553 U.S. 128 S. Ct. 2146, 170 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2008)
Anup Engquist was hired in 1992 by Norma Corristan to serve as an international food standard specialist for the Export Service Center, a laboratory within the Oregon Department of Agriculture.1
During her employment Engquist experienced repeated problems with co-worker Joseph Hyatt and complained to Corristan that he had made false statements about her and otherwise made her life difficult.2 Corristan responded by directing Hyatt to attend diversity and anger management training.3
In 2001 John Szczepanski assumed responsibility over the Export Service Center and supervised Corristan, Hyatt, and Engquist.4 Szczepanski told a client that he could not control Engquist and that Engquist and Corristan would be gotten rid of.5 When Engquist and Hyatt both applied for a vacant managerial post, Szczepanski chose Hyatt despite Engquist's greater experience.6 Later that year during budget cuts Szczepanski eliminated Corristan's position, and on January 31, 2002, Engquist was informed that her position was being eliminated because of reorganization.7
Engquist's collective-bargaining agreement gave her the opportunity to bump to another position at her level or take a demotion, but she was found unqualified for the only other position at her level and declined a demotion, resulting in her effective layoff.8 Engquist then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against the Oregon Department of Agriculture, Szczepanski, and Hyatt, alleging violations of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and state law, including a class-of-one equal protection claim that she was fired for arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.9 The district court allowed the class-of-one claim to proceed.10
The jury rejected Engquist's race, sex, and national origin claims but found in her favor on the class-of-one claim.11 The jury awarded her $175,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages.12 The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
Whether the class-of-one theory of equal protection applies in the public employment context?15
The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary government classifications, and while a class-of-one claim can be sustained where a plaintiff shows intentional differential treatment from similarly situated individuals without a rational basis, that theory does not extend to the public employment context because employment decisions inherently involve discretionary, subjective, and individualized assessments resting on factors difficult to articulate or quantify, unlike regulatory actions subject to clear standards, and because recognizing such claims would contradict the at-will employment doctrine and the practical reality that government offices could not function if every personnel decision became a constitutional matter.16
No. The Supreme Court held that the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context.17
The promotion denial to Engquist, the elimination of her position, and the denial of bumping rights were subjective and individualized decisions by public employers Szczepanski and Hyatt resting on a wide array of factors difficult to articulate and quantify, not the application of a clear standard as in property easement or tax assessment cases.18 Treating Engquist differently from others in this context is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials as employers rather than regulators.19 This does not raise the concern of arbitrary classification addressed by the Equal Protection Clause.20 Recognition of the claim would be contrary to the at-will nature of government employment.21
The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Souter And Ginsburg
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the majority created an unnecessary novel exception excluding state employees from the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary and irrational treatment.23 He argued that Village of Willowbrook v. Olech directly controls because the jury expressly found that respondents intentionally treated Engquist differently from others similarly situated without any rational basis and solely for arbitrary, vindictive, or malicious reasons, satisfying the traditional equal protection standard that the Clause secures every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.24 Stevens maintained that discretionary decisions are distinct from arbitrary ones lacking any rational justification, that rational-basis review already confines class-of-one claims to wholly unjustified actions, and that the at-will employment doctrine provides only a feeble justification given longstanding rejection of the notion that public employment may be subjected to any conditions however unreasonable.25
He further noted that such claims have been infrequent, are usually asserted alongside other claims, and are almost all dismissed well before trial, so no broad carve-out is required to prevent a flood of litigation.26