Concept
Analyzing a Section 5 Statute
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
Analyzing a Section 5 Statute
A Section 5 problem asks one question in several forms: does the statute enforce Section 1’s guarantees against the States, or does it change them? Congress holds power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,”1 and each limit in this chapter tests whether a statute stays inside that grant. The label Congress puts on a statute does not answer the question, and neither does the worth of its purpose. Five filters, applied in order, do. An early failure often decides the problem, and the order also shows where a failing statute may still stand on another footing, because the state action limit belongs to Section 5 and not to Congress’s other powers.
The first step fixes the baseline for everything after it. Congress “does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is”; it holds the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a violation.2 The reason is structural. If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Amendment’s meaning, the Constitution would sit “on a level with ordinary legislative acts,” and shifting legislative majorities could circumvent the amendment process of Article V.3 The courts’ definition therefore supplies the yardstick, and the standard of review inside that definition sets how much state conduct is already unconstitutional. The same baseline catches a statute that lowers the floor, since legislation that lets a State do what Section 1 forbids does not enforce the right either.4
The second step is a branch as well as a filter. Section 1 restrains States, so a Section 5 statute must answer something a State has done. The Civil Rights Cases show the limit at work. The Court invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that imposed criminal penalties for denying any person “the full enjoyment of” public accommodations and conveyances, because Congress had exceeded its power by regulating private conduct. The Enforcement Clause, the Court said, authorizes not “general legislation upon the rights of the citizen” but “corrective legislation,” legislation “necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce.”5 A statute aimed at private persons therefore fails when Section 5 is its only support, though it may stand on a different power.
The third step sorts the statutes that remain. A remedy that requires proof of every element of the judicially recognized violation tracks the right as the courts define it. A remedy that prohibits a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including conduct the Amendment’s text does not itself forbid, can still be valid, because the power to enforce includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violations.6 But a nonparallel remedy must satisfy the requirement announced in City of Boerne v. Flores: “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Without that connection, legislation “may become substantive in operation and effect.”7
The fourth step applies that requirement to the particular statute. The cases supply the questions: what precise constitutional evil Congress meant to remedy, how broad the remedy is, how deep and pervasive the problem is, and what features confine the remedy to that problem. The more generalized the evil and the response, and the more the response intrudes on state prerogatives, the less likely the Court is to find congruence and proportionality.8 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the model of a remedy that passed. Its provisions were “aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant,” and the record showed “subsisting and pervasive discriminatory—and therefore unconstitutional—use of literacy tests,” so the remedy displaced mostly conduct that was unconstitutional anyway.9 The same remedy spread over every State and every subject would displace mostly lawful conduct and begin to operate as a new standard.
The fifth step stands apart because it concerns a different protection: the State’s immunity from private damages suits. A statute can pass every earlier step and still fail to subject a State to such suits if Congress did not state unmistakably its intent to abrogate. A clear statement cannot rescue a statute that fails the earlier steps.
Worked example: the VAWA civil remedy
The facts of United States v. Morrison make the sequence concrete, because they support an argument on each side. A university student alleges that a varsity football player raped her. The university’s disciplinary committee suspended him for two semesters, but the university later rescinded the punishment as too severe. She sues him under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which gives victims of gender-motivated violence a federal civil remedy against the person who committed the crime. Before enacting it, Congress held hearings documenting bias in the justice systems of a substantial number of States, in the form of insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime and unacceptably lenient punishment, though Congress did not survey every State.10 Does the remedy fall within Section 5?
A defender of the statute begins at the first step. The right is freedom from gender discrimination in the administration of justice by the States, and gender classifications receive heightened scrutiny, so the statute enforces a well-established right, unlike the right Congress tried to protect in Boerne. At the second step, the defender locates state action in the problem Congress found: biased state criminal justice systems. At the fourth, the defender concedes that the remedy is broad and seemingly permanent, but argues that it does not reach into the processes of state government the way the Religious Freedom Restoration Act did, and that its nationwide availability reasonably answers bias found in a substantial number of States.11
A challenger answers at the same steps. The cause of action contains no state action requirement, so any congruence is illusory. The remedy does not correct the underlying violation, because suits against private individuals will not alter patterns of discrimination in state justice systems, and it reaches private defendants even in States that prosecute and punish every such crime. On proportionality, the remedy depends on no underlying violation, so only a pattern of bias so pervasive that narrower measures would fail could justify it, and Congress found the problem only in a substantial number of States. A proportionate remedy would target the jurisdictions where bias was established, as the Voting Rights Act did.12
The Court sided with the challenger. In United States v. Morrison it held that Congress’s power under Section 5 does not extend to the VAWA civil remedy.13 It rested first on the state action limit, which traces to the Civil Rights Cases, and it accepted Congress’s voluminous record of state bias without letting that record change whom the statute reaches.14 The remedy was “directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”15 The defender found state action in the problem Congress identified; the Court looked at the defendants the statute actually reaches.
The Court’s second ground concerned fit. The statute visited no consequence on any Virginia official, unlike the remedies upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and Ex parte Virginia, each directed at state officials. And it applied uniformly throughout the Nation although Congress’s findings indicated that the problem did not exist in all States or even most of them.16 A statute that bound state officials only in the States where hearings documented discriminatory non-enforcement would present a closer question, because the remedies the Court contrasted with VAWA were aimed at culpable officials in the places where Congress found the evil.
Because the inquiry turns on how generalized the evil is and how intrusive the response, no label on a statute answers it. A strong answer states the test, builds each side’s case from the statute’s own facts, and commits to a conclusion. The facts that carry the argument are the defendants the remedy reaches, the pattern Congress documented, and the fit between that pattern and the remedy’s breadth and targeting.