Concept
Rational Basis With Bite
Rational basis review
Rational Basis With Bite
The Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 For most classifications the Court enforces that command through the rational basis test, and it applies the test with enormous deference.2 Laws almost always pass. A few have not. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center the Court used rational basis review to invalidate a zoning ordinance that kept a home for people with intellectual disabilities from operating. In Romer v. Evans it held that a Colorado voter initiative failed the same test; the initiative repealed laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and precluded the adoption of new protections.3
Many call decisions like these rational basis review with “bite.” The Court puts bite into the test most commonly when a majority concludes that a law rests on “animus” against the class it burdens.4 The label raises a puzzle, because a test that lets a court imagine any legitimate purpose should almost never defeat a law. One view holds that the Court applies a more rigorous version of the test in some cases, so that the standard runs, under a single name, from complete deference to substantial rigor. The other view holds that the test is constant and that the invalidated laws simply lacked a legitimate purpose or were so arbitrary as to be unreasonable.5 The Court has never acknowledged applying anything other than the traditional test, so the first view cannot be confirmed. Yet the very fact that these laws failed is a powerful sign that something more than ordinary review was at work,6 and in some of the cases a majority may have made its own assessment of the law’s reasonableness.7
One pattern holds across the cases. Wherever the standard appears to gain rigor, the group burdened was politically powerless or politically unpopular.8 Those groups are not necessarily suspect classes. A suspect class is one saddled with disabilities, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process.9 The Court has been reluctant to enlarge that category: in Cleburne it declined to treat intellectual disability as quasi-suspect, in part because it saw no principled way to distinguish the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.10 The decisions that gave the test its bite protected burdened groups without adding them to the list. People from other states fit the same pattern. They have no voice in the political process that produced a measure burdening them, and the Court has occasionally used an enhanced rational basis test to review laws that discriminate against current or former out-of-staters.11 Critics add that deference has its own cost. Because a conceivable legitimate purpose can be identified for virtually any law, unfair laws stand, frequently laws that help a politically strong group at the expense of a weaker one.12
The next three parts follow the animus explanation outward from its anchor case. Romer shows a law failing the conventional test because its breadth outruns every reason offered. The animus decisions generalize that inference and mark its limits. Class-of-one claims then reach a narrower target, the government that singles out one person instead of a group. Through all three the default answer to a rational basis problem is still that the law stands. A stem that departs from that answer will say why through its facts: a disfavored group, a record of hostility, or a law so sweeping that no conceivable justification explains it.
Romer v. Evans
In Romer v. Evans the Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that named gays, lesbians, and bisexuals and barred every level of state and local government from protecting them against discrimination.13 The Court said it was applying the ordinary rational basis test, the one nearly every challenged law passes. The opinion therefore shows how a law can fail that test without any change of tier, and the features of the amendment that carried the result are the ones to learn.
Amendment 2 came from a 1992 statewide referendum. It answered ordinances in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver that banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare services.14 Its text prohibits “all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their ‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.’”15 The amendment thus did more than repeal three ordinances. It forbade every future protection of the same kind: no city council could adopt one, no state agency could issue one, and no court could recognize one, so a group seeking protection would first have to amend the state constitution.16
Colorado defended the amendment chiefly by arguing that it put gays and lesbians in the same position as everyone else and denied them only “special rights.” The Court called that reading implausible. It relied not on its own interpretation of the amendment but on the authoritative construction of the Colorado Supreme Court.17 A State’s highest court speaks with final authority on the meaning of state law, so its reading fixed what the amendment does and left only the federal question. As construed, the amendment withdraws from homosexuals, and from no one else, specific legal protection against the injuries of discrimination, and it forbids restoring that protection. The label “special rights” fits poorly because the protections withdrawn are ones most people either already have or have no need for.18
The Colorado Supreme Court had applied strict scrutiny on the theory that the amendment infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process, and on remand the trial court found that the amendment failed strict scrutiny and entered final judgment for the challengers.19 The United States Supreme Court affirmed on a narrower ground: the amendment lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. That ground sufficed, so the Court did not decide whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate for discrimination based on sexual orientation.20 It began from the standard formulation, under which a classification draws strict scrutiny only when it impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, and otherwise stands if it is rationally related to a legitimate end.21 That starting point places the case in the default tier, so everything after it argues that Amendment 2 cannot meet even the lenient standard.
Amendment 2, the Court said, “fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry,” and it gave two reasons.22
The first reason concerns the amendment’s form. It has “the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,” an exceptional and invalid kind of legislation.23 Even under deferential review the Court wants to know the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained, because the search for that link gives the Clause its substance, tells legislatures what laws they may pass, and marks the limit of judicial authority.24 A law of limited scope can be matched to a goal. Amendment 2 instead identified people by a single trait and denied them protection across the board, a disqualification the Court called unprecedented in its jurisprudence.25 Behind that point lies the principle that government and each of its parts must remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. A law making it generally more difficult for one group than for all others to seek aid from government denies equal protection “in the most literal sense.”26
The mechanism explains the force of that point. An ordinary classification leaves those it burdens free to ask the next legislature or city council for relief. Amendment 2 shut one group out of the lawmaking process on one subject and left it the slowest remedy available, a statewide constitutional amendment.
The second reason compares the amendment’s reach with the justifications Colorado offered. The State’s primary rationale was respect for the associational freedom of landlords and employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality, and it added an interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups.27 The Court’s objection went to fit. The breadth of the amendment was “so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”28 The mismatch shows in what the amendment reached. A concern for the liberty of private landlords and employers could support an exemption for them, yet the amendment also nullified protections in health and welfare services and private education, and it barred protection from discrimination by every level of Colorado government, where no landlord’s associational freedom is at stake.29 A resource-conservation aim likewise cannot explain why one group alone is shut out of the lawmaking process.
When no legitimate aim fits the breadth of a law, the remaining explanation is a desire to disadvantage the people it burdens, and that desire is not a legitimate interest. The Court drew the inference by invoking Moreno: a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.30 Broad laws with ambitious purposes can usually be explained by legitimate policies that justify their incidental disadvantages. Amendment 2 announced that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, an immediate, continuing, and real injury that outruns and belies any justification offered for it.31 The Court called the amendment a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit, and concluded that it “classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”32
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented from the six-to-three decision. He wrote that the Court had “mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite,” and he described the amendment as a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise them through the law.33 His doctrinal argument ran through Bowers v. Hardwick. If a State may make homosexual conduct criminal, he reasoned, it may surely enact other laws merely disfavoring that conduct.34 He also read the amendment as prohibiting special treatment of homosexuals and nothing more, leaving general laws against arbitrary discrimination in place, so that assaults on homosexuals could still be prosecuted.35 And he attacked what he took to be the majority’s thesis: that a person who receives equal treatment under the laws, but cannot obtain preferential treatment as readily as others, has been denied equal protection.36 The dissent also leaned on Davis v. Beason, an 1890 decision approving an Idaho territorial law that denied polygamists, and those who advocated polygamy, the vote and public office. The majority answered that, to the extent Davis allowed persons advocating a practice to be denied the vote, it is no longer good law.37 The two opinions thus disagree about what the amendment does. For the majority it withdraws ordinary protections from one group. For the dissent it declines to confer preferences and rests on a legitimate moral judgment.
Romer announces no new tier of review. The Court applied the conventional inquiry, and the result turned on the amendment’s breadth and on the inference of animus that breadth supports. Yet the decision departs from the usual pattern, because a court ordinarily has no business testing how closely a classification fits its goals unless it has first decided that some form of enhanced scrutiny applies.38 Many commentators accordingly read Romer as applying heightened scrutiny without saying so. On that view, saying so would have committed the Court to striking down, among other things, the then-existing federal ban on gay people in the military and prohibitions on same-sex marriage.39 The decisive factor, in any event, was the Court’s conviction that the amendment was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.”40 Unlike Moreno, where the Court cited specific legislative history showing hostility toward “hippies,” Romer relied on no background materials of that kind, so the animus was inferred from the structure of the law itself. It remains unclear whether the enhanced approach reaches measures less sweeping than Amendment 2, or how a court is to find animus when no lawmaker admits it.41 The tier question stayed open in later cases, because the Court has carefully avoided holding that laws discriminating against gays and lesbians receive heightened scrutiny.42
A law that passes the same test shows which features carried Romer. In New Orleans v. Dukes the city banned pushcart food vendors from the French Quarter except those who had operated there continuously for eight years or more. The Court accepted the city’s interest in the charm of a historic area and accepted that newer businesses were less likely to have built up reliance interests. Dukes shows how much tenuousness the default tier tolerates, since the Court has been enormously deferential to this kind of line-drawing.43 The Romer majority listed Dukes among laws “narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for us to ascertain some relation between the classification and the purpose it served.”44 The vendor ordinance sorted by tenure in one trade in one district, tied that line to tourism, and left newer vendors free to lobby the city council like anyone else. Amendment 2 sorted by a personal trait across every transaction and every level of government. Dukes marks how far the default tier bends, and Romer marks where it stops: at a law whose reach is so out of proportion to its stated reasons that no one can credit them.
An exam stem built on this case describes an enactment that names a group by a single trait and shuts that group, and only that group, out of any chance to obtain protection from government or from private discrimination, while the state recites respectable interests such as associational freedom or limited enforcement resources. The answer applies rational basis review and invalidates the law, because its breadth outruns every justification offered, which signals animus. Two errors recur. One is to say that the Court held sexual orientation a suspect class or applied strict scrutiny, when the opinion rested on rational basis and left the tier question open. The other is to defend the law by pointing out that a legitimate interest can be conceived, an answer that works for the narrow vendor ordinance in Dukes but fails when a law’s reach is so out of proportion to the interest that no one could credit it.
Animus and Moral Disapproval
Romer’s inference of hostility from breadth rests on an older principle. In Moreno the Court said that if equal protection means anything, it must at the very least mean that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”46 That sentence puts a floor under the first element of rational basis review. The purpose must be legitimate, and a wish to disadvantage a disfavored group does not qualify, however well the law serves it. Romer cited Moreno with approval,47 and later decisions applied the floor to a zoning permit, a criminal statute, and a federal definition of marriage.
The floor follows from how the test is built. Rational basis review asks whether a classification is rationally related to a legitimate end, and the question has content only if the end exists apart from the burden itself. A law whose only aim is to burden a group fits that aim perfectly, because every disadvantage it imposes advances the wish to impose it. If that aim counted as legitimate, every hostile law would pass. The Court’s definition of discriminatory purpose in other equal protection cases draws a similar line. Purpose means more than awareness of consequences; the decisionmaker must have chosen a course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects on an identifiable group.48
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. applied the floor to land-use regulation. A buyer of a house in Cleburne, Texas, planned to lease it to Cleburne Living Center for a group home that would house thirteen men and women with intellectual disabilities under constant staff supervision.49 The zoning ordinance required no special use permit in that district for apartment houses, boarding houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals, or nursing homes for the aged, but it required one for a home of this kind, and the city council voted three to one to deny it.50 The Court refused to treat intellectual disability as a quasi-suspect classification, so it reviewed the ordinance under rational basis review, and it still held the ordinance invalid as applied.51
A comparison condemned the permit requirement. The Court granted that persons with intellectual disabilities differ from others in real ways, but it said the difference was largely irrelevant unless the home would threaten legitimate city interests in a way that the freely permitted uses would not.52 It then examined the council’s reasons one at a time. The negative attitudes of neighboring owners and the fears of elderly residents could not justify different treatment, since “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”53 The worry about students harassing residents, the flood plain location, doubts about legal responsibility, and concerns about density and the serenity of the neighborhood applied just as strongly to the nursing homes, boarding houses, fraternity houses, and hospitals that needed no permit.54 Each justification failed for the same reason. It offered a ground for burdening the home that applied equally to uses the city freely allowed, so nothing was left to explain the line except who the residents would be, and the Court concluded that the requirement rested on irrational prejudice.55
Cleburne turned on its record. The ordinance’s own terms gave strong signs that its actual goal was illegitimate, and those signs led the Court to give less than the usual deference to the hypothetical purposes the city’s defenders offered. Where such signs are missing, the Court has upheld classifications that burden persons with intellectual disabilities, as in Heller v. Doe, which approved commitment procedures that made commitment easier for them than for the mentally ill.56 The Justices disagreed about what to call the review in Cleburne. Justice Marshall wrote that “perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called ‘second order’ rational-basis review rather than ‘heightened scrutiny.’ But however labeled, the rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the [traditional] rational-basis test.”57 Justice Stevens, concurring, thought the cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses and not three sharply defined standards.58
The principle reached criminal law in Lawrence v. Texas, where Texas made sodomy a crime only when the participants were of the same sex. Justice O’Connor had joined Bowers, and she did not join the Court in overruling it, but she agreed that the Texas statute was unconstitutional and rested her conclusion on the Equal Protection Clause.59 That choice framed the question narrowly. Bowers had decided only that the right to privacy does not protect private consensual homosexual activity, and its Georgia statute reached heterosexual and homosexual conduct alike.60 Bowers therefore never asked whether moral disapproval of a group can justify a classification that burdens only that group. Justice O’Connor answered that it cannot: moral disapproval of the group, like a bare desire to harm it, is an interest insufficient to satisfy rational basis review.61 She added that the Court has been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional where, as there, the legislation inhibits personal relationships, and she described the review used in such cases as “a more searching form of rational basis review.”62
Her reasoning shows why disapproval of a group amounts to animus when it stands alone. Legal classifications must not be drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened, and a State that invokes disapproval of a group as its interest shows only a desire to burden that group. Texas replied that the statute targeted conduct and not people, but the conduct it reached is closely correlated with being homosexual, which made the law a measure directed at gay persons as a class.63 The holding has limits drawn in her own words. The Court has never held moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, sufficient to justify a law that discriminates among groups, and her reasoning did not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would fail, because other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.64
United States v. Windsor carried the principle to Congress. Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act defined “marriage” and “spouse” for all federal purposes to cover only opposite-sex unions,65 so Edith Windsor, whose New York marriage was valid under state law, paid $363,000 in federal estate tax because the marital exemption was unavailable to her. The Court held section 3 unconstitutional by a vote of five to four, finding that it violated due process and equal protection principles applicable to the federal government. The majority invoked Moreno and said that discriminations of an unusual character especially require careful consideration. The evidence of purpose came from the statute and its history: the House Report described the law as an expression of moral disapproval of homosexuality, and the Court concluded that interference with the equal dignity of these marriages was more than an incidental effect of the statute, because it was the statute’s “essence.”66 Like Romer, Windsor did not name the level of scrutiny it applied.
Read together, these decisions show where courts look for animus. Moreno rested on specific legislative history, and Windsor rested on the House Report and the text of the Act.67 Cleburne rested on a comparison with uses the city left alone, Romer on a breadth far beyond the reasons offered, and Lawrence on a criminal statute that reached same-sex conduct alone. Lawmakers seldom confess to hostility, so the comparison and the mismatch between a law and its stated reasons carry most of the weight.
Whether these decisions apply a separate, more searching standard is an open controversy, and the two sides disagree about a concrete point.
- On Justice O’Connor’s view, a law that exhibits a desire to harm a politically unpopular group draws a more searching form of rational basis review.68
- On Justice Scalia’s view, the decisions she cited recognize no such standard, and they reached their conclusions only after finding, as conventional rational basis analysis requires, that no conceivable legitimate state interest supported the classification.69
The dispute matters because of what the default tier otherwise allows. In ordinary review the government’s lawyers may supply any conceivable legitimate purpose, whether or not the legislature held it. If animus review is a separate standard, a law whose actual purpose is hostility can fall even though some legitimate purpose can be imagined, and Justice Scalia read O’Connor’s formulation to mean exactly that.70 If animus review is ordinary review applied candidly, a law falls only when no legitimate purpose can explain it, and evidence of hostility counts as proof that none can. The Court has never said which reading is right.71
Justice Scalia pressed the point on the marriage example. “Preserving the traditional institution of marriage,” he argued, is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples, so that on O’Connor’s approach a judge can validate a law by calling it tradition or invalidate it by calling it disapproval.72 Chief Justice Roberts later invoked her caveat in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, reasoning that distinguishing opposite-sex from same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ legitimate interest in preserving the traditional institution of marriage.73 The majority in Obergefell, like those in Romer and Windsor, did not announce a level of scrutiny.74
The principle has a limit that matters as much as the rule. In Trump v. Hawaii challengers pointed to public statements suggesting hostility toward Muslims and attacked a proclamation restricting entry from several countries, most with Muslim majorities. The Court assumed it could look behind the proclamation to ask whether the policy is plausibly related to its stated objective, and it said it would uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds. A policy fails under that review only if it is impossible to discern a relationship to legitimate state interests or the policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Because persuasive evidence gave the entry suspension a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, the Court accepted that independent justification.75 The claim there arose under the Establishment Clause and in the immigration setting, where review is especially narrow, but the Court’s statement of what defeats an animus claim is the modern one.
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer shows the same limit in ordinary employment regulation. The Court upheld a rule excluding every methadone user from Transit Authority employment.76 It reasoned that any special rule short of total exclusion would be less precise and more costly, because any cutoff, whether after one year of treatment or later, would inevitably discriminate between employees equally or almost equally apt to achieve full recovery.77 What separates Beazer from Cleburne is whether an independent legitimate purpose actually explains the line. In Beazer a job-related concern accounted for the classification, while in Cleburne every proffered concern collapsed once it was compared with the uses the city allowed. Justice Kennedy stated the working test in his concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London: a court applying rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a government classification that is “clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.”78
An exam stem on this point usually describes an ordinary-looking classification of a disfavored group and a record that contains both a hostile remark and a stated safety or economic reason. The comparison in step four decides the answer, so ask whether the stated reason applies equally to similar groups the law leaves alone. Three errors recur. One is to call the group suspect or quasi-suspect, when Cleburne refused that label for persons with intellectual disabilities and Romer and Windsor left the tier unannounced.79 Another is to treat any hostile remark as dispositive, which Trump v. Hawaii contradicts. A third is to say that moral disapproval can never support a law, when O’Connor’s holding concerns disapproval of a group as the only asserted interest and she preserved other reasons, such as those offered for marriage laws.80
Class-of-One Claims
The animus decisions involved laws that burdened a group. A class-of-one claim needs no group at all: the plaintiff says the government singled out the plaintiff alone for different treatment that no rational basis explains. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech Grace Olech and her husband asked the Village to connect their property to the municipal water supply. The Village at first conditioned the connection on a 33-foot easement, although, the Olechs said, it required only 15 feet from other owners seeking the same service. After a three-month delay it relented and connected the property on a 15-foot easement.82 Olech then sued, alleging that the larger demand was “irrational and wholly arbitrary” and was driven by ill will left over from an earlier, successful lawsuit against the Village.83
The case reached the Supreme Court from a dismissal at the pleading stage. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Seventh Circuit reversed on the theory that a plaintiff states a violation by alleging state action motivated solely by a “spiteful effort to ‘get’ him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.”84 The Supreme Court took the case to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause supports a cause of action for a “class of one” when the plaintiff alleges no membership in any class or group. It affirmed, though on a narrower ground, recognizing such claims where the plaintiff alleges intentional different treatment from others similarly situated and no rational basis for the difference. Such a claim is reviewed under the rationality test.85 Because the Court reviewed a dismissal, it decided only that the complaint stated a claim; whether the Village in fact lacked a rational basis awaited proof.
The Court reasoned from the purpose of the Clause, which is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether it comes from the express terms of a statute or from its improper execution by duly constituted agents.86 Two phrases carry the doctrine. “Every person” explains why group membership is unnecessary: arbitrary differential treatment harms a person whether the official singled out a thousand owners or one, and the number of individuals in a class is immaterial to equal protection analysis. The only trait on which a class-of-one claim rests is the trait of being the plaintiff.87 “Improper execution” explains why the claim reaches cases where no statute draws a line, since a neutral practice can be applied to one owner on terms offered to no one else. The allegations did the rest. The Village demanded 33 feet where it required 15 from similarly situated owners, the demand was called irrational and wholly arbitrary, and the Village connected the property once it received a 15-foot easement, which suggests that the extra 18 feet served no purpose the smaller easement did not. Those allegations sufficed “quite apart from the Village’s subjective motivation,” and the Court declined to reach the Seventh Circuit’s ill-will theory.88
Justice Breyer concurred only in the result because he feared the rule would turn ordinary violations of local law into constitutional ones. Zoning decisions will often, perhaps almost always, treat one landowner differently from another, and a decision that departs from a reasonably clear zoning rule might be said to lack a rational basis. If intentional difference and the absence of a rational basis were enough standing alone, every faulty permit decision would become a federal constitutional case. He found his safeguard in the extra factor the Court of Appeals had identified, which it called vindictive action, illegitimate animus, or ill will, and he thought that factor enough to avoid “transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.”89 Ill will works as a filter because it separates a retaliatory demand aimed at one owner from an official’s mistake or a good-faith disagreement over a permit. No other Justice joined him, but some lower courts follow his view, others treat motive as irrelevant, and the Seventh Circuit accepts either a totally illegitimate animus or the absence of any rational basis.90 The Court’s own rule asks about treatment and rationality, and the motive question is one a student should flag as unevenly resolved below.
A second filter operates at the pleading stage. Many class-of-one plaintiffs fail because they cannot identify others who are similarly situated, and one court put the standard for development projects this way: to be similarly situated, a project “must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects.”91 The demand for close comparators follows from how rational basis review works. Any applicant who loses can point to someone who won, and unless the winner matches the loser in every respect the law cares about, the difference in outcome has an obvious rational explanation.
The Olech complaint avoided each gap. Its comparators were other owners seeking the same water connection, it alleged a retaliatory history, and it described an extra easement the Village abandoned as soon as it received the smaller one.92
The theory also has a categorical limit. In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture the Court held that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment context.”93 The discharged employee there alleged that she was singled out for adverse treatment out of animosity, and her claim still failed. The Court reasoned that the government has significantly greater leeway as an employer than when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large, and that extending the theory would turn “a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments” into constitutional claims.94 Employment decisions are discretionary and individualized by nature, so nearly every dismissal could be pleaded as differential treatment, and the exclusion guards against the same flood Justice Breyer feared in zoning. Olech’s water hookup involved the Village acting toward a citizen at large, which is why the theory applied there.
An exam stem built on this doctrine usually describes one landowner or licensee who was treated worse than neighbors by a local official, sometimes after a quarrel with the government. The answer depends on whether the comparators are truly alike and whether any rational explanation for the difference can be found, and a showing of ill will strengthens the claim without being the rule the Court announced. If the plaintiff is a government employee, the analysis stops before it starts.