514 U.S. 211 (1995)
In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents.1 The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.2
The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations.3 While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991.4 The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal.5
The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf.6 On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations.7 Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991.8
On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.9 Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991.
Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action.11 The District Court denied the motion.12 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether the judgment of the Court of Appeals is final for purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254?14
Yes. The Court of Appeals completely disposed of the questions at issue when it held that section 27A(b) is constitutional and that petitioners' action must be reinstated.17 The remand in this case is for the mere ministerial task of entering judgment for petitioners.18 This satisfies the finality requirement under the statute because no further substantive proceedings remain.19
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is final for purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.20
Whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioners' motion under § 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?21
Yes. The District Court plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying securities fraud action.24 It dismissed the action not for lack of jurisdiction but for failure to state a claim under the Lampf statute of limitations.25 Such a dismissal is a judgment on the merits, and the judgment was final on December 18, 1991.26 The District Court therefore had jurisdiction over petitioners' section 27A(b) motion to reinstate the action that had been dismissed with prejudice.27
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioners' motion under § 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.28
Whether § 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment?
Section 27A(b) requires federal courts to reinstate on motion any private civil action under section 10(b) that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, dismissed as time barred after that date, and timely under the pre-Lampf limitation period applicable in the jurisdiction as it existed on June 19, 1991.
Yes. Section 27A(b) provides that any such action shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991.29 Petitioners' action was commenced in 1987, dismissed as time barred on August 13, 1991, after Lampf, and would have been timely under the pre-Lampf Kentucky statute of limitations.30 The judgment became final on December 18, 1991, the day before enactment, and petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate the action.31
The statute therefore directs reopening of final judgments entered before its enactment.32
Section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas joined the opinion of the Court.34 He wrote separately to note that the Framers' understanding of the judicial power confirms the result reached today.35 The Framers viewed the judicial power as the authority to render dispositive judgments that could not be overridden by legislative action.36
This historical understanding directly supports the majority's conclusion that Congress lacks authority to direct the reopening of final Article III judgments.37 Thomas's concurrence reinforces the structural separation of powers by emphasizing the original understanding of judicial finality.38
Whether § 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violates the separation of powers by requiring federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment?39
Article III vests the judicial power in federal courts to render dispositive judgments, and the separation of powers prohibits Congress from setting aside final judgments of Article III courts, as confirmed by Hayburn's Case, United States v. Klein, and Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp.40
Yes. The separation of powers is a structural safeguard that prohibits one branch from exercising powers assigned to another.41 The judicial power includes the authority to make dispositive judgments that Congress cannot override by directing courts to reopen final judgments.42 Section 27A(b) effects a clear violation by directing federal courts to reinstate actions dismissed with prejudice before its enactment.43
This principle applies directly to the established facts that petitioners' judgment became final on December 18, 1991, and section 27A(b), enacted the next day, commanded reinstatement of that specific final judgment along with others in the same class.44
Section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment.45
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.46 He agreed that section 27A(b) violates separation of powers because it is exclusively retroactive, applies to a limited number of individuals, and reopens closed judgments without the mitigating features of prospectivity or general applicability.47 He emphasized that the statute impermissibly attempts to apply as well as make the law, though he would not adopt an absolute rule against all reopenings of judgments.48
Breyer stressed the liberty-protecting objectives of separation of powers and noted that the law here lacks the safeguards of generality and prospectivity that would reduce the risk of legislative overreach into judicial functions.49
Joined by Justice Ginsburg (as To Part Ii)
Justice Stevens dissented.50 He argued that section 27A(b) is a valid remedial statute that restores rights inadvertently impaired by the retroactive application of Lampf.51 He maintained that Congress has historically enacted laws authorizing courts to reopen final judgments and that such statutes are ordinary products of legislative power.52
Stevens concluded that the majority's extension of separation-of-powers doctrine to invalidate this remedial measure is unwarranted.53 He highlighted that the statute specifies both a substantive rule and a procedure for courts to apply, leaving outcomes to individualized judicial determinations rather than directing particular results.54