Concept
Limits and Judicial Review
War, defense, and foreign affairs powers
Limits and Judicial Review
The war power reaches far. In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., the Court upheld rent controls that outlasted the fighting. The war effort had contributed heavily to the housing shortage, and Congress may act even after hostilities cease to control the forces that a war-created shortage set loose.1 A power with that range invites a question: what holds it in check?
Three checks answer it. The first is the Constitution’s own prohibitions. The war power is a granted power and operates inside the Constitution, though courts have enforced its limits unevenly in wartime. The second is judicial review of war legislation, in which a court asks whether a statute invoking the war power really falls within it; courts ask with real but heavy deference to the political branches. The third arises when the President acts alone. Congress’s war powers then restrain the executive, and courts intervene more readily. The constitutional limits come first.
Constitutional Limits on War Power
The Article I war grants and the President’s command authority under Article II, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause and the nation’s inherent authority over foreign affairs, give the United States the complete power to make war. Yet the war power, like every other granted power, is subject to constitutional limitations, including those in the Bill of Rights.2 The reason is structural. A grant of power settles who may act and toward what end. A guarantee such as the Fifth Amendment settles something different: what the government may not do to a person even while acting within a granted power. A measure can therefore pass the first inquiry, because Congress is plainly exercising a war power, and still fail the second, because the measure burdens a protected right.
Courts have found the principle easier to state than to enforce. The Supreme Court did not firmly establish until 1919 that war powers legislation is subject to judicial review, and since then the actuality of war has sometimes undermined the Court’s willingness to apply constitutional limits with their full force.3 Korematsu v. United States, which deferred to the government’s detention of Japanese Americans during World War II, is the usual example, and it is one reason the war power has been called perhaps the most dangerous of all constitutional powers.4 Two features of wartime review help explain the unevenness.
The first is the standard that the power itself supplies. The war power is the power to wage war successfully, so a wartime measure is tested against what the war requires. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Korematsu, drew the conclusion: validity under the war power “must be judged wholly in the context of war,” and a wartime action “is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless.” He added that the spheres of action of military authorities and of judges “are of course very different.”5 The point is sound as far as it goes, since the grant that supports wartime wage and price controls also supports measures a peacetime Congress could not defend. The danger is that the context of war can absorb the whole analysis and leave the guarantee with nothing to do.
The second feature is who applies the limits, and under what pressure. Justice Jackson, concurring in Woods, agreed with the result but warned that the war power is the most dangerous power to free government. It is usually invoked in haste and excitement, when calm legislative attention to constitutional limits is hard to come by. It is exercised amid a patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular. And, “worst of all,” it is interpreted by judges “under the influence of the same passions and pressures.” The government, he observed, urges hasty decision to forestall some emergency and pleads that paralysis will follow if its claims to power are denied.6 He drew a practical rule from that diagnosis. When the war power is invoked to do things to liberties, property, or the economy that only indirectly affect the conduct of the war and do not relate to its management, the constitutional basis should be scrutinized with care.7
Korematsu shows what deference looks like once those pressures operate. The Court sustained an exclusion order removing persons of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens, from the West Coast war area.8 The majority recognized a limit: only the gravest imminent danger to public safety could justify excluding people from their homes. It then accepted the military authorities’ own conclusions as meeting that test. Those authorities had concluded that a curfew gave inadequate protection and that the disloyal could not be quickly separated from the loyal, and the Court found that exclusion bore a close relationship to preventing espionage and sabotage. The lesson lies in the structure of the reasoning. The Court announced a demanding standard, and the party whose conduct was under review certified that the standard had been met. Casebooks present the decision as posing a stark choice between appropriate judicial deference to the military in wartime and unjustified judicial abdication in the face of racial prejudice.9
The separate opinions show two postures a court can take toward a claim of necessity. Frankfurter’s concurrence, with its stress on the different spheres of military authorities and judges, leaned toward the military’s judgment. Justice Murphy’s dissent agreed that “great respect” for military judgment in wartime was appropriate, but insisted that “the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined.” He conceded a very real fear of invasion, sabotage, and espionage on the West Coast in 1942. He was nonetheless not persuaded that the deprivation of rights was reasonably related to a public danger so immediate, imminent, and impending as not to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes. The exclusion of “all persons of Japanese ancestry” seemed to him “an obvious racial discrimination” and so a denial of equal protection.10 Murphy’s opinion shows that deference was a choice about how much review a claim of necessity would receive, and the war power did not compel it.
Other decisions show a specific guarantee holding against the political branches. In Boumediene v. Bush, Congress had barred habeas review for detainees at Guantanamo Bay and substituted a limited form of appellate review. The Court held the substitute inadequate and the arrangement a violation of the Suspension Clause. The question there was whether a specific guarantee reached the claimants and whether the government’s procedure honored it. That question differs in kind from the one in Korematsu. A claim that exclusion is needed to prevent sabotage is a factual judgment about danger, which courts under wartime pressure tend to leave to those who hold the intelligence. Whether a guarantee applies, and whether a substitute for it is adequate, are legal questions that courts also decide in peacetime, so the pressure of war has less to work on.
Students often stop once Congress has plainly invoked a war grant, as though authority to act answered the rights claim. The contrast between the two groups of cases suggests a better sequence.
Deferential Judicial Review
Courts do review legislation that invokes the war power. In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. the Court sustained the Housing and Rent Act, and in the same opinion it said that whether the war power has been properly employed in such a case is open to judicial inquiry.14 That review follows from what the postwar cases showed. Because the power reaches the conditions the war produced, a court must be able to ask whether the war really caused the condition Congress regulated; otherwise a statute could invoke the war power with no war-caused condition behind it. Review seldom ends in invalidation, however. A federal court strikes down domestic war powers legislation as beyond Congress’s authority only under rare circumstances, and a successful challenge to an extraterritorial application is rarer still.15
Two earlier decisions show what the inquiry looks like. In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, a rent law for the District of Columbia remained in force after the armistice, and the Court upheld the authority of a federal court to decide whether the emergency behind the legislation had ceased to exist.16 As Baker v. Carr later quoted the opinion, a court is “not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake” when the validity of a law depends on the truth of what the law declares, and it may “inquire whether the exigency still existed upon which the continued operation of the law depended.”17 That inquiry is factual. The statute’s validity rests on a premise about present conditions, and a court may test the premise. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. shows review at the level of power and rights: the Court examined the War-Time Prohibition Act, found it within Congress’s power and consistent with the Bill of Rights, and affirmed.18 Chastleton asks whether the factual premise survives, and Hamilton asks whether the statute stays inside the power and the Bill of Rights. Both treat war legislation as a proper subject of judicial examination.
Review rarely produces invalidation because of what a war measure depends on. The validity of a wartime economic regulation usually turns on judgments about what the war effort required and which conditions it caused, such as scarce housing, strained production, or the demobilization of veterans. Congress and the President hold the information and the responsibility for those judgments. Woods reflects that division of labor. The Court declined to assume that Congress was unmindful of its constitutional responsibilities, and it gave Congress’s judgment that the war was a direct and immediate cause of the housing shortage the respect due legislation enacted under the police power.19 A court that examines the connection to the war and finds a real one affirms. Review is thus a check available in every case, and a statute with a documented war-caused condition passes it.
Whether a war has begun or ended is a different question, and on that question the Court has generally refused to review the political departments’ determination. Baker v. Carr placed the dates of duration of hostilities among the settings where the political question doctrine applies, meaning the doctrine under which courts leave certain questions to the elected branches.20 The dominant reason is the need for finality in the political determination, because an emergency demands “[a] prompt and unhesitating obedience.”21 If a court could reopen the date a war ended, every statute, regulation, and military measure that depends on that date would be exposed to litigation just when the political departments need certainty about their own authority. The same passage repeats a premise that Woods itself relied on: the cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the war power. The date assigned to the end of hostilities therefore settles less than it first appears to.22
The deference reaches only as far as the reasons for it. Baker explains it by isolable reasons, and where those reasons are absent the political question barrier falls away. The barrier gives way where the question does not seriously implicate finality, as with a public program of importance that is not central to the emergency effort, and where clearly definable criteria for decision are available.23 Rent control is the Court’s own example of such a program, and the passage cites Chastleton and compares Woods. Each case asks about an economic condition, the persistence of a shortage, and evidence of supply and demand can answer that kind of question without anyone fixing the date a war ended. The reverse also holds. The absence of judicially discoverable standards can send a court back to the political departments’ dates of beginning and ending hostilities even in private litigation.24
Two opposite overreadings follow from this material. A student who answers a war-power challenge by calling the whole subject a political question has stretched Baker, which reaches the determination of when hostilities began or ended and gives way when finality is not central and criteria exist. A student who predicts invalidation because review is available has stretched Woods and Chastleton, since review of domestic war legislation ends in affirmance far more often than not. Review becomes less deferential when the executive acts on its own, without Congress behind it, and the next subsection takes up that setting.
Executive Action Without Congress
When the President acts without Congress, the division of war powers between the branches does real work, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld shows how. The Constitution makes the President Commander in Chief, but it vests in Congress the powers to declare war and make rules concerning captures, to raise and support armies, to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.26 Because both branches hold a piece of the field, the first question about any presidential action in war is whether Congress has spoken to it. Exigency alone cannot justify penal tribunals that Article I, Section 8 and Article III, Section 1 do not contemplate, unless some other part of the Constitution authorizes a response to the felt need. Any such authority can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of war.27
Courts have historically shown much greater willingness to review war-power action when no federal statute or treaty authorized it and the executive acted on its own.28 The reason connects to the deference described above. A statute passed under the war power, such as the Housing and Rent Act sustained in Woods, usually reflects the combined judgment of both political branches, so a court asked to strike it down must contradict Congress and the President together, and judges seldom do. A President acting alone presents the judgment of one branch, and the other branch’s constitutional powers may point the opposite way. The court then enforces a boundary between the branches. That is a legal question of a kind courts decide in peacetime as well, and the wartime setting supplies little reason to defer. Congress’s war powers therefore operate as a limit on the executive.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan was captured by militia forces in November 2001 during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban and turned over to the U.S. military. He was held at Guantanamo Bay and charged with a single count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by military commission.29 The Court held that the commission lacked power to proceed because its structure and procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.30 Each source of law supplied its own conflict. Article 36 of the Uniform Code called for rules governing military commissions and courts-martial to be uniform insofar as practicable, and the President had not justified the commission’s departures from court-martial procedure. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which the Uniform Code brought into U.S. law, required a “regularly constituted court,” and the commission was not one.31 The Government answered that Congress had superseded those restrictions through the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Force and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. The Court found that neither statute furnished “specific, overriding authorization for the very commission that has been convened to try Hamdan.”32 The word specific carries the point. A general grant of power to use force says nothing about how a particular tribunal may be built, so it cannot be read to waive the rules Congress had already written for that tribunal.
The Court was careful about how far it went. In a footnote it said that, whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, “he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.” It cited Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.33 The footnote separates two questions. The first is whether the President holds power to act when Congress is silent, which the Court left open. The second is whether the President may override a limit that Congress has imposed, and the Court answered no. Hamdan belongs to the second question, because the Uniform Code is a body of rules for the government of the armed forces and so an exercise of Congress’s own war powers. A student who reads the case as holding that military commissions are unconstitutional, or that the President has no independent war power, has gone past what the footnote decides.
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence supplies the structural reasoning behind that footnote. He would indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain the President’s exclusive function of commanding the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside world. When that force is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor, he would give it no such indulgence. The command power is subject to limitations consistent with a constitutional republic whose law and policy-making branch is a representative Congress.34 The purpose of lodging the two titles in one man, he said, was to insure that the civilian would control the military, and “[n]o penance would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding that a President can escape control of executive powers by law through assuming his military role.”35 The reasoning explains why a military title cannot work as an exemption. If invoking the role of commander could lift the President out of the statutes that govern the forces, Congress’s power to make rules for those forces would bind no one who held the office. The point leaves command of operations untouched. It reaches matters Congress has regulated by law, such as who may try a captured person and by what procedure.
The third step does the deciding work. The ruling rested on a federal statute and a treaty that Congress had made applicable, and on no constitutional bar to commissions generally, so the Court made clear that the result would have been different had the President acted with congressional authorization.36 That statement invited Congress to act, and it did so in the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Presidential action consistent with that Act falls within the safest harbor of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework, the first category of most clearly authorized presidential actions, because the President then acts with Congress behind him and the objection that he is overriding Congress has nothing to attach to.37 Presidential power when Congress is silent is a separate question, and Hamdan left it open. For this chapter the working point is narrower: Congress’s war powers constrain the President, and an executive who acts alone against those constraints loses the deference that a joint act of the political branches would receive.