Concept
Injury in Fact
Standing
Injury in Fact
Standing asks whether this plaintiff has an immediate and personal stake in the claim.1 Injury in fact is its first requirement and the one most directly about the plaintiff’s own situation. The demand for an immediate interest, as opposed to a future one, expresses the ban on advisory opinions, and the demand for a personal interest, as opposed to a public or mere taxpayer interest, expresses the counter-majoritarian principle.2 A plaintiff without that stake leaves the court without subject matter jurisdiction, and the court must dismiss.3
The question rarely troubled courts in traditional litigation. Through the nineteenth century, constitutional issues generally arose in criminal prosecutions and in suits for trespass, breach of contract, or personal injury, where the plaintiff’s injury was the subject of the suit itself.4 In the twentieth century the role of government shifted,5 and the injury question grew harder once plaintiffs began challenging regulation instead of suing over a trespass or a broken contract.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins breaks injury in fact into three separate showings. The invasion of a legally protected interest must be (1) concrete, (2) particularized, and (3) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.6 A complaint can satisfy two and still fail on the third. Nor is injury in fact enough by itself. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the plaintiffs alleged specific occasions on which hospitals denied them care because they could not pay, and the Court accepted that as an injury in fact. The suit still failed, because the only defendants were Treasury officials and the hospitals that caused the injury were not parties.7
At the easy end sits the plaintiff who alleges bodily harm. Jean, who sues over a personal injury, invokes the basic tort right to be free from bodily harm and claims an actual and personal invasion of that legally protected interest, which is to say a concrete and particularized one.8 The typical individual-rights case resolves just as easily.9
Most disputes fall between the easy cases and the hopeless ones, and no formula sorts them. The working principle is that an interest or harm that is conceptually or factually too abstract or speculative will not trigger an Article III court’s authority to adjudicate,10 and the more creative the theory of harm, the more reluctant courts become to find an injury in fact.11 Two plaintiffs who assert the same interest show how the principle works. Alice regularly hikes trails in a national forest that the Forest Service has approved for a ski resort, and she sues to enjoin the development for failing to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act. Courts have consistently held that harm to one’s enjoyment of the environment satisfies Article III, and Alice claims a concrete and personal invasion of that interest.12 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs relied on a comparable interest, because the desire to observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic reasons, is cognizable.13 Their affiants, however, offered only “some day” intentions to revisit project sites abroad, with no concrete plans and no date, and the Court found no actual or imminent injury.14 Both plaintiffs invoked a recognized interest. What separated them was how specific and how near the facts made the harm.
The subsections below take the three descriptors in turn, with a separate subsection on plaintiffs whose only alleged wrong is a statutory violation, where the descriptors are most often confused. The showing is not a one-time hurdle, either. Standing must also hold at the appellate level, where a party seeking relief must show that a favorable ruling would redress the injury caused by the adverse decision below.15
Particularized Injury
A particularized injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”17 The operative word is personal: the plaintiff must be among the injured and cannot be a bystander with strong views about the defendant’s conduct. An injury to a cognizable interest does not satisfy the test by itself, because the party seeking review must “be himself among the injured.”18
The requirement reflects the idea that only parties with a concrete stake can bring a dispute before the federal courts.19 The common-law writ system worked the same way: a party who suffered a cognizable injury to person or property could bring a trespass action, while a bystander was barred for want of legal injury.20
Sierra Club v. Morton applied the rule to an organization. The Court held that an organization’s interest in a problem, however active and long-standing, is not injury in fact.21 But the Club could establish injury in fact if some of its members used the area in question for recreation, because the aesthetic injury those members suffered counted.22 By pointing to the factors that would support an individual’s standing, the Court let groups overcome their own standing problems by acting for interested members.23 The hiker whose trails the resort would destroy shows what the Club’s complaint lacked: the loss falls on her because of her own use.24
The same contrast appears between cities. Residents of Boston cannot challenge a park closure in Boise on the strength of their remorse about the loss of green space in America. Residents of Boise can sue if they have visited the park and would keep doing so were it to stay open.25
Particularization is necessary but not sufficient, and Spokeo corrected a court that treated it as the whole inquiry. The Ninth Circuit found a concrete injury because Robins alleged that Spokeo violated his own statutory rights and not merely the rights of other people, and because his personal interests in the handling of his credit information were individualized rather than collective. The Supreme Court answered that both observations concern particularization, not concreteness, and that an injury in fact must be both.26 A plaintiff can be the only person the defendant’s conduct touched and still hold a harm that is abstract. The dissent likewise found Robins’s claim personal, since he sought redress “not for harm to the citizenry, but for Spokeo’s spread of misinformation specifically about him.”27
A shared harm remains particularized when each person is individually affected. The generalized-grievance decisions turn on a different defect: no individual would have had standing to challenge the CIA’s budget or the issuance of military commissions to members of Congress.28 That doctrine has its own section later in this chapter. On an exam, a stem that stresses how many people share a harm tests whether each person is individually affected, while a stem that stresses how deeply the plaintiff cares tests whether anything personal is at stake.
Concrete Injury
A concrete injury is “real,” and not “abstract.”29 The inquiry differs from particularization: a plaintiff may show that the defendant’s conduct reached her personally and still must show that the harm exists.30
Concrete does not mean tangible. Tangible injuries are easier to recognize, but intangible injuries can be concrete too, as the Court has confirmed in free-speech cases such as Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and free-exercise cases such as Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.31 The noneconomic injuries the Court has historically recognized include injury to aesthetic and conservational interests, a “spiritual stake in First Amendment values,” and the inability to compete on an equal footing, with stigma or indignity as a possible addition. The Court has nonetheless tightened the requirements since the early 1990s.32
Environmental harms show how far recognized interests extend. Courts have consistently held that harm to one’s enjoyment of the environment satisfies Article III, and the authorities include Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Sierra Club, and United States v. SCRAP.33 Members who use an area for recreation suffer an aesthetic injury that counts.34 SCRAP, however, marks the generous extreme. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation called it an expansive view of standing that the Court has never since emulated, and the Chief Justice later called it “the previous highwater mark of diluted standing requirements.”35
For an intangible harm, courts consult two guides, history and Congress.36 History comes first because standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and that requirement is grounded in historical practice. It is therefore instructive to ask whether the alleged harm has a close relationship to one that has traditionally been regarded as a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.37 Recent decisions lean harder on that tradition. They ask whether the plaintiff has identified a close historical or common-law analogue for the asserted injury, and they treat theories with a close relationship to traditionally recognized harms as likelier to pass than newfangled ones.38 History is a guide, not a gate, because other factors continue to play a role,39 and Trump v. Hawaii held that a person’s interest in being united with relatives is concrete and particularized enough to be an Article III injury in fact.40
Congress’s judgment is the second guide. Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, so its judgment is instructive and important, and it may elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.41 The word is instructive and not controlling, as the next subsection explains.
A harm can also be too abstract, and it can fail in two ways. Conceptual abstraction comes first: as allegations rest on less familiar legal ground, courts grow more reluctant to hold that an invasion of the underlying interest satisfies the requirement.42 Stigma illustrates the difficulty. Allen v. Wright held that stigma flowing from the government’s treatment of others does not suffice unless the plaintiff is personally denied equal treatment, a point developed under redressability.
Factual abstraction is the second way, and Lujan shows it. The interest was never the problem, because the desire to observe an animal species is cognizable. What failed was the connection between that interest and the plaintiffs. The Court rejected three creative theories of harm, the ecosystem nexus, the animal nexus, and the vocational nexus, explaining that standing is not “an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable” but requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.”43 The animal nexus would have credited the harm that anyone interested in an endangered species would feel whenever government action threatened its survival.44 To say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species anywhere in the world is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species “with which he has no more specific connection” goes “into pure speculation and fantasy.”45
Steps two and four do the work. A plaintiff who lost no money has not failed step two, since intangible harms qualify, and a plaintiff who feels strongly about a species or a policy has not passed step four, since strong feeling supplies no connection to the harm.
Statutory Violations
A plaintiff whose only alleged wrong is that the defendant broke a statute must still show a concrete injury, because Article III standing requires one even in the context of a statutory violation.47 Robins sued Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for spreading misinformation about him.48 The Ninth Circuit found injury in fact in the violation of his own statutory rights, and the Supreme Court held that the finding addressed particularization and never reached concreteness.49
Congress’s role is real but bounded. Congress may elevate previously inadequate, concrete, de facto injuries to legally cognizable status, but that role does not mean a plaintiff automatically satisfies injury in fact whenever a statute grants a right and purports to authorize suit to vindicate it. Robins could not, for example, allege “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm.”50
The limit is structural. If Article III did not require concrete harm, Congress could authorize virtually any citizen to bring a statutory damages suit against virtually any defendant who violated virtually any federal law.51 The public interest in private entities’ compliance with the law cannot “be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens . . . to sue.”52 Such a regime would also intrude on the Executive Branch’s Article II authority, since the choice of how aggressively to pursue those who violate the law belongs to the Executive and not to private plaintiffs, who are not accountable to the people.53 Even statutes that do authorize citizen suits seldom let private plaintiffs prosecute every violation: Congress has excluded some violations for political reasons, and the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states that seek monetary penalties.54
Spokeo vacated and remanded rather than decide the question, taking no position on whether the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion was correct.55 A concurring opinion offered a sorting principle. If Congress created a private duty owed personally to Robins, violating it suffices, but if the provision vests any and all consumers with power to police Spokeo’s “reasonable procedures,” Robins has no standing without an allegation of individualized harm.56
A statutory violation may cause no harm at all. A consumer reporting agency might fail to give a user the required notice while the information stays entirely accurate, and not every inaccuracy causes harm or presents a material risk of harm. An incorrect zip code, without more, could hardly work any concrete harm.57 Yet the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can sometimes constitute injury in fact, and the plaintiff then need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress identified.58 The question that reconciles the two is whether the violation created a real risk of harm to this plaintiff of a kind the law recognizes. Procedural and informational injuries therefore qualify only in limited circumstances. The omitted procedure must be one whose violation “could impair a separate concrete interest,” and an “abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law” does not suffice.59
Informational injury shows the favorable side. In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, voters challenged the FEC’s decision that a lobbying group was exempt from statutory reporting requirements, and the Court held that their inability to obtain information Congress had decided to make public was a sufficient injury in fact.60 The voters had been deprived of information that would have helped them evaluate candidates, so the injury was concrete because it related directly to the exercise of the right to vote.61
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez marks the unfavorable side, and it applied these principles to a class action. TransUnion generated credit reports that erroneously flagged many law-abiding people as potential terrorists and drug traffickers, violating FCRA provisions that entitle consumers to accuracy.62 The named plaintiff, Ramirez, learned of the flag when a Nissan salesman told him the dealership would not sell him a car because his name was on a “terrorist list,” and his wife had to buy the car in her own name.63 The Court split the class. The 1,853 members whose reports went to third-party businesses suffered a concrete harm, and the 6,332 whose reports did not go out suffered none.64 The Court analogized to defamation, which requires publication. The FCRA has no publication requirement, so the line came from the analogy and not from the statute, and the undisseminated reports caused no harm beyond the statutory violation itself.65 The class members whose complaint concerned only the format of TransUnion’s mailings fared no better, since none but the named plaintiff suffered a concrete harm.66
The majority implied that the members with undisseminated reports could have sought an injunction against dissemination, though not statutory damages for the mere maintenance of misleading information.67 That result applies the claim-by-claim rule. A person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking injunctive relief if the risk is sufficiently imminent and substantial, but standing to seek an injunction does not necessarily give standing to seek retrospective damages.68 Four Justices dissented. Justice Thomas collected evidence that federal courts in the early Republic heard similar no-injury claims, and Justice Kagan stressed Congress’s comparative advantage over the Court in judging the need for suits to prevent harm from faulty credit-reporting procedures.69
Steps two and three do the work. A student who stops at step one concludes that the statute settles standing, which Spokeo and TransUnion reject, and a student who treats every statutory violation as insufficient overlooks that risk of harm and informational injury can carry the plaintiff across the line.
Actual or Imminent Injury
The third showing looks forward. “Actual or imminent” requires more than allegations of possible future injury, and the Court has at times suggested that the injury must be certainly impending.70 The requirement serves the ban on advisory opinions, since standing demands an immediate interest and not a future one.71
Lujan shows what the requirement demands. Two affiants, Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred, had visited project sites abroad and said they would return. Asked at a deposition when she planned to go back to Sri Lanka, Skilbred said she intended to go but could not say when: a civil war was under way, it would not be next year, and it would be “[i]n the future.”72 The Court granted the “questionable” assumption that the funded projects threatened endangered species, yet it found that “some day” intentions, “without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be,” do not support a finding of actual or imminent injury.73 Later decisions state the lesson as a rule. Individual litigants must show that they personally have suffered some specific loss, which is more than a plan to visit an area that agency action may affect.74
The rule has a practical logic. A trip is the plaintiff’s to take or to skip, and a rule that accepted any stated intention would let plaintiffs manufacture standing by announcing a plan. One opinion in Lujan made the point from the other side: there is no reason in principle to demand evidence that third persons will act while presuming that the plaintiff himself will.75 A concrete plan is the fact that would have changed the outcome. A plaintiff who had already bought a ticket or made specific arrangements to visit the area at a definite future time would have made the threatened injury less speculative and remote.76
Environmental plaintiffs need two links: when they will be present, and where, tied to the places the challenged action will affect. In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, residents who lived near the river said they would use it for recreation if the discharges stopped, and the Court distinguished that from the some-day intentions of plaintiffs hoping to visit distant habitats. Affidavits claiming use of unspecified portions of an immense tract failed the geographic link in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, and the Lujan affiants failed the temporal one. One concurring Justice would have left the matter to a factfinder: from the women’s past visits, professional backgrounds, affidavits, and deposition testimony, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Kelly and Skilbred would return and be injured.77 The majority required concrete plans, and its view controls.
The same requirement governs any plaintiff whose injury depends on something the plaintiff must do. In Carney v. Adams, a lawyer challenged state eligibility rules for judgeships, and the Court held that he lacked standing because he had not shown that he was able and ready to apply in the reasonably foreseeable future. A court tests a stated intention against what the plaintiff has already done, so the strong fact pattern includes a purchased ticket, a filed application, or a similar step.
Imminence also interacts with the relief sought, which is the claim-by-claim rule seen through the timing requirement. Damages for a past injury redress it adequately, and an injunction that alters the defendant’s direct conduct against the plaintiff is readily redressable, a point developed under redressability.78 Trouble arises when the plaintiff seeks an injunction against future conduct. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the plaintiff had been put in a chokehold by police, but that past event did not show a real and immediate threat that it would recur. To obtain an injunction he would have had to allege both that he would encounter the police again and either that every Los Angeles officer always chokes anyone he encounters or that the city ordered or authorized officers to do so, and his complaint did not explain why officers acting within the city’s policy realistically threatened him.79
When the injury lies wholly in the future, the Court has used two formulations. The demanding one requires that the harm be “certainly impending,” and in some cases the Court has found standing based on a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur.80 The decisions applying them are hard to reconcile. A statistical likelihood that an environmental group’s members would experience reduced enjoyment of national forests because of timber harvests approved by the Forest Service was insufficient in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, while a farmer’s claim that deregulating genetically engineered alfalfa could contaminate his traditional crop sufficed in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.81
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA applied the demanding formulation. The plaintiffs contended that there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications with foreign contacts would be intercepted under Section 1881(a) at some future time.82 The Court, per Justice Alito, rejected that contention by a vote of 5–4 and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.83 Among other problems, it was speculative whether the Government would target on an imminent basis.84 The plaintiffs’ fear rested on a chain of independent decisions by the Government and a surveillance court, and they could not close the gap by spending money to protect their communications, because a plaintiff cannot manufacture standing through costs incurred to avoid a harm that is not certainly impending.
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus shows the more tolerant approach to pre-enforcement challenges. A plaintiff need not wait for arrest or prosecution if she alleges an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest but proscribed by a statute, and she faces a credible threat of prosecution. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project reached the same result for plaintiffs who wished to continue conduct that a federal statute forbade. Because both formulations remain available, a careful answer states both, tests the facts against the demanding one first, and then asks whether the substantial-risk alternative also fits.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the majority relied on petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits that global sea levels rose between 10 and 20 centimeters over the twentieth century and that rising seas had already begun to swallow the Commonwealth’s coastal land.85 The dissent saw conjecture. One declarant predicted a rise of 20 to 70 centimeters by the year 2100, and another mapped the resulting loss with a computer model whose conceded average error was about 30 centimeters.86 The Court also gave special solicitude to the injury asserted by Massachusetts because it is a sovereign state suing in its parens patriae capacity, a choice the casebooks question. Are states more or less likely to have a concrete stake, and should they have greater latitude than individuals to drive the national regulatory agenda?87
Steps two and three do the work. A plaintiff who recites a sincere intention has not completed step two, and a plaintiff whose harm rests on a series of contingent government decisions has not completed step three, however strongly the plaintiff fears the outcome.