Concept
The Right to Travel
Fundamental rights
The Right to Travel
The Constitution never uses the word “travel,” yet the Court treats the right to move from one state to another as a constitutional right of the first rank. Justice Stewart, concurring in Shapiro v. Thompson, quoted United States v. Guest for the proposition that the right “has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized,” and he added that it includes the right of “entering and abiding in any State in the Union.” The Court, he wrote, “simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.”1
Two reasons support that status. The first is individual freedom: the freedom to move. The second is federalism. Barriers to free movement between states would cause friction among them, just as trade barriers would, and the right to travel secures a national labor market the way the dormant Commerce Clause secures a national market for goods and services.2
Saenz v. Roe overruled none of the Court’s earlier travel decisions, among them Crandall v. Nevada, Edwards v. California, and Shapiro, so each still stands for a fundamental right to travel protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. A law that substantially impairs the right draws independent judicial review and is unlikely to survive unless narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, and the cases on durational residency requirements may in the future be cited as Privileges or Immunities Clause cases.3 In Saenz the Court treated it as common ground that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the third component of the right to travel.4
The marriage cases show how heightened review works, and the travel cases borrow its shape. Virginia’s second argument in Loving asked the Court to defer to the legislature because the scientific evidence on interracial marriage was in doubt.5 The Court replied that where distinctions are not drawn according to race, it has merely asked whether any rational foundation supports them and has deferred to state legislatures, but that a racial classification carries “the very heavy burden of justification” the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required.6 Equal application of the statute to both races did not lift that burden.7 The travel cases reach a comparably demanding standard by a different trigger. Families who move between states exercise a constitutional right, so a classification that penalizes that exercise is unconstitutional unless shown necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.8
Loving also shows how far state power can reach into where people live. Virginia’s ban was one of sixteen state prohibitions, and its present scheme dated from the Racial Integrity Act of 1924.9 After the Lovings pleaded guilty, the trial judge suspended their one-year jail sentence for twenty-five years on the condition that they leave Virginia and not return together.10 The Court decided the case under the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the freedom to marry, not under the right to travel,11 but the sentence shows what is at stake when a state can attach conditions to where a person may live.
Not every state law that burdens movement impairs the right. A restriction on interstate movement of people or goods that neither limits anyone’s ability to establish residency nor treats newly arrived residents worse than longtime ones is not an impairment of the fundamental right to travel. A state license fee on trucks passing through the state does reduce the amount of transportation through it, yet the fee does not impair the right, and the Court has not subjected such fees to strict scrutiny under the due process or equal protection clauses.12
The subsections below follow the right through its main applications: the penalty Shapiro condemned, the administrative defenses that failed to justify it, the limits of congressional approval, the residency rules that survive, and Saenz.
Penalizing Interstate Movement
Shapiro v. Thompson concerned welfare rules in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia.13 Each denied aid to applicants who were otherwise eligible, solely because they had recently moved into the jurisdiction.14
The Court held that the waiting period penalized the exercise of a constitutional right. In moving between states, the applicants exercised the right to travel, and any classification that penalizes that exercise is unconstitutional unless shown necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.15 Measured against that standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause.16
The statutes imposed two separate hurdles: an ordinary residence requirement and the one-year wait, which the Court called distinct and independent prerequisites.17 That separation marks a line the later cases keep. The Court has always distinguished bona fide residence requirements, which separate residents from nonresidents, from durational, fixed-date, and fixed-point requirements, which treat established residents differently according to when they migrated into the state.18 A rule of the second kind treats newly arrived residents less favorably than longtime ones and impairs the right to travel. A restriction that neither bars anyone from establishing residency nor disfavors newcomers does not.19
The Court also tested the states’ reasoning by following it to its end. It declined to rest on the particular facts of the cases because the states’ reasoning would logically permit a state to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries, to deprive them of police and fire protection, and to apportion all benefits and services according to citizens’ past tax contributions.20 A justification that proves that much justifies nothing in particular.
Saenz later made explicit that the classification itself can be the penalty. When a state treats citizens who have completed their move worse than other residents, a court need not ask whether the rule actually deterred anyone from traveling.21
Administrative Justifications
The states in Shapiro defended their waiting periods as serving four permissible administrative goals: planning the welfare budget, supplying a rule of thumb for residency, preventing fraud, and encouraging newcomers to join the labor force.24 The Court refused to accept a mere showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period and these admittedly permissible objectives. Because the waiting period penalized the right to travel, the states had to show it was necessary to a compelling interest.25
The change of standard changes what the state must prove. Administrative convenience is a legitimate state interest, but the Court has held it too weak to count as compelling.26 Where the Court doubts the importance of an asserted interest, it may insist that the state “advance a factual showing” that the classification addresses “a real, as opposed to a merely speculative, problem.”27 A justification that costs a brief only a sentence must therefore be backed by the record.
The budget defense failed on the record. The claim that the wait helped with planning was “plainly belied” by the fact that the states did not impose it on long-term residents, the group that receives the bulk of welfare payments. The states relied on other methods to make budget estimates, and a Pennsylvania official testified that her office had already estimated what eliminating the one-year requirement would cost and that its estimates of the costs of other regulatory changes “have proven exceptionally accurate.”28
The residency rule-of-thumb defense failed because the state already asked the direct question. The residence requirement and the waiting period were distinct and independent prerequisites, and before granting any application the welfare authorities investigated the applicant’s employment, housing, and family situation and learned the facts that show whether the applicant is a resident.29 A year of waiting added nothing to what the caseworker had already found out.
The labor-force defense proved too much. Pennsylvania suggested that the wait encourages new residents to join the labor force promptly, but that logic would require a similar wait for long-term residents, so the goal gives no rational basis for burdening new residents alone.30
The fraud defense identified a valid interest and a poor fit. A state may prevent fraud by any applicant, whether a newcomer or a long-time resident, but less drastic means were available and already employed, so the waiting period was unnecessary for that goal.31
The Court concluded that the states neither used nor needed the one-year requirement for any of the suggested purposes, so even under traditional equal protection tests the classification would seem irrational. Because it touches the fundamental right of interstate movement, however, the classification faced the compelling-interest standard, and it clearly failed.32 The order of the argument is instructive: when the record shows that the state does not use its rule for the stated goal, the state loses before strict scrutiny does any work.
Cost savings fare no better, because a state that wants to save money can spread the cost across everyone. In Saenz the Court said, “The question is not whether such saving is a legitimate purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the discriminatory means it has chosen,” and it observed that an evenhanded reduction of about 72 cents per month for every beneficiary would produce the same result.33
Justice Harlan’s dissent shows what the majority declined to do. He wrote that the judiciary should be “especially slow to fetter the judgment of Congress and of some 46 state legislatures in the choice of methods,” that residence requirements have “advantages, such as administrative simplicity and relative certainty, which are not shared by the alternative solutions proposed by the appellees,” and that he could not find that the burden residence requirements imposed on the ability to travel outweighed the governmental interests.34 The disagreement concerns who bears the burden. Harlan weighed a burden against interests and deferred on means. The majority required the states to show that the wait was necessary and found that less drastic means were available.
Steps two and three decided Shapiro: the budget claim failed on the record, and the fraud claim failed because less drastic means existed. Step four disposed of the labor-force argument.
Congressional Approval
One defense in Shapiro did not depend on any state interest: the states pointed to a federal statute. The Court read it and found no approval. “On its face, the statute does not approve, much less prescribe, a one-year requirement. It merely directs the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to disapprove plans submitted by the States because they include such a requirement.”38
The legislative history showed that Congress had something else in mind. The suggestion that Congress enacted the directive to encourage state participation in the AFDC program was “completely refuted by the legislative history,” and the directive was the means Congress chose to deny federal funding to any state that persisted in stipulating excessive residence requirements.39
The Court gave a second answer that would have defeated the defense even on the states’ reading of the statute. Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause, so section 402(b), insofar as it permitted the one-year wait, would itself be unconstitutional. The majority’s example makes the point: Congress might induce wider state participation in school construction by authorizing joint funds for segregated schools, but the need to secure state cooperation could not justify the authorization.40
The Court has repeated the limit. Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment “is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.” Although the Court gives deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan states the rule, quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan.
The District of Columbia appeal differed in one respect. Congress itself had enacted the District’s welfare residence requirement, so the right to travel invoked there had to be enforceable against congressional action, while the Pennsylvania and Connecticut requirements were state rules that Congress had authorized.42 Justice Harlan’s dissent identified the source of a right that does bind the federal government: the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since freedom to travel is settled to be an element of the “liberty” that clause secures.43
Two dissents treated congressional approval as an exercise of the commerce power. Justice Harlan found a genuine federal purpose in allowing the states to use residence tests, one that would make the provision a permissible use of the commerce power unless another constitutional provision forbade it.44 He saw nothing in the nature of federalism that would prevent Congress from authorizing the states to do what Congress could validly do itself, since Congress may empower the states to regulate commerce in ways the negative implications of the Commerce Clause would otherwise prohibit.45 The Chief Justice objected that the footnote in the Katzenbach case on which the majority relied protects racial equality and does not limit Congress’s power to further interstate commerce through reasonable residence requirements. In his view, the dispositive question was whether Congress could impose residence requirements under the commerce power.46
The dissenters’ premise is sound in its own field. A dormant Commerce Clause holding keeps an area of commerce free of burdensome state regulation until Congress has a chance to decide how it wishes the area governed, and Congress rather than the Court has the last word, so congressional authorization excuses conduct that would otherwise violate the clause.47 The premise fails where an individual right is at stake, because neither Congress nor a state can validate a law that denies Fourteenth Amendment rights.48 An exam fact pattern that says Congress approved the state practice therefore calls for one question: is the limit a structural check on state power over commerce, which Congress may lift, or an individual right, which no statute can dilute?
Where Residency Rules Survive
The right to travel does not make every residency rule suspect. The cases sort the survivors along three lines: whether the rule requires only real residence, how much the withheld benefit matters, and how long the wait lasts.
A bona fide residence requirement draws a line between residents and nonresidents. Justice Rehnquist, quoting Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, recalled that the Court has “always carefully distinguished” such requirements from durational, fixed-date, and fixed-point rules, which “treat established residents differently based on the time they migrated into the State.”52 The distinction tracks the truck-fee principle: a restriction that neither bars anyone from establishing residency nor treats newly arrived residents less favorably than longtime ones does not impair the right to travel.53
The same principle explains why a state may confine the vote to its own residents. Denial of the franchise to nonresidents is subject only to rational basis review, because states and towns have a legitimate interest in limiting the vote to those with a stake in the community; otherwise, busloads of outsiders could decide a town’s fate on election day.54 A local government’s organization, including how its citizens take part in its operation, is basic to its functioning,55 and in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa the Court upheld a city’s refusal to let people living outside its limits vote in city elections, though the city’s police powers reached them. Wealth stands on different footing. A state may not condition voting on economic status, because “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”56
Durational rules draw a sliding inquiry. Whether a durational residency requirement impinges on the right to travel may depend on both the nature of the benefit and the length of time it is withheld.57 For a truly vital benefit, such as welfare or medical care, even a short waiting period may trigger strict scrutiny; for less critical benefits, it may take a long wait before one could conclude that the right to travel was being penalized.58 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County illustrates the first half, because the Court invalidated a one-year county residence rule for nonemergency medical care at public expense.
Sosna v. Iowa illustrates the second half. A state defending a one-year wait for a less critical benefit will cite Sosna, which upheld a one-year waiting period for filing a divorce action under the Equal Protection Clause without applying strict scrutiny.59 The Court noted that most states imposed divorce waiting periods of between six months and two years and that Iowa’s one-year period was the most common one prescribed.60 A summary affirmance in Starns v. Malkerson likewise left in place a one-year residence requirement for in-state tuition.
Voting shows both halves of the inquiry at once. The right to vote is fundamental, yet it exists alongside a compelling government power to regulate elections, so the holdings go both ways.61 In Dunn v. Blumstein the Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement for voting. For shorter periods the test appears to be reasonableness: the Court has upheld a fifty-day restriction, and a restriction of less than two months may be necessary to verify voter lists or records and prevent fraud.62 What separates the permissible interval from the invalid one is the fit between the length of the wait and the task it serves.
Since Saenz, a durational rule that disfavors newly arrived citizens can also be challenged under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which protects the third component of the right to travel.63
Exam answers most often go wrong at the third step. Some treat Shapiro as a ban on every waiting period, and others treat Sosna’s one-year wait as proof that any one-year wait is safe. Neither follows from the nature-and-length inquiry.
Saenz and Newly Arrived Residents
Saenz v. Roe struck down a California welfare scheme that classified recipients by how long they had lived in the state and where they had lived before, but it rested on a different clause than Shapiro. The Court held that the right to move to a state and be treated like all other residents is a component of the right to travel and one of the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.68 That right is the third component of the right to travel, the one the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects.69
The change of clause answers an argument that complicated the equal protection cases. Those cases look to the nature of the benefit and the length of the wait.70 A court concerned solely with deterrence of migration might consider a partial withholding of benefits a lesser incursion than an outright denial. But because the right to travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new state of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a penalty, and the state’s claim that its scheme affects travel only “incidentally” is beside the point.71
Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a state law that “discriminates against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the State for less than” a specified period is subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of how “incidental” its effect.72 A challenger therefore need not show that the withheld benefit is vital or that any family was deterred from moving.
California’s scheme also failed on its own terms. Neither the duration of the recipients’ California residence nor the identity of their prior states bears any relevance to their need for benefits or to the state’s interest in making an equitable allocation among its needy citizens.73 The fiscal defense failed for the reason given earlier: a flat reduction for every beneficiary would have saved the same amount without singling out newcomers.
Because Saenz overruled no earlier travel decision, the equal protection cases continue to govern the settings they addressed, and a law that substantially impairs the right still needs narrow tailoring to a compelling interest whichever clause is invoked.74 A law that neither restricts the ability to establish residency nor disfavors newcomers does not impair the right at all, as the truck-fee example shows.75
Two dissents attacked the revival of the clause from different directions. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court departed from Shapiro and its progeny and, while paying lip service to the right to travel, did little to explain how the right was involved at all, since the case concerned only the respondents’ right to enjoy immediately all the privileges of being a California citizen against the state’s ability to test the good-faith assertion of that right.76 Justice Thomas argued that the majority gave the clause a meaning likely unintended when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, without addressing its historical underpinnings, and that the Slaughter-House Cases had sapped the clause of any meaning.77 History offers no easy answer to the second objection; the Court has said of the historical sources on the Fourteenth Amendment that they “cast some light” but are, “[a]t best, . . . inconclusive.”78