Concept
Applying the Full Analysis
Does Ex parte Young permit the officer suit and the relief sought?
Applying the Full Analysis
The Eleventh Amendment withdraws federal judicial power over suits "in law or equity" against a state, so a complaint that names the state or one of its agencies fails at the threshold whatever relief it seeks.1 Ex parte Young gives the private plaintiff a way around that bar. A suit to enjoin a state official from violating federal law is treated as a suit against an individual, because an official who acts contrary to federal law is "stripped" of state authority, a fiction that rests on the Supremacy Clause.2 The earlier sections taught the parts of that exception one at a time. A fact pattern hands them to you together, and the reliable response is to ask the same four questions in the same order. Each question screens out a different defect, and an answer at any step can end a claim or narrow its remedy.
Steps one, two, and four test the claim as a whole; step three tests each request for relief on its own. One complaint therefore often comes out split.
Edelman v. Jordan shows the split in its plainest form. Welfare applicants sued state officials, alleging that the officials were missing federal timing requirements for processing applications and paying benefits. At steps one and two the suit qualifies: the defendants are individuals, the requirements come from federal law, and the violation was continuing. Step three then divides the relief. The Court affirmed the order that officials comply with the federal requirements in the future, although that order probably cost the state more than payment for three years of past violations would have, and it rejected the order to pay past-due benefits.3 The rejected order was retroactive relief payable from the treasury, and the Amendment bars that even when the defendant is nominally an official.4 Had the class named the state welfare department in place of the officials, it would have lost at step one, because neither a state nor its agency is an individual to whom the fiction can attach, and the forward-looking order would have fallen with the rest.5
Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland isolates steps two and three. Verizon alleged that the Commission's order violated federal law to the extent it required Verizon to keep making the contested payments, and it sought an injunction. The Court reduced the inquiry to one sentence: a court "need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective."6 Verizon's complaint met both conditions. Change the legal theory and the result changes. Had Verizon claimed instead that the same order violated state law, and asked for the same injunction, the Eleventh Amendment would bar even that prospective relief, whether the officials failed to implement state law or acted contrary to it.7 The stripping fiction exists to enforce federal supremacy, and when state law supplies the right, that justification is missing.8 Pairing a state-law count with a federal one does not rescue it. The state count is dismissed and the federal count proceeds.
Employment claims against state employers show step three working alongside the limits on congressional power. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents the Court held that Congress exceeded its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it applied the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the states. The Commerce Clause had earlier supplied the power to apply the Act to the states, but Seminole Tribe v. Florida holds that Article I gives Congress no power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.9 Congress therefore did not validly abrogate the state's immunity under the Act. Injunctive relief against officials survives. Courts may still grant it against state officials acting in their official capacity under Ex parte Young, even when compliance requires an incidental expenditure from the state treasury, so long as the order is prospective only.10
Timing matters most in challenges to state benefit programs. The risk is that the state alters its regulations or practices before relief is obtained, which makes preliminary injunctive relief essential in Medicaid cases.13 The reason follows from steps two and three together. An injunction needs a continuing violation to restrain, and because retroactive remedies are barred, the plaintiff has nothing to fall back on once the violation stops. The period in which the violation continues is effectively the whole case.
The fourth question is the one most often forgotten, because everything before it may look favorable. A plaintiff can name an individual, allege a continuing federal violation, and ask only for an injunction, and still lose if the statute that creates the duty carries its own detailed remedial scheme. As the preceding section on the Seminole Tribe limit explained, such a scheme signals that Congress did not intend the officer suit to supplement it, and the claim against the official is then treated as a suit against the state. A statute that creates a right and says nothing about its enforcement against the state leaves the officer suit intact.
A complaint that asks for everything shows how the four steps combine.
Step one removes the State and the Department and leaves Ruiz. Step two keeps the federal hearing claim, because the practice is continuing, and it ends request (3), since a state-constitutional ground is barred even when it duplicates request (1).14 Step three permits request (1) whatever the hearings cost the state,15 bars request (2) as repayment from the treasury for a completed violation,16 and leaves request (4) alive as a claim against Ruiz personally, subject to the absolute or qualified immunity she will usually be able to claim.17 Step four finds no remedial scheme in a statute that only creates the right, so nothing displaces the officer suit. Of four requests, one survives intact, one survives against Ruiz personally subject to immunity, and two fall.
The pattern in these problems describes what a successful plaintiff actually wins: an injunction against future illegal conduct, and little more. Redress for past violations comes, if at all, from remedies the state chooses to provide, from the individual official, who will usually be able to claim absolute or qualified immunity,18 or from valid congressional abrogation, which Article I cannot supply.19 The Court said as much in Quern v. Jordan, observing of benefits withheld in violation of federal law that "whether or not the [plaintiffs] will receive retroactive benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts and legislature, not with the federal court."20 The same decision recognized the lower court's power to order notice informing class members of their right to pursue state remedies for past-due benefits.21 The class in Edelman accordingly won its processing deadlines, and whether it would ever see the past-due benefits was left to the state.
The objection that an immunity this broad lets states disregard federal law was answered in Alden v. Maine. The Court rejected the proposition that its broad reading of the Eleventh Amendment confers on a state a right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law. It was unwilling to assume that states will refuse to obey federal law, and it treated their good faith as an important assurance. It added that states are not necessarily shielded from damages liability, even where Congress lacks power to abrogate because it enacted the law under Article I.22 The decisions, some favoring accountability and others immunity, are best read as balancing respect for state dignity, protection of the state treasury, and enforcement of federal law.23 That balance explains why answers in this area are rarely all or nothing: a complaint usually survives in the part that looks forward and falls in the part that looks back. The line is imperfect. All relief for past wrongs is "prospective" in the sense that the officer in Edelman was ordered to pay past-due installments in the future, and one critique finds little to recommend the distinction.24 Even so, the Court still frames the inquiry as whether the relief sought is "properly characterized as prospective."25