Concept
Applying the Doctrine
Political question doctrine
Applying the Doctrine
A political question problem arrives with a list and no order. Baker v. Carr gives six considerations, and a dispute stays in court unless one of them is “inextricable from the case at bar.”1 The six are a textual commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of resolving the issue independently without expressing a lack of the respect due coordinate branches; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; and the potential embarrassment of multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. When a court finds none of them in the dispute, it may decide the case.
Because the list does not say where to begin, a problem needs a sequence, and the best one runs from the most structural question to the most discretionary. The doctrine is a separation-of-powers doctrine. It does not come into play where no separation-of-powers concern exists, so a challenge to state action alone does not trigger it unless the state action somehow implicates the powers of the federal political branches.2 If a federal branch is involved, the next question is whether the Constitution commits the issue to it, because a textual assignment rests on the document’s own allocation of power and not on a judge’s sense of prudence. The remaining considerations mostly serve that question. A lack of judicially discoverable standards, or a need for a nonjudicial policy choice, supports the conclusion that the text assigns the issue to a coordinate branch. The same factors also give the Court room to apply prudential considerations in deciding whether the judicial branch should resolve the matter.3
Starting with the structural questions also keeps the word “political” from doing work it should not do. A court that begins by asking whether a case is controversial will dismiss cases that are merely sensitive. Three problems show the sequence at work, and each comes out differently.
The suit attacks a state’s districting, so step one asks whether that state action implicates the federal political branches. A defendant would look to the Elections Clause, which gives state legislatures the power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner” of electing Representatives and gives Congress the power to “make or alter” those regulations.4 Step three keeps the claim in court. Over the years the Court developed a “one-person, one-vote” standard that applies without any nonjudicial policy determination, so equality is judicially measurable, and Baker itself held that a vote dilution challenge to legislative reapportionment does not present a political question.5
A partisan gerrymandering claim lacks that footing. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the plaintiffs challenged congressional districts that were equally apportioned in population but drawn to give one party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength. Four Justices called the claim a political question, and one relied on standing.6 Equal population no longer supplies a count, and the Elections Clause leaves the field to state legislatures and to Congress, which has regularly exercised its power to alter state rules, including to address partisan gerrymandering.7 The Court took the same view in Rucho v. Common Cause, discussed above.
Step one is met, because a ruling for the member-elect would hold that the House lacked power to act and would set the court against a coordinate branch. Step two decides the problem. Article I, Section 5 makes each House the judge of its members’ qualifications, so a clause does assign the House a decision. The question is how far the assignment runs. In Powell v. McCormack the claim was that the House was without power to exclude a member-elect, and the Court treated that claim as calling for an interpretation of Article I, Section 5. It read the clause to reach only the qualifications the Constitution sets out, which are age, citizenship, and residency.8 Disapproval of campaign speeches is not on that list, so the exclusion falls outside the commitment.
The remaining steps add nothing for the House. The Court said that deciding the right to sit “would require no more than an interpretation of the Constitution,” which falls within the traditional role of courts and for which judicially manageable standards exist. Such a decision involves neither a lack of the respect due a coordinate branch nor an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.9 The lesson is that the commitment inquiry asks how far a clause reaches. Finding a clause that names a chamber’s authority only begins it.
The answer depends on how the court frames what it must decide. If the case asks a court to determine whether Jerusalem falls within the sovereignty of Israel or of Jordan, it would likely present a political question, because it involves the recognition of foreign governments, an area of foreign affairs the Constitution textually assigns to the President.10 The plaintiff, however, asks for something else: enforcement of a statute. Whichever way the court rules, a political branch’s determination will control the city’s status. If Congress acted constitutionally, its resolution governs, and if the statute invades the executive sphere, the President’s policy governs. In neither event does the court make an independent determination about Jerusalem.11 What remains for the court is the constitutionality of a statute, a question the courts decide routinely and one that may rarely, if ever, qualify as political.12
The decision on justiciability did not decide who would win. When the case in Zivotofsky returned, the Court invalidated the statute and concluded that the President has exclusive power to recognize a foreign nation.13 The plaintiff lost on the merits, and the case was never dismissed as a political question.
The three problems show that the characterization of the issue often decides the outcome. The same passport dispute can be described as a demand to settle Jerusalem’s status or as a request to apply and test a statute. The same House vote can be called an unreviewable judgment or an exclusion on a ground the text does not list. The same districting complaint can claim equal populations or demand fair partisan representation. Before applying any factor, therefore, state in one sentence what the court would have to decide to grant the relief requested. Then ask whether the Constitution gives that decision to a political branch or whether the law supplies no measure for making it. Step four seldom settles a problem alone. The Zivotofsky decision may suggest a certain discomfort with prudential factors, consistent with the Court’s turn away from doctrines that let federal courts decline cases on prudential calculations.14