Concept
Printz and Executive Officers
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
Printz and Executive Officers
New York v. United States shielded a state legislature from federal commands, but state laws are carried out day to day by executive officers, and that decision left open whether they enjoy the same protection. Printz v. United States answered that they do: a five-Justice majority held that Congress may not use its commerce power to compel state and local executive officers to implement federal law.1 The holding extends the logic of New York, which had already rejected the argument that an important federal interest could justify forcing state regulation. The Constitution lets Congress regulate directly or preempt, New York said, but it does not let Congress conscript state legislative processes.2
The statute in Printz put the burden on a local official rather than a federal one. Under the interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, a firearms dealer who proposed to sell a handgun gave notice to the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) for the buyer's locality. The CLEO then had to make a reasonable effort, within five business days, to learn whether the sale would be lawful, including research in whatever state and local recordkeeping systems were available and in a national system the Attorney General designated.3 If the search found no prohibiting information, the CLEO had to destroy all records of the transaction. CLEOs received no compensation, and Congress appropriated no funds for the work.4
The Government stressed how little the statute asked. The purposes were important, local officers could administer the checks efficiently in the interim, and the burden was minimal and temporary.5 That mildness makes Printz a useful test. If New York guards only against heavy federal control, the Brady duty might survive; if it guards against commandeering as such, the duty falls however light it is. The majority found no constitutional text on point, so it looked to historical practice and then to the structure of the Constitution before it tested the Government's proposed limits on New York.6
The Brady Act Holding
Justice Scalia's majority opinion held the background-check duty unconstitutional and stated the governing rule in two sentences. The first says what Congress may not do: “The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” The second shuts the doors a defender of the statute would try: “It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary,” because such commands are “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”7
Taken together, the two sentences make the rule a category rather than a multifactor test. The first identifies the forbidden command; the second tells a court what it may not ask once it has found one. How heavy the burden is and how much the program matters drop out, and the inquiry ends as soon as a federal directive is shown to command state or local officers to administer a federal program.
The rule has two prongs, and the second closes a gap the first leaves open. New York held that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program; Printz adds that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly.8 Without the second prong, Congress could recast any program New York forbids as an order to the sheriffs, clerks, and inspectors who carry out state law. The words “or those of their political subdivisions” close a similar gap, because a county's chief law enforcement officer is no less commandeered than a state official.
Applied to the statute, the rule decides the case. The Court had little difficulty concluding that the Act pressed local officers into federal service by compelling them to execute federal laws.9 The central duty ordered a local officer to research whether a proposed sale was lawful, which is an order to administer part of a federal regulatory scheme, and the Court said the duty “plainly runs afoul” of the rule.10 The command was also unpaid, so Congress was demanding the officers' service rather than purchasing it.11
The Government's defense piled up reasons the duty was mild, and the Court treated them as beside the point. Such factors might matter when a generally applicable federal law only incidentally burdens state government. They have no place when the whole object of the law is to direct the functioning of the state executive, because that kind of law offends the principle of separate state sovereignty itself, and no comparison of interests can cure the defect.12 A student who answers that the Brady duty was small, short-lived, and aimed at a serious problem has analyzed the wrong question. The right question asks whom the statute commands and what it commands that person to do.
Congress keeps several lawful routes to the same checks. It may regulate the private activity directly or preempt the states from the field, or it may try to entice them into implementing a federal scheme with monetary incentives.13 It may purchase cooperation through the spending power, so a law that paid local officers to run the checks would be valid if every state remained free to refuse the deal.14 And where Congress can regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, it may offer the states a choice between regulating under federal standards and facing federal preemption, because the burden of refusing falls on private parties rather than on the State as sovereign.15 New York treated “conditional preemption” and “conditional spending” as different in kind from a mandate: where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences.16 Each route leaves the decision with the state. The Brady Act's mandate left the officers none.
Garcia marks the other side of the line. New York explained that Garcia involved a federal law that subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties, since the Fair Labor Standards Act applied equally to public and private employers; a law that imposes duties only on state governments is not generally applicable.17 The rule also does not depend on whether the commanded function is a traditional one. When Congress regulates commerce evenhandedly, a state can claim no immunity merely because it has traditionally engaged in the regulated activity, as an early decision on a state-run railroad held.18
Invalidating the background-check duty did not end the Court's work on the Act. The duty, implicit in the check, to accept notice of the completed Brady Form and a copy of it fell with it. The petitioners also attacked two other provisions: one requiring an officer to destroy the form and any record derived from it, and one requiring an officer who finds a buyer ineligible to give the buyer written reasons on request. With the earlier duties gone, those provisions asked nothing of the petitioners, because an officer cannot destroy a form never received or explain a determination never made. The Court treated them as inoperative as to the petitioners, since they could apply only to an officer who had chosen to take part in the federal scheme.19 The Court declined to decide whether dealers must still forward notice of a sale and wait. Those provisions burden only dealers and purchasers, no dealer or purchaser was before the Court, and the Court would not speculate about the rights of absent parties. New York, by contrast, had addressed severability because the remaining provisions there affected the plaintiffs.20
Two Justices in the majority wrote separately. Justice O'Connor stressed that the decision leaves Congress free to encourage state participation through financial incentives or to preempt state law, so long as it does not compel the states to enact or administer a federal program. Justice Thomas suggested that the Second Amendment may supply an additional ground for doubting the Act, although the majority's holding rests on dual sovereignty alone.21
History and the Dissent
Early practice is evidence of what the Constitution was understood to allow, and the Government's best early evidence came from statutes that put duties on state courts. The first Congresses required state courts to take part in naturalization, for example by recording applications for citizenship. The majority noted that these requirements may have applied only in states that had authorized their courts to conduct naturalization proceedings, which would make them consensual.23 It then drew a narrower inference: the statutes show at most that state judges could be required to enforce federal law on matters suited to the judicial power. Courts were a special case for two reasons. The Supremacy Clause declares that the judges in every state are bound by federal law, and unlike legislatures and executives, courts apply the law of other sovereigns all the time, as the law of transitory causes of action and the Full Faith and Credit Clause show.24 New York had drawn the same line, observing that the text of the Supremacy Clause authorizes federal direction of state judges without permitting Congress to command state legislatures.25
The contrast in the record supplies the majority's inference. Many early statutes burdened state courts, while the Government pointed to only one early federal law that imposed duties on state executive officers, despite the attractiveness of that course to Congress. The majority read the contrast as suggesting an assumed absence of power over executives.26 The exception, the Extradition Act of 1793, required a state's executive authority to arrest and deliver a fugitive on the request of the state the fugitive had fled, and that duty directly implemented the Extradition Clause of Article IV, so it carried its own constitutional authorization.27 The record also holds a telling refusal. When the First Congress needed state jails for federal prisoners, it recommended that the states provide them rather than ordering them to, and when Georgia refused, Congress's only response was a law authorizing the marshal to rent a temporary jail.28 That is how a Congress that doubted its power over state executives would be expected to act.
Later practice told much the same story. An 1882 immigration statute enlisted state officials to inspect arriving immigrants and to provide for those in need, but it did not mandate those duties; it merely empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to contract with state officers whom a governor designated.29 The Government's modern examples fared no better. They were of such recent vintage that they were no more probative than the Brady Act itself of a constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the text, and their persuasive force was far outweighed by almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance. The Court compared INS v. Chadha, where the legislative veto was held unconstitutional even though perhaps hundreds of federal statutes contained it.30
The dissenters read the same history as a grant of power. Justice Stevens argued that the Framers abandoned the Articles of Confederation's method of commanding the states because it was cumbersome and inefficient, so the change was meant to enhance national power and not to create a new immunity for state officers.31 On his view, the new power to reach individuals directly included a power to act through local officials, and he quoted Hamilton's statement in The Federalist No. 27 that the change would “enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws.”32 The ratification debates, he added, assumed that state agents would collect federal taxes, and he called the majority's reply to that evidence weak.33 In his account, Congress's use of state judges and court clerks for executive functions shows that state office conferred no immunity from federal service, and he found the majority's treatment of those statutes incomplete and at times misleading.34 The dissenters also argued that demanding a founding-era analogue for every challenged statute proves too much, because applied consistently it would undermine most post-New Deal Commerce Clause doctrine.35
The majority met the Federalist evidence with a point about consent. The passages predicted that Congress would probably use state officers and state regulations to collect federal taxes and that state officers would be clothed with federal authority in organizing the judicial power. None of them necessarily implies that Congress could impose those duties without the consent of the states. They rest on the natural assumption that the states would let their officials help, an assumption borne out by the voluntary assistance that ran in both directions in the early Republic.36 Justice Souter's separate dissent leaned instead on Federalist No. 27's statement that state legislatures, courts, and magistrates would be “incorporated into the operations of the national government” and “rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.” The majority found two problems with that reading. The passage says those results flow from officers' oath to observe federal law, so state officers would need no congressional directive to take an active role, and no one claims that. And the passage names legislatures specifically and first of all, so the reading would make state legislatures subject to federal direction, which New York forbids.37 The majority read the language to describe the duty of state officials to enact, enforce, and interpret state law so as not to obstruct federal law, which is how preemption ordinarily works. Madison's Federalist No. 44 fits that reading: his example of state officers' “essential agency” in giving effect to the Constitution was their conduct of federal elections under state law, and he said nothing about a duty to execute federal statutes.38
Both sides accept that the founding generation expected state officials to help carry out federal law. They disagree about whether that expectation reflected a power to demand help or confidence that the states would give it. The majority reads early practice, in which Congress asked, paid heed to refusals, and used state courts, as consistent with voluntary cooperation and hostile to a power of command; the dissent reads the plan of acting directly on individuals as a plan to use local officials. The majority itself conceded that this practice “tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive,” and it turned to structure for the argument that carries the holding.39 An answer that cites the early naturalization statutes as proof that Congress may command a state's executive officers has overlooked whom those statutes bound. Duties on state judges rest on the judicial role and the Supremacy Clause, the Extradition Act implemented an express constitutional clause, and the 1789 jail resolution was a request that Congress answered with a federal workaround when the request was refused.
Structure and Necessary and Proper
History tends to negate the power without settling the question, so the majority turned to the structure of the Constitution, which it read as creating dual sovereignty: two governments, each holding authority of its own. Residual state sovereignty is implicit in the Constitution's grant to Congress of only discrete, enumerated powers, and the Tenth Amendment makes that implication express: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”41
The Amendment does not do the work by itself. It places no limit on the federal government; it recognizes that other limits, such as those that derive from the structure of the Constitution, may reserve powers to the states.42 The question in a case like Printz is therefore whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.43
The Framers rejected a central government that would act upon and through the States. They designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments exercise concurrent authority over the people, whom Hamilton called “the only proper objects of government.” As New York put it, “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.” The great innovation was that citizens would have “two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”44 A statute that orders state officers to administer federal law revives the method the Framers rejected, because Congress would again act through the states rather than upon individuals.
Dividing authority between the two governments also protects liberty. Madison described a “double security” for the people's rights: the power the people surrender is divided between two governments and then subdivided among separate departments, and “[t]he different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”45 Federal enforcement ordinarily costs Congress something, and that cost restrains it. If Congress could impress the police officers of the 50 states into its service at no cost to itself, the Court warned, the power of the Federal Government “would be augmented immeasurably.”46
A second structural objection concerns the federal executive. The President must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” and the Framers insisted on unity in the Federal Executive to secure both vigor and accountability.47 The Brady Act effectively transferred responsibility for its program to thousands of CLEOs in the fifty states, who were left to carry it out without meaningful presidential control, if such control is possible at all without the power to appoint and remove.48 The President cannot appoint, direct, or remove a county sheriff whose office depends on state or local law. That unity would be shattered, the Court said, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws.49
The dissent answered both structural arguments with the Necessary and Proper Clause. In its view, the commerce power over handgun sales, joined to that Clause, conclusively validates the Brady Act, because the Tenth Amendment limits only powers not delegated.50 The majority agreed that the Tenth Amendment is not the source of the limit and found the defect in the Clause itself, which authorizes only laws that are proper as well as necessary. A law that violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the structural provisions is not a law proper for carrying the Commerce Clause into execution; in Hamilton's words, it is “merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation” that “deserve[s] to be treated as such.”51 The reasoning follows from what the Clause is. It supplies means for ends the Constitution already assigns to Congress, so a means that offends the Constitution's structure cannot be justified by the importance of the end. The Supremacy Clause does not help the dissent either: it makes supreme only laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, so the argument returns to the question whether a law conscripting state officers violates state sovereignty.52
Four Justices rejected the majority's structural case, and the grounds of their disagreement explain the 5-4 division. Justice Stevens's dissent said that the Framers' intent to preserve state sovereignty does not decide whether individual state employees may be required to perform federal tasks. It relied on Garcia's political safeguards: members of Congress are elected by the people of the states, each state has equal Senate representation, and it is unrealistic to assume that Congress will ignore its constituents' concerns about sovereignty.53 The dissent met the majority's worry about free use of state officers by pointing to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, in which Congress itself addressed unfunded mandates, and it predicted that the rule would backfire by pushing Congress to build national bureaucracies with no state participation.54 Arguments built on Garcia carried little weight with the same five-Justice majority that had decided United States v. Lopez two years earlier.55 The majority enforces the line between state and federal power through a rule that courts apply; the dissent leaves the line to the political process.
An answer that defends a federal command to state officers by joining the commerce power to the Necessary and Proper Clause therefore skips the word that decides the question. The Clause validates a means only if the means is proper, and a statute that conscripts state officers fails that test because it offends the dual-sovereignty structure and displaces the President's role as executor of federal law.
Rejecting the Policymaking Line
Printz had to explain why New York reaches a statute that asks so little of the states, and the Court did so by answering, one at a time, the arguments for confining New York to its facts. The Government's first argument was that the take-title provisions in New York forced state officials to make policy, while the Brady Act issues a final directive and leaves CLEOs nothing to decide.57 On that theory, Congress may command state or local officials to help implement federal law whenever Congress itself devises a clear legislative solution that regulates private conduct and asks the officers for only limited, non-policymaking help; the constitutional line is crossed only when Congress compels the states to make law in their sovereign capacities.58 The Court gave two independent answers: the line cannot be drawn, and a clean line would point the wrong way.
The first answer is that the line between making law and merely enforcing it is unworkable. The Court compared it to the line between a proper grant of executive power and an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, a line it has not been notably successful in describing, and it doubted that the Government's line would be any sharper.59 Executive action with no policymaking component is rare, especially for a jurisdiction's chief law enforcement officer. The Brady Act required only a reasonable effort to learn whether a sale was lawful, and how much effort to spend is a choice. An officer might decide, for example, that no check should divert personnel from pending felony investigations; nothing in the Act required that parsimony, and giving up some felony-investigation time would not be unreasonable either. The decision between maximum and minimum reasonable effort is preeminently a matter of policy. Once a line at “no policymaking” proves impossible to draw, the Government must retreat to a line of “not too much policymaking,” and an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority is not likely to be an effective one.60
The second answer assumes the line could be drawn and still finds it unhelpful. Even if the Brady Act left the states no policymaking discretion, the Court could not see how that improves the intrusion on state sovereignty. Preserving the states as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than by reducing them to “puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”61 An officer who carries out a federal instruction mechanically exercises no state judgment at all, so the more ministerial the task, the closer the officer comes to serving as an instrument of Congress. The Court added that it is no more compatible with state independence for officers to be “dragooned” into administering federal law than it would be for the United States to have its own officers impressed into service to execute state laws.62
The Government also contended that requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks does not diminish the accountability of state or federal officials, and the Court found that the argument fails on its own terms.63 When Congress forces state governments to absorb the financial burden of a federal program, its Members can claim credit for solving problems without asking their constituents to pay for the solutions through higher federal taxes. Even when states do not absorb the costs, they take the blame for a program's burdensomeness and defects. Under the Brady Act it is the CLEO, not some federal official, who stands between the purchaser and immediate possession of the gun, and it will likely be the CLEO who is blamed for any error, even one in the designated federal database, that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected.64 Voters who watch their sheriff delay a sale have no easy way to learn that Congress designed the delay. The later sections on political accountability and cost shifting develop both points.
The two decisions the Government offered as precedent show where the line between command and permissible federal use of state institutions runs. Testa v. Katt holds that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law, a result the Supremacy Clause mandates by binding the judges in every state, so it says nothing about whether state executive officers must administer federal law.65 FERC v. Mississippi stated that the Court had never sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations. It upheld the provisions before it because they did not commandeer state government: they imposed preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise preempted field, in accord with Hodel, and they required state administrative agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity, in accord with Testa.66 A statute of the FERC kind leaves the state an exit, since the state can stop regulating and let federal law govern. The Brady Act gave the CLEO no comparable exit, because its duty was mandatory. The later section on state courts returns to Testa.
The dissent did not defend the Government's basis for distinguishing New York and offered a different one: the Brady Act is addressed to individuals, namely CLEOs, while the take-title provisions were directed to the State itself.67 The Court agreed that this is a difference but held that it cannot be a constitutionally significant one, because the Act directs those individuals in their official capacities as state officers and controls their actions as agents of the State, not as private citizens.68 The distinction between a person in a personal capacity and the same person in an official capacity is an ancient one. A suit against a state official in an official capacity is a suit against the official's office and so is no different from a suit against the State, and a directive to an official in that capacity is likewise a directive to the State.69 A State has no hands except those of its officers, so a rule that barred commands to the State but permitted commands to every sheriff, clerk, and inspector through whom it acts would bar nothing. The Court put the point in a sentence: “To say that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all of its officers, is to say nothing of significance.”70 The dissent's theory, it concluded, would disembowel New York.71
The Government's last group of arguments held that the Brady Act serves important purposes, is most efficiently administered by CLEOs during the interim, and imposes a minimal, temporary burden. The Court did not pause over the dispute about how heavy the burden was. Assuming every one of those factors was true, they might bear on whether the incidental application to the states of a federal law of general applicability excessively interfered with state government.72 A law of that kind regulates a state as one actor among many, so the question is one of degree, and degree invites weighing. How much weighing survives Garcia and South Carolina v. Baker is taken up in the later section on evenhanded regulation. The Brady Act raised a different question. Where the whole object of the law is to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, balancing is inappropriate. The very principle of separate state sovereignty is what such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that defect.73
The Court supported that categorical treatment by analogy to the separation of powers, where it has declined to balance, as in Chadha and in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., which barred Congress from reopening final judgments.74 The analogy makes the logic plain: a rule that exists to protect a structural arrangement cannot depend on weighing the benefits of departing from it, because every departure arrives with benefits attached. The Court therefore adhered to the categorical rule of New York, that the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, and held that the mandatory duty on CLEOs to run background checks plainly runs afoul of it.75
A statute that directs county clerks to check each buyer of a restricted pesticide against a federal list puts all three of the Government's arguments into one problem, and an exam answer has to meet each of them.
The first statute fails each of the Government's arguments from Printz. The mechanical character of the task cannot save it, because the policymaking line cannot be drawn. The clerks act as agents of the county, so a command to them is a command to the county. And the small cost is a fact about burden, which the Court declined to weigh where a law's object is to direct a local executive office. The second statute leaves the county where Garcia leaves it, as one regulated seller among many, so any objection from burden belongs to the evenhanded-regulation analysis taken up later in this chapter. An answer that upholds the first statute because it is small, ministerial, or aimed at a serious problem relies on distinctions the Court rejected.
One question remains open. Justice O'Connor joined the majority but wrote separately to say that the Court was not deciding the validity of purely ministerial reporting requirements that Congress imposes on state and local authorities, such as requirements to identify missing children to the Department of Justice.76 A strong reading of the rule would reach such requirements, since they too order state officials around and can saddle states with costs. The contrary argument is that a law asking states only to pass along information they gathered in the ordinary course of their operations does not regulate the states' sovereign authority to regulate their own citizens. The question is unsettled, and a problem built on a bare reporting duty calls for both arguments.