Also known as: supremacy of the law · rule of law
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The doctrine that governmental power must be exercised according to established legal principles rather than through arbitrary or discretionary action.
A state agency left a chemical container unsecured on public property. A citizen later knocked it over during an argument, causing a spill that injured a bystander. The agency argued the unusual chain of events should cut off responsibility. The court held the agency liable because governmental power is exercised only according to established legal principles without special relief based on the precise manner the harm unfolded.
A municipal authority disputed whether an antique clock installed in a government building counted as a fixture under state law. When the agency sought to apply its preferred forum's rules, the court applied the law of the situs to classify the item. This ensured governmental power operated under the governing legal rules rather than any agency's preference for a different approach.
A state probate court construed a will leaving ranch land to heirs at law. The estate agency argued this language created an automatic reversion under traditional doctrine. The court rejected the claim because governmental power may not recognize any reversionary interest based on such wording once the legislature has abolished the rule.
A state-owned bank published a report falsely stating that a company faced imminent bankruptcy. Several clients canceled contracts after reading the report, causing measurable losses. The bank claimed the indirect way the harm occurred should shield it from responsibility. The court imposed liability because governmental power is not exercised through special exemptions based on the precise path the loss followed.
Samantha Stone faced delinquency charges in juvenile court for an alleged theft. The prosecution sought to prove the case by a preponderance of the evidence. The court required proof beyond a reasonable doubt instead, holding that the constitutional command of law governs even in specialized proceedings.
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseSerena Soto's land was taken by the city for a public project. The city offered only nominal payment based on its internal valuation. The court required full compensation under the law, rejecting any claim that the government could set its own terms for the taking.
The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
View caseThe principle requires that liability attach whenever negligent conduct is a substantial factor in producing the harm. No separate doctrine excuses responsibility simply because the precise sequence of events was unusual or involved other contributing conditions.
The principle directs courts to classify items as immovable or movable according to the law selected by established choice-of-law rules rather than by ad hoc preferences of the parties.
The principle abolishes any automatic reversionary interest created by language describing beneficiaries as heirs or similar terms. Such language receives no special legal effect beyond ordinary construction rules.
The principle requires that the reasonable-doubt standard apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings because constitutional commands of law govern even specialized forums.
Supporting sources
…for certiorari of the individual petitioners and of the Times. 371 U. S. 946. We reverse the judgment. We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth…