969.3
Both plaintiffs enrolled as full-time students at the University for the 1969-1970 school year and were classified as nonresident students by the University.4 This meant that they were required to pay tuition in an amount more than double that they would have had to pay had they been classified as resident students.5 The classification of the plaintiffs as nonresident students was made pursuant to the Board of Regents’ tuition regulations.6
Plaintiffs appealed from their nonresident classifications and on January 12, 1970, the Board of Review on Resident Status acted on their petitions and classified them as residents.7 Pursuant to the one-year waiting rule, however, the Board postponed the effectiveness of the classification for tuition purposes until the first summer session, 1970.8 The beginning of the first summer session, 1970, coincides with the first anniversary of plaintiffs’ continuous presence in the State of Minnesota.9
On January 23, 1970, plaintiffs instituted this action asserting federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the alleged deprivation of Federal Constitutional rights.10 This three-judge court was convened pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284 by the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit on April 29, 1970.11
Whether the Board of Regents' one-year durational residency requirement for resident tuition classification at the University of Minnesota violates the Equal Protection Clause?12
When the classification does not affect a fundamental right, its constitutionality is judged on the basis of whether the distinctions drawn by the statute have some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.13 The problems of government are practical ones and may justify rough accommodations, and a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.14
No. The regulation creates a distinction between residents based on duration of presence in the state, yet this classification bears a rational relation to the legitimate state objective of achieving partial cost equalization between those who have and those who have not recently contributed to the state's economy through employment, tax payments, and expenditures.15 The plaintiffs moved to Minnesota in June 1969, enrolled as full-time students for the 1969-1970 school year, and were classified as nonresidents required to pay more than double the resident tuition rate.16 On appeal the Board of Review classified them as residents but postponed effectiveness until the first summer session of 1970 under the one-year rule.17 This application of the regulation to the plaintiffs' circumstances is reasonable.18
The state may require new residents to make some contribution toward the state's welfare for twelve months before enjoying reduced tuition.19 The distinction is not arbitrary or permanent.20
The one-year durational residency requirement does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.21
Whether the regulation infringes on the fundamental right to interstate travel so as to require application of the compelling state interest test?22
When the discrimination created by a statute or regulation infringes on a person's fundamental rights, the test is whether the distinctions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest rather than whether there is a rational basis.23 However, the compelling state interest test has no application where the one-year durational residence requirement does not constitute a penalty upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.24
No. The regulation is distinguishable from Shapiro v. Thompson because there are no facts upon which to find that the one-year waiting period has as a specific objective excluding or deterring out-of-state students, and the record shows that of approximately 50,000 students enrolled in the fall of 1968 over 6,000 were nonresidents, indicating the waiting period does not deter any appreciable number of persons from moving into the state.25 Unlike Shapiro, the waiting period here does not deny the basic necessities of life to needy residents or have dire effects equivalent to those in Shapiro, so there is less likelihood that it would make a person hesitate when deciding to establish residency in Minnesota.26 The plaintiffs' move to Minnesota in June 1969 with their husbands who obtained employment therefore does not trigger strict scrutiny.27 The traditional equal protection standards apply instead.28
The regulation does not infringe on the fundamental right to interstate travel.29
Whether the regulation's irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for students who have not resided in the state for one year is constitutionally permissible?30
A classification is not subject to the infirmity of an absolute and permanent presumption that cannot be rebutted under any circumstances.31 It is reasonable to presume that a person who has not resided within the state for a year is a nonresident student. The presumption can be overcome by proof of bona fide domiciliary status after one year.32
Yes. The regulation provides that an out-of-state student is presumed not to be in the state as a permanent resident, but this presumption can be overcome if the student provides sufficient evidence to show bona fide domiciliary status within the state, one element of which is proof of residence for a period of one year, unlike the permanent classification struck down in Carrington v. Rash.33 The plaintiffs appealed their nonresident classifications, and on January 12, 1970 the Board of Review classified them as residents yet postponed effectiveness for tuition purposes until the first summer session of 1970, which coincides with the first anniversary of their continuous presence since June 1969.34 This application demonstrates that the presumption is not arbitrary or permanent.35
It is reasonably related to the state's legitimate objective of partial cost equalization.36
The regulation's irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for one year is constitutionally permissible.37