264 U.S. 543 (1924)
In August 1922 the Rent Commission of the District of Columbia issued an order reducing rents for apartments in the Chastleton apartment house effective from March 1 of that year.1 The proceeding had been initiated on January 25, 1922, with notice given only to the F. H. Smith Company as agent for the owner at that time, Lake.2 Congress had originally enacted rent control legislation in October 1919, extended it in 1921, and reenacted it with amendments on May 22, 1922, declaring that the emergency continued to exist until May 22, 1924.3
On September 25, 1922, Hahn purchased the property under foreclosure of a preexisting mortgage.4 He subsequently conveyed it to the Chastleton Corporation.5 On October 27, 1922, the Chastleton Corporation, Hahn, and Lake filed a bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the Rent Commission and the tenants to enjoin enforcement of the order.6
The bill alleged that the emergency that justified interference with the ordinarily existing private rights in 1919 had come to an end in 1922.7 It also asserted that Hahn and the Chastleton Corporation had not participated in the Commission proceeding.8 The lower courts dismissed the bill, and the Court of Appeals left the question of changed conditions for decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.9
The Supreme Court granted review to examine whether the allegations of changed conditions could be maintained and whether further factual development was required in the lower court.10
Whether the emergency that justified the rent control legislation continued to exist in 1922?11
A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other specific state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.12 The Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared by the legislature.13 A legislative declaration looking to the future can be no more than prophecy liable to be controlled by events.14
No. The order was passed some time after the latest statute and long after the original act would have expired.15 This made it open to inquire whether the exigency still existed upon which the continued operation of the law depended.16 It is a matter of public knowledge that the Government has considerably diminished its demand for employees.17 That demand was one of the great causes of the sudden afflux of people to Washington.18 Other causes have lost at least much of their power.19 It is conceivable that extensive activity in building has added to the ease of finding an abode.20 If about all that remains of war conditions is the increased cost of living, that is not in itself a justification of the act.21
Without going beyond the limits of judicial knowledge, the plaintiffs’ allegations cannot be declared offhand to be unmaintainable.22 On the facts that the Court judicially knows the law has ceased to operate.23
The emergency may have ended by 1922, so the bill should not have been dismissed and the case requires further factual development in the lower court to determine whether the statute has ceased to operate.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brandeis agreed that the decree should be reversed as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn.25 He would not have reached the constitutional question of whether the emergency continued to exist in 1922.26 If protection of their rights required the Court to pass upon the constitutionality of the District Rent Acts, he would have agreed to the procedure directing the lower court to ascertain the facts.27
In his opinion it does not.28 To express an opinion upon the constitutionality of the acts or to sanction the enquiry directed would therefore be contrary to a long-prevailing practice of the Court.29 The Court never anticipates a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.30
The Court never formulates a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.31
Whether the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal from the Rent Commission's order?32
No. It is doubtful whether the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn were not entitled to treat the order as a nullity so far as they were concerned.36 It is open to equal doubt whether in a proceeding under the law they could assail its validity.37 There are many tenants to be dealt with. However looked at, a bill in equity is the natural and best way of settling the parties’ rights.38
The plaintiffs properly invoked equity jurisdiction rather than an appeal at law, so dismissal of the bill was error as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brandeis agreed that the decree should be reversed as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn. So far as concerns the plaintiff Lake, the bill was properly dismissed for want of equity.40 This was among other reasons because his administrative appeal from the order of the Rent Commission was pending in the Supreme Court of the District when this suit was begun and still remains undisposed of.41
Whether the Rent Commission's order is void as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn for lack of notice to the mortgagee?42
The required notice must be given personally or by registered mail to all parties in interest.43 Notice to an agent for collection of rents is insufficient for a mortgagee or those claiming under a preexisting mortgage.44 The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to such persons.45 Congress did not make the proceeding one in rem binding upon all the world regardless of lack of notice.46
Yes. The proceeding was begun January 25, 1922 and the order entered August 7, 1922.47 When the proceeding began Lake was the owner subject to duly recorded mortgages.48 Hahn purchased under foreclosure of one of those mortgages after the order was entered and conveyed to the Chastleton Corporation.49
Notice was never served on the mortgage holder or on Hahn or the Chastleton Corporation.50 The only notice served was to the F. H. Smith Company as agent for Lake, and that company had no authority to represent the mortgagee or those claiming under him.5152
As the required notice was not served on the mortgagee or those claiming under him the order is necessarily void as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn.53
The order is void as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn even if the Rent Acts are valid, so the bill should be sustained as to them without reaching the constitutional question.54
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brandeis concluded that the order is void as to the Chastleton Corporation and Hahn even if the Rent Acts are valid.55 The District Rent Act of 1921 required that in all cases the commission shall give notice personally or by registered mail and afford an opportunity to be heard to all parties in interest.56 The 1922 Act added a proviso that notice to an agent for collection of rents is good notice to the principal.57
When the proceeding began Lake was the owner subject to mortgages.58 Hahn purchased under foreclosure of one of those mortgages after the order was entered and conveyed to the Chastleton Corporation. They claim title as purchasers under the foreclosure of a mortgage which antedated Lake’s purchase.59
Notice was never served on the mortgage holder or on Hahn or the Chastleton Corporation. The only notice served was to the F. H. Smith Company as agent for Lake.60 That company had no authority to represent the mortgagee or those claiming under him. As the required notice was not served on the mortgagee or those claiming under him the order is necessarily void as to them.61 The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to persons so situated.62