561 U.S. 139 (2010)
In 2004, Monsanto Company, the owner of intellectual property rights to Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a genetically engineered variety of alfalfa tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate, along with its licensee Forage Genetics International, petitioned the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for deregulation of two strains of RRA under the Plant Protection Act.1
APHIS, which had previously classified RRA as a regulated article, prepared a draft environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and received hundreds of submissions.2 After review, APHIS issued a finding of no significant impact and granted unconditional deregulation without preparing an environmental impact statement.3
Approximately eight months later, respondents consisting of conventional alfalfa seed farms and environmental groups filed suit in federal district court challenging the deregulation decision on grounds including violation of the National Environmental Policy Act.4 During the two years of nonregulated status prior to the lawsuit's resolution, more than 3,000 farmers planted an estimated 220,000 acres of RRA across 48 states, following nearly 300 field trials authorized over eight years.5 The district court accepted that RRA posed no health risks to humans or livestock but found the environmental assessment inadequate regarding risks of gene transmission to conventional and organic alfalfa and development of herbicide-resistant weeds.6
In the remedial phase after granting summary judgment on the NEPA claim, the district court considered proposed judgments from the parties, including an intervenor petition from Monsanto and Forage Genetics.7 APHIS proposed vacating its deregulation decision but replacing it with terms allowing continued planting under six restrictions such as isolation distances and equipment cleaning requirements.8
The district court rejected this approach, vacated the deregulation, ordered preparation of an environmental impact statement before any further action on the petition, and entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting planting of RRA after March 30, 2007, while imposing conditions on already-planted crops. The government and petitioners appealed the scope of the relief to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's injunction after reviewing the record for abuse of discretion.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
Whether petitioners have standing to seek this Court's review of the Ninth Circuit's judgment affirming the entry of injunctive relief?11
Article III standing requires an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, fairly traceable to the challenged action, and redressable by a favorable ruling.12
Yes. Petitioners satisfy all three criteria because they are injured by their inability to sell or license RRA to prospective customers until APHIS completes the EIS.13 That injury is caused by the very remedial order that petitioners challenge on appeal.14 It would be redressed by a favorable ruling from this Court.15
Respondents' argument that the injury is independently caused by the unchallenged vacatur fails.16 Petitioners preserved their objection that the vacated deregulation decision should have been replaced by APHIS's proposed judgment. Petitioners also have standing to challenge the part of the order enjoining partial deregulation.17
Petitioners have standing to seek this Court's review.18
Whether respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief from the complete deregulation order?19
Article III standing requires an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, fairly traceable to the challenged action, and redressable by a favorable ruling, and prudential standing requires that the interest asserted falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute.20
Yes. The District Court found that respondent farmers had established a reasonable probability that their conventional alfalfa crops would be infected with the engineered Roundup Ready gene if RRA were completely deregulated.21 A substantial risk of such gene flow injures respondents in several concrete ways, including the need to conduct testing and take measures to minimize contamination.22 Those harms are readily attributable to APHIS's deregulation decision.23
A judicial order prohibiting the planting or deregulation of all or some genetically engineered alfalfa would redress respondents' injuries by eliminating or minimizing the risk of gene flow.24 Respondents' injury has an environmental as well as an economic component that falls within NEPA's zone of interests.25
Respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief from the complete deregulation order.26
Whether the District Court abused its discretion in enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation of RRA pending completion of the environmental impact statement?27
Before a court may grant a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy a four-factor test demonstrating irreparable injury, inadequacy of legal remedies, that the balance of hardships warrants equitable relief, and that the public interest would not be disserved, and this test fully applies in NEPA cases without any presumption that injunctive relief is available.28
No. Respondents cannot show that they will suffer irreparable injury if APHIS is allowed to proceed with any partial deregulation.2930 If and when APHIS pursues a partial deregulation that arguably runs afoul of NEPA, respondents may file a new suit challenging such action and seeking appropriate preliminary relief.31 A partial deregulation need not cause respondents any injury at all if its scope is sufficiently limited so that the risk of gene flow could be virtually nonexistent.32
The District Court erred by foreclosing even the possibility of a partial and temporary deregulation.33 It barred the agency from pursuing any deregulation no matter how limited the geographic area, how great the isolation distances, or how small the risk of environmental harm.34 The order enjoining any partial deregulation improperly relieves respondents of their burden to make the requisite evidentiary showing of likely irreparable injury.35
The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation of RRA pending completion of the environmental impact statement.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.37 After considering the voluminous record, the court made findings that RRA can contaminate other plants, that even planting in a controlled setting had led to contamination, that APHIS has limited ability to monitor or enforce limitations, and that genetic contamination could decimate farmers' livelihoods.38 In his view the District Court's judgment can be understood as an equitable application of administrative law.39
The court may well have concluded that any deregulation of RRA requires an EIS under NEPA given the substantial evidence of risks of gene transmission and development of herbicide-resistant weeds.40 Justice Stevens further reasoned that the District Court's judgment can be understood as a reasonable response to the nature of the risks posed by RRA.41 The marginal threat posed by additional planting was significant.42
Injunctive remedies are meant to achieve a nice adjustment between competing claims of injury.43
Whether the District Court abused its discretion in entering a nationwide injunction prohibiting the planting of RRA pending the agency's completion of its environmental review?44
Before a court may grant a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy a four-factor test demonstrating irreparable injury, inadequacy of legal remedies, that the balance of hardships warrants equitable relief, and that the public interest would not be disserved, and an injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which should not be granted as a matter of course when a less drastic remedy such as vacatur is sufficient to redress the injury.45
No. Because it was inappropriate for the District Court to foreclose even the possibility of a partial and temporary deregulation, it follows that it was inappropriate to enjoin planting in accordance with such a deregulation decision.4647 Respondents have represented that the District Court's injunction against planting does not have any meaningful practical effect independent of its vacatur.48
An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which should not be granted as a matter of course.49 If a less drastic remedy such as partial or complete vacatur of APHIS's deregulation decision was sufficient to redress respondents' injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted.50 The District Court therefore abused its discretion in prohibiting the possibility of planting in accordance with the terms of a partial deregulation.51
The District Court abused its discretion in entering a nationwide injunction prohibiting the planting of RRA pending the agency's completion of its environmental review.52
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens would have affirmed the District Court's nationwide injunction against planting.53 The court found that gene transfer can and does occur and that if it were to spread through open land the environmental and economic consequences would be devastating.54 In his view the District Court reasonably concluded that the most equitable solution was to allocate the limited amount of potentially safe RRA to the farmers who had already planted that crop.55
The court acted with exactly the sort of caution that Congress endorsed in NEPA.56 It did so by waiting for an EIS before concluding that APHIS could manage RRA's threat to the environment.57 The court had strong evidence that gene transmission was likely to occur and that limits on growing could not be enforced.58