speedy trial right

In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.

Petitioner Teague, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all-white jury. During jury selection for petitioner's trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner's counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner's counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was entitled to a jury of his peers. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the jury appeared to be a fair one. On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1983. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner's arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. Rehearing was postponed until after Batson v. Kentucky was decided. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Petitioner's conviction became final two and a half years prior to Batson.

Appellees Marion and Baxter operated Allied Enterprises, Inc., a business engaged in selling and installing home improvements such as intercom sets, fire control devices, and burglary detection systems in the District of Columbia metropolitan area. They were indicted on April 21, 1970, and charged in nineteen counts with offenses committed between March 15, 1965, and February 6, 1967, involving alleged misrepresentations, alterations of documents, and deliberate nonperformance of contracts. Allied Enterprises had been subject to a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist order on February 6, 1967. In October 1967 a series of articles appeared in the Washington Post reporting the results of that newspaper's investigation of practices employed by home improvement firms such as Allied and predicting that indictments would soon be forthcoming. In the summer of 1968, at the request of the United States Attorney's office, Allied delivered its business records to that office, and appellee Marion was interviewed there about his conduct as an officer of the company. The grand jury that indicted appellees was not impaneled until September 1969, appellees were not informed of the grand jury's concern with them until March 1970, and the indictment was finally handed down in April 1970. On May 5, 1970, appellees moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to commence prosecution within time to afford due process and speedy trial rights. No evidence was submitted at the hearing on the motion, and no specific prejudice was claimed or demonstrated. The District Court granted the motion on June 8, 1970, for lack of speedy prosecution. The United States appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.