Concept
Pre-Enforcement Suits
Younger abstention
Pre-Enforcement Suits
Younger v. Harris addressed a plaintiff who sued after the State had already indicted him, and the rule it announced protects a state prosecution that is already under way. By its terms, the decision does not reach a plaintiff who gets to federal court first.1 The gap was visible from the start. Dombrowski v. Pfister, the decision Younger cut back, allowed suits to enjoin future state prosecutions when the federal suit was filed before the state case began.2 And in Younger itself, three plaintiffs, Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky, lacked standing because no one had threatened them with prosecution; the Court acknowledged that their case might have been different had the State made such a threat.3
Each reason for restraint developed earlier in this chapter presupposes a state case. Equity withheld relief because a person charged under a statute normally has an adequate remedy at law: he can raise the constitutional defense in the state proceeding.4 Comity and “Our Federalism” shielded the state court already hearing the case,5 and a federal injunction would have made a federal district judge the reviewer of a state court that our constitutional system treats as an equal.6 A person who has been threatened but not charged has none of this: no trial in which to raise a defense, no state judge whose work a federal order would displace, and no state appeal to bypass. Ex parte Young is the model for his suit. The railroad’s shareholders there converted federal defenses into affirmative claims to restrain enforcement, and they sued before any state proceeding had begun.7 A defendant already charged can vindicate his rights by defending a single criminal action, while the uncharged plaintiff has no comparable remedy except the one Steffel v. Thompson supplies.8
This dependence on pendency creates a complication, because the date of the federal complaint does not settle whether a state proceeding counts as pending. Hicks v. Miranda expanded the notion of a pending proceeding to include one begun after the federal action was filed.9 It also qualified Steffel in two ways. A federal plaintiff against whom nothing is pending is still bound by Younger if his interests were intertwined with those of persons already being prosecuted. And where the State begins proceedings after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court, Younger applies in full force.10 Three questions therefore organize this unit: whether a state proceeding was pending when the federal suit was filed (Steffel and Doran), when the state case began if it came later (Hicks and timing), and whether the federal plaintiff is the person being prosecuted or someone tied to that person (Hicks and intertwined interests).
Steffel and Doran
A plaintiff who sues before the State charges anyone stands differently from Harris, and a unanimous Court said so in Steffel v. Thompson: “regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied.”11 The holding has two conditions: no state prosecution is pending when the federal suit is filed, and the plaintiff faces a genuine threat of enforcement. With both present, the restraint that defeated Harris has nothing to attach to. The same logic carries over to injunctions, and the Anti-Injunction Act is no obstacle, because it reaches only injunctions against pending proceedings and does not bar an injunction against the initiation of state proceedings in the future.12 Steffel rather than Younger therefore governs where injunctive relief is sought before state criminal proceedings begin.13
Steffel wanted to distribute handbills opposing the Vietnam War at a shopping mall. The mall treated him as a trespasser and called the police, who warned Steffel and a companion that they would be arrested if they continued. Steffel left. His companion stayed and was arrested, and Steffel then sued for a declaratory judgment that he could handbill free from arrest and prosecution.14 The Court found a concrete controversy: the threat of arrest, joined with his companion’s arrest, made Steffel’s dispute with the local prosecutor immediate, and that showing sufficed for standing.15
None of the reasons for restraint had anything to work on. With no prosecution begun, a federal ruling could neither duplicate nor disrupt a state proceeding, and defending a prosecution could offer Steffel no remedy because there was no prosecution in which to raise the defense.16 Refusing to hear him, the Court warned, would “place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity.”17 In plain terms, Steffel could keep handbilling and risk arrest to find out whether the statute was valid, or he could stop and surrender speech he believed the Constitution protected.
Steffel sought a declaration, a remedy that determines the parties’ rights and legal relations in a justiciable controversy.18 The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes that relief without reference to whether damages or an injunction would be available.19 The Act creates no rights and confers no jurisdiction, so the plaintiff still needs an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as the constitutional claim itself.20 The declaration also carries force later. If the federal court holds the statute invalid and the State prosecutes anyway, the state court must give the federal determination collateral estoppel effect and dismiss the case.21
Steffel left a gap, because a declaratory judgment arrives only when the federal case ends. While the case drags on, a plaintiff who obeys the statute gives up the conduct and may suffer serious harm, and one who violates it invites a state prosecution that can force dismissal of the federal suit under Hicks.22 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. closed the gap. A local ordinance banned topless dancing, and three bars that had featured it sued in federal court, claiming the ordinance violated the First Amendment. Two of them, Salem and Tim-Rob, stopped dancing and complied. The third, M & L, resumed topless dancing right after the complaint was filed and was promptly prosecuted in state court.23 The Supreme Court upheld preliminary injunctions for the two bars that complied and denied relief to M & L, because a state criminal proceeding was pending against it.24
Why enjoin when a declaration is available? A preliminary injunction is a temporary order that holds the parties in place until the court decides the merits, and a declaration is a final judgment that cannot issue until then. Because no declaratory alternative can maintain the status quo, the Steffel principle supports a preliminary injunction.25 A plaintiff who wins the injunction may resume the conduct without fear that the State will start a prosecution and trigger Younger. If the federal court ultimately holds the statute invalid, the declaration then protects the plaintiff, backed by collateral estoppel in any later state case.26
The three bars attacked one ordinance on one constitutional ground and differed in a single fact: whether a state prosecution existed when the federal court acted. Salem and Tim-Rob paid for their position by giving up the dancing while they waited. In return, nothing was pending against them, so an injunction disturbed no state judge’s work, and Steffel’s logic applied to them as it had to Steffel. M & L already had a state forum for its First Amendment defense, which put it in Harris’s position, and the federal court had to stand aside.
Both holdings turn on the word genuine. The threat to Steffel was aimed at him and had already been carried out against his companion. A general dislike of a statute lacks that concreteness, because declaratory relief requires a justiciable controversy, and imaginary or speculative fears do not qualify.27
The plaintiff’s opening is narrow, and it can close after the suit is filed, because a state prosecution begun before the federal court reaches proceedings of substance on the merits revives the bar.28 That timing rule comes next. On a fact pattern, ask first whether a prosecution was pending when the complaint was filed. If none was, ask whether a specific threat was directed at the plaintiff’s planned conduct. When one was, declaratory relief is available against the statute, whether the attack is facial or as applied, and a preliminary injunction is available to hold the status quo. A pending prosecution, as with Harris and with M & L, returns the analysis to the Younger bar and its exceptions.
Hicks and Timing
The State can end a pre-enforcement suit after it has begun. Hicks v. Miranda shows how. Police raided a theater to stop the showing of a film, and the prosecutor started a civil proceeding to close the theater and criminal proceedings against the employees who had run the film on the night of the raid.30 The owner, who had not been charged, sued in federal court for an injunction against any prosecution of him, and the district court rejected his application for a temporary restraining order, an emergency order that holds matters in place for a short time.31 The State charged him more than six weeks after he filed but a day after he served the complaint, well before the federal court could address the merits.32 The district court nonetheless went forward and eventually enjoined the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that equitable restraint required it to stay its hand once a state proceeding had begun in which the owner could assert his federal defense.33
The Court refused to confine Younger to cases in which the state proceeding was pending on the day the federal complaint was filed. Its rule is that “where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.”34 Full force means that the ordinary analysis governs: the federal action is dismissed unless an exception applies.35 A first-to-file rule, under which the earlier complaint wins, was rejected, so filing in federal court before the State files is not enough to avoid abstention.36 Hicks also rested on a second ground, that the owner’s interests were intertwined with those of the employees already charged, taken up in the next subsection.37
The rule rests on two reasons, and each explains a different part of its shape. The first is incentive. If filing first immunized a plaintiff, a person who had violated a state law could race to federal court before the State was able to bring its own case, and the comity that Younger protects would turn on who won the race.38 The second is what the federal court has at stake. Federal district courts may not sit in review of state-court decisions,39 and a federal case that has barely begun has little invested in it. The test seems designed to protect federal jurisdiction only where the district court has spent substantial judge time, so that dismissal in favor of a later-filed state prosecution is no great affront to federal authority.40 The first reason explains why the filing date was dropped as the measure, and the second explains why the stage of the federal case replaced it.
What must a fact pattern show to keep a federal case alive after the State files? It must show federal activity of substance on the merits before the filing. The phrase has no precise definition, but two decisions mark its ends. In Hicks the only ruling the district court had made was the denial of a temporary restraining order, and that was not a proceeding of substance.41 Whether granting such an order would count is unsettled, and the doubt has a source: a judge deciding the request must make the same preliminary assessment of the merits whether the order is granted or denied, so treating one result as substance and the other as nothing sits awkwardly.42 At the other end, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff involved a federal plaintiff who obtained a preliminary injunction before the state proceedings began. The Court said that a federal action in which a preliminary injunction has been granted “has proceeded well beyond the embryonic stage, and considerations of economy, equity, and federalism counsel against Younger abstention at that point.”43 A denied restraining order is therefore not enough federal involvement to avoid abstention, while a granted preliminary injunction is.44
The difference between the two decisions is the judicial attention the federal claim had received when the State acted. A ruling on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief or for summary judgment necessarily entails some consideration of the merits, so a court that has decided one has plainly invested in the case.45 A stem that says only that the plaintiff filed first, or that a restraining order was denied, describes Hicks. A stem in which the federal judge has granted a preliminary injunction describes Midkiff.
The two limits squeeze a plaintiff who wants to challenge a statute before being charged. Running to federal court at the first hint of prosecution does not solve the problem, because standing doctrine bars suits filed too early, and a plaintiff seeking an injunction before charges must show a truly imminent threat of prosecution.46 The plaintiff needs a credible, imminent threat to be heard at all and substantial federal rulings on the merits before the State files to stay in federal court, and the window between the two is narrow.47 Conduct during the wait tightens the squeeze. A plaintiff who violates the statute while the federal case proceeds gives the State the occasion to file in its own courts and force dismissal under Hicks, and one who obeys gives up the conduct for what may be a long interim and may suffer serious harm.48 Doran v. Salem Inn shows both outcomes. M & L resumed topless dancing just after the federal complaint, was quickly prosecuted, and lost its request for relief because a state proceeding was pending, while Salem and Tim-Rob complied and had their preliminary injunctions upheld.49
The way out is sequence. A plaintiff can comply with the statute long enough to obtain a preliminary injunction against enforcement and then resume the conduct without fear that a state prosecution will trigger Younger.50 If the federal court ultimately declares the statute unconstitutional, the declaratory judgment protects the plaintiff, because a state court must give it collateral estoppel effect.51 The route has costs. A preliminary injunction is equitable relief, so the plaintiff must show irreparable harm, a strong likelihood of success on the merits, and clean hands, and a plaintiff who has already violated the statute risks an unclean-hands objection.52
Hicks has drawn criticism on two fronts. The first is fairness: the rule lets the State defeat a federal suit by filing a criminal case after it begins, and the four dissenting Justices objected that the majority “virtually instructs state officials to answer federal complaints with state indictments.”53 The reply is the race problem, since a first-to-file rule would let a person who has violated a state law defeat Younger by racing to the federal court.54 The second front is clarity. The Court left the trigger ill-defined, and the dissenters noted that it remains unclear what counts as proceedings of substance on the merits.55 A plaintiff cannot know in advance how much federal activity will be enough, which is why the cases at the two ends, Hicks and Midkiff, matter more than the phrase itself.
The third step does the real work, and the usual mistake is to treat the filing date as decisive in either direction. A plaintiff who sued first has not escaped Younger by that fact, and a State that charged second has not lost the right to abstention by that fact. What controls is whether the federal court had reached proceedings of substance on the merits by the time the State filed.
Hicks and Intertwined Interests
Younger abstention ordinarily attaches to a person, the defendant in the pending state case, and does not spread to everyone who might someday be prosecuted under the same statute.58 When two people take part in conduct that could support a prosecution and the State charges only one, the other may therefore seek prospective federal relief against a future prosecution.59 Hicks carved an exception out of that personal rule: a federal plaintiff against whom no state proceeding is pending is still bound by Younger if his interests “were intertwined” with those of persons against whom state criminal proceedings have been commenced.60 This is the first of the two qualifications Hicks placed on Steffel; the second, the timing rule, was the subject of the preceding subsection.
The facts of Hicks show how the exception works. Police raided a theater to stop the showing of a film, and the prosecutor started a civil proceeding to close the theater and criminal proceedings against the employees who had run the film on the night of the raid.61 Misdemeanor charges reached the two employees on duty at the time of the seizure, while the theater’s owner and his corporation, who had not been charged, sued in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief.62 The Supreme Court held that although no criminal case was pending against the owner and the corporation when they filed, their interests and those of the employees were intertwined. The federal action would therefore interfere with the employees’ pending prosecution, and Younger could not be avoided on the ground that nothing was pending against the plaintiffs on the filing date.63 The Court also relied on the State’s charging the owner soon after the federal complaint was filed, the timing ground taught above, so the result rests on two supports.64
The inquiry is practical. The mere pendency of a parallel state proceeding is not enough; before abstaining, the court must find that the relief sought in federal court would in some manner directly interfere with ongoing state judicial proceedings.65 A federal ruling for the owner would have done exactly that. The employees’ prosecution had already put a question before a state judge: whether showing that film that night could be punished consistently with the First Amendment. The owner asked a federal court to answer the same question about the same screening, and an answer in his favor would have told the state judge how the employees’ case ought to come out. The employees could raise that defense in their own trial, so a federal decision would have duplicated their remedy and disturbed their pending case at once. A rule that attached Younger only to the person charged would also leave a loophole, since any defendant could arrange for an uncharged owner, partner, or corporation to file the federal action and obtain the ruling the defendant could not. Treating closely tied parties alike closes that door.
The limit on the exception matters as much as the exception. A shared statute alone cannot make interests intertwined, because otherwise every pre-enforcement suit would be barred whenever anyone was being prosecuted under the same law, and the opening Steffel created would close. The handbiller in Steffel was threatened with arrest for his own planned leafleting, and his companion, who kept handbilling, was arrested, yet the Court held that declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending against the plaintiff and he faces a genuine threat of enforcement.66 Two people whose conduct is independent of each other stand in the same position as the handbiller. The State’s charge against one leaves the other free to seek prospective relief, because a federal ruling on the second person’s future conduct does not decide the charge before the state judge in the first person’s case.67 What separated Hicks was the tie between plaintiffs and defendants. The owner and his corporation ran the theater whose employees were charged for showing the film, so the conduct, the statute, and the claimed defense belonged to both.
The two Hicks rules together narrow the window that Steffel and Doran opened. A plaintiff who wants federal relief before being charged can avoid Younger only by proceeding meaningfully in federal court before the state case begins, and only if he does not fall within the intertwined-interests holding.68 On a fact pattern, ask first whether the federal plaintiff is the person who has been charged. If not, ask whether he and a charged person share the same conduct and the same defense, as an owner and corporation share them with the employees who operated the business. When they do, Younger applies even though nothing was pending against the plaintiff on the filing date. When the uncharged plaintiff’s conduct is independent of the charged person’s, the analysis moves to the Steffel and Doran rules and then to the timing question.