541 U.S. 267 (2004)
In 2000, the census showed that Pennsylvania was entitled to only 19 Representatives in Congress, a decrease of 2 from its previous delegation.1 Pennsylvania's General Assembly, controlled by Republicans who also held the Governor's office, undertook the task of drawing a new districting map.2 Prominent national Republican figures pressured the Assembly to adopt a partisan plan as punishment for Democratic redistricting elsewhere.3
On January 3, 2002, the General Assembly passed its plan, signed into law as Act 1.4 Registered Democrats Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Act 1 created malapportioned districts and constituted a political gerrymander in violation of Article I and the Equal Protection Clause.5 A three-judge panel dismissed the gerrymandering claim but allowed the apportionment claim to proceed.6
After trial, the court ruled for plaintiffs on apportionment and retained jurisdiction pending a remedial plan.7 Governor Schweiker signed Act 34, a remedial plan enacted by the General Assembly, on April 18, 2002.8 Plaintiffs moved to impose their own remedial districts, arguing Act 34 was both malapportioned and an unconstitutional gerrymander.9 The District Court denied the motion, finding the new districts properly apportioned and rejecting the gerrymandering claim for the reasons stated earlier.10
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Act 34 gerrymandering claim, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.11 The complaint alleged that the districts were meandering and irregular, ignored traditional redistricting criteria solely for partisan advantage, and that the plan was designed to maximize Republican seats.12 The District Court dismissed the political gerrymandering claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.13
Whether claims alleging that a state congressional redistricting plan constitutes an unconstitutional political gerrymander are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause?14
Under the political question doctrine, a claim is nonjusticiable if there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, as set forth in Baker v. Carr.15
No. The established facts demonstrate that the plaintiffs, registered Democrats, challenged Act 34 as a political gerrymander designed to maximize Republican advantage, but the District Court dismissed the claim.16 In the years following Bandemer, lower courts struggled to apply any standard, with most claims resulting in no relief, and the plaintiffs' measures like efficiency gap were found inadequate because they require courts to make policy judgments.17
Political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment of dismissal but refuses to close the door on all future political gerrymandering claims.19 He acknowledges the absence of any comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries and the lack of rules to limit judicial intervention.20 At the same time, he maintains that courts should remain open to the possibility that a limited and precise rationale might emerge in an appropriate case.21
Such a standard could allow adjudication of at least some claims without committing federal courts to unprecedented intervention in the political process.22 He notes that the First Amendment may ultimately supply a sounder basis than the Equal Protection Clause for evaluating whether an apportionment burdens representational rights by reason of voters' political views.23 Because no such standard has yet been shown in the present record, he agrees that the complaint must be dismissed.24
Joined by Ginsburg, J., And Breyer, J., As To Parts Ii And Iii
Justice Stevens dissents from the holding that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.25 He argues that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from drawing district lines for the purpose of disadvantaging a particular group of voters.26 In his view, judicially manageable standards already exist and have been applied in racial gerrymandering cases, which examine whether race or partisanship was the predominant factor motivating the legislature.27
He would decide the case on the narrow ground that plaintiff Furey stated a valid district-specific claim by alleging that District 6 was drawn solely for partisan advantage and ignored all traditional redistricting criteria.28 Because the District Court failed to apply well-settled propositions when it dismissed her claim, he would reverse and remand for further proceedings.29
Joined by Ginsburg, J.
Justice Souter dissents and would preserve the justiciability holding of Davis v. Bandemer while adopting a fresh, five-step prima facie test modeled on McDonnell Douglas.30 Under his proposed standard, a plaintiff must show membership in a cohesive political group, that the district paid little heed to traditional districting principles, specific correlations between those deviations and the group's distribution, the existence of a superior hypothetical district, and intentional manipulation to pack or crack the group.31 Once these elements are established, the burden shifts to the State to justify the district by reference to legitimate objectives other than naked partisan advantage.32
He believes this framework supplies workable clues for identifying when partisan competition has reached an extremity of unfairness and would therefore vacate the judgment and remand to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint.33
Justice Breyer dissents, contending that courts can and should intervene when a districting plan produces a severe and durable distortion of the electoral process that cannot be justified by legitimate state interests.34 He identifies unjustified entrenchment of a minority party in power as a particularly serious constitutional harm that violates basic democratic norms.35 In his view, the Pennsylvania plan appears to meet this standard because it was designed with the explicit goal of maximizing Republican seats and succeeded to a degree that cannot be explained by neutral factors.36
He sets forth several sets of circumstances that would support a claim. These range from repeated failure of the majority party to obtain a legislative majority despite receiving a majority of votes to mid-cycle redistricting accompanied by statistical evidence of likely entrenchment.37 Because the plaintiffs could readily amend their complaint to assert such circumstances, he would reverse the District Court's dismissal.38
Whether the plurality standard announced in Davis v. Bandemer provides a judicially manageable standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims?39
The Bandemer plurality required a showing of both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group. Specifically, the group had to be denied its chance to effectively influence the political process as a whole.40
No. The established facts show that the Bandemer standard led to 18 years of litigation with virtually no relief granted in gerrymandering cases. Lower courts found the effects prong vague and unmanageable because it required proof that a political group had been consistently degraded in its influence on the political process as a whole. This produced the same outcome as nonjusticiability in nearly every case.41
The Bandemer standard is not judicially manageable.42
Whether the standards proposed by the plaintiffs for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders are judicially discernible and manageable?43
A proposed standard for political gerrymandering must be both discernible from the Constitution and judicially manageable, meaning it provides clear guidance without requiring courts to make policy determinations.44
No. The established facts indicate that the plaintiffs' proposed standard, requiring predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage and effects shown by packing and cracking that thwart majority translation into seats, relies on contested assumptions about proportionality and would require courts to assess statewide party strength in ways that are unmanageable.45
The plaintiffs' proposed standards are not judicially discernible and manageable.46