133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)
In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to authorize and regulate certain governmental electronic surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes.1
After the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to conduct warrantless wiretapping of telephone and e-mail communications.2 One party to the communication was located outside the United States, and a participant in the call was reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.3 In January 2007, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued orders authorizing the Government to target international communications into or out of the United States where there was probable cause to believe that one participant to the communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization.4
In 2008, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act, which added Section 702 to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.5 This provision permits the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to jointly authorize, for a period of up to one year, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.6 On the day the FISA Amendments Act was enacted, respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a declaration that Section 702 is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against surveillance authorized under it.7
Respondents are United States persons, including attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations, whose work requires them to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals they believe are likely targets of surveillance under Section 702.8 Respondents claim that they communicate by telephone and e-mail with people the Government believes or believed to be associated with terrorist organizations, people located in geographic areas that are a special focus of the Government's counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts, and activists who oppose governments that are supported by the United States Government.9 The district court held that respondents lacked standing.10 The Second Circuit reversed.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge Section 702 of FISA on the ground that there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be acquired under that provision?13
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.14 Threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.15
No. Respondents assert that they have suffered injury in fact that is fairly traceable to Section 702 because there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications with their foreign contacts will be intercepted under Section 702 at some point.1617 This argument fails because the Second Circuit's objectively reasonable likelihood standard is inconsistent with the Court's threatened injury requirement.18
Respondents' standing theory also rests on a speculative chain of possibilities that does not establish that their potential injury is certainly impending or is fairly traceable to Section 702.19 It is highly speculative whether the Government will imminently target communications to which respondents are parties.20 Since respondents, as U.S. persons, cannot be targeted under Section 702, their theory necessarily rests on their assertion that their foreign contacts will be targeted.21 Yet they have no actual knowledge of the Government's Section 702 targeting practices.
Even if respondents could demonstrate that the targeting of their foreign contacts is imminent, they can only speculate as to whether the Government will seek to use Section 702-authorized surveillance instead of one of the Government's numerous other surveillance methods.22 Even if respondents could show that the Government will seek FISC authorization to target respondents' foreign contacts under Section 702, they can only speculate as to whether the FISC will authorize the surveillance.23 Even if the Government were to obtain the FISC's approval, it is unclear whether the Government would succeed in acquiring those contacts' communications.24 Even if the Government were to target respondents' foreign contacts, respondents can only speculate as to whether their own communications with those contacts would be incidentally acquired.25
Respondents do not have Article III standing based on the likelihood of future interception of their communications.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, And Kagan, Jj.
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs' standing depends upon the likelihood that the Government, acting under the authority of 50 U. S. C. §1881a, will harm them by intercepting at least some of their private, foreign, telephone, or e-mail conversations.27 In his view, this harm is not speculative but as likely to take place as are most future events that commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell us will happen.28 He found that similarity of content, strong motives, prior behavior, and capacity all point to a very strong likelihood that the Government will intercept at least some of the plaintiffs' communications, including some that the 2008 amendment authorizes.29
Justice Breyer argued that the Court has often found standing where the occurrence of the relevant injury was far less certain than the chain here, and that the standard is reasonable probability or high probability rather than absolute certainty.30
Whether respondents have Article III standing based on the present costs they have incurred to protect the confidentiality of their international communications from potential surveillance under Section 702?31
Respondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.32 Because they do not face a threat of certainly impending interception under Section 702, their costs are simply the product of their fear of surveillance, which is insufficient to create standing.33
No. Respondents' alternative argument is that they suffer ongoing injuries that are fairly traceable to Section 702 because the risk of Section 702 surveillance requires them to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications.3435 But respondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.36
Because they do not face a threat of certainly impending interception under Section 702, their costs are simply the product of their fear of surveillance, which is insufficient to create standing. Accordingly, any ongoing injuries that respondents are suffering are not fairly traceable to Section 702.37
Respondents do not have Article III standing based on the present costs incurred to avoid potential surveillance.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, And Kagan, Jj.
Justice Breyer also addressed the present injury theory. He noted that the plaintiffs have a strong motive to engage in conversations that the Government has a strong motive to listen to, such as those concerning suspected foreign terrorists and their contacts.39 He argued that the present necessary expenditure of time and effort to mitigate the threat constitutes a concrete injury, similar to the situation in Monsanto where plaintiffs had standing due to costs to combat the threat of contamination of their crops.40
In his view, the ongoing threat of terrorism means that the relevant interceptions will likely take place imminently, if not now.41