399 U.S. 78 (1970)
The Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 16, secures the right of trial by jury to all and provides that in all criminal prosecutions the jury shall consist of twelve men, except in prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months, in which case the jury shall consist of six men.1
Petitioner Williams faced charges of robbery, a felony carrying a potential sentence of life imprisonment.2 Williams filed a timely motion requesting a jury of twelve persons, which the trial court denied in accordance with state law.3 The case proceeded to trial before a jury composed of six members.4 Following the presentation of evidence, the six-person jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.5
Williams appealed his conviction to the Florida District Court of Appeal.6 The appellate court rejected his constitutional claim and affirmed the judgment.7 The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted a writ of certiorari, restricting its inquiry to the issues of jury size and the necessity of a unanimous verdict in state criminal prosecutions for serious offenses.8
Whether a jury of less than 12 persons in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense violates the Sixth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment?9
The Sixth Amendment, incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a jury trial for serious criminal offenses but does not require that the jury consist of exactly twelve members.10 The essential feature of the jury is the interposition of the common-sense judgment of laypersons between the accused and the accuser, along with community participation and shared responsibility in determining guilt or innocence.11
No. Williams was charged with robbery, a felony punishable by life imprisonment, making the offense serious and triggering the jury-trial right recognized in Duncan v. Louisiana.12 He timely moved for a twelve-person jury, but the motion was denied and trial proceeded before six jurors.13 After presentation of evidence the six-person jury convicted him and the court imposed a life sentence.14 The appellate court affirmed.15
Six remains large enough to promote group deliberation free from intimidation and to allow a fair possibility of a representative cross-section of the community.16 The number twelve is a historical accident unrelated to those purposes.17 Therefore the six-person jury used in Williams's trial satisfied the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.18
A jury of six persons in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense does not violate the Sixth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the judgment of the Court. He agreed that the Sixth Amendment does not require a 12-man jury in state criminal trials.20 His position rests on a textual reading of the Sixth Amendment that finds no mandate for any particular jury size.21
Black's concurrence reflects a willingness to permit states flexibility in structuring their criminal procedures without imposing every common-law detail as a federal constitutional mandate.22 He therefore joined the result allowing Florida's six-person jury while declining to constitutionalize historical accidents of the common law.23
Justice Stewart concurred in the opinion of the Court.24 He joined the majority's conclusion that a six-person jury satisfies the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Stewart accepted that the interposition of lay judgment and community participation do not depend on any fixed number of jurors beyond a size sufficient for deliberation and representativeness.26
By concurring without separate writing, Stewart endorsed the view that the essential purposes of the jury trial remain intact when the jury is reduced from twelve to six members in non-petty state prosecutions.
Justice Marshall dissented. He maintained that the right to jury trial includes the right to a twelve-man jury.27 The historical evidence demonstrates that the Framers intended to preserve the common-law jury of twelve.2829
Reducing the size of the jury to six substantially impairs the purpose and function of the jury by diminishing the opportunity for full deliberation and community representation that the Framers sought to secure.30 Marshall viewed the twelve-person requirement as an essential safeguard against governmental oppression rather than a mere historical accident.31
Justice Douglas dissented for the reasons stated in his dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana.32 The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the States provide the same jury trial that is required in federal courts.3334 That includes a jury of twelve and a unanimous verdict.35
His view insists on full incorporation of federal jury standards without dilution for state proceedings.36 Douglas argued that selective incorporation cannot justify reducing the protections the Sixth Amendment affords in federal prosecutions by allowing smaller juries in state courts.37
Justice Harlan concurred in the result as to the jury-size issue.38 He criticized the incorporation doctrine as the source of the need to dilute federal protections.3940 He would have sustained the Florida statute on the due-process premises set forth in his Duncan dissent rather than by redefining the federal right itself.41
In his view the decision illustrates the tension created when selective incorporation forces the Court to adjust federal standards downward to accommodate the common practice in the States of providing less than a 12-member jury for many offenses.42 Harlan urged a return to a due-process approach that respects state experimentation.
Whether the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?43
The Sixth Amendment does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials for non-petty offenses.44 Unanimity is a common-law rule followed in federal courts but is not a constitutional imperative.45 The States remain free to experiment with different verdict requirements so long as the essential purposes of the jury trial are preserved.46
No. The Sixth Amendment itself contains no language requiring unanimity, and the Constitution contains no provision mandating unanimous verdicts in criminal cases.47 Williams was convicted by a unanimous six-person jury.48 Because the verdict reached in his case satisfied even the stricter common-law unanimity rule, there was no constitutional infirmity.49 The Court further held that the States are not compelled to impose unanimity in any event, leaving them free to adopt non-unanimous verdict rules consistent with the core functions of the jury.50
The requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense does not violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.51
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the requirement of a unanimous verdict is not a constitutional command.52 His concurrence underscores that neither the text of the Sixth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision imposes unanimity as an indispensable element of the jury trial right when states conduct criminal prosecutions.53
Black's textual approach leaves states free to adopt non-unanimous verdict rules without violating the incorporated Sixth Amendment.54 He viewed the common-law unanimity rule as a detail that states need not replicate under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Stewart concurred in the opinion of the Court without separate elaboration. He endorsed the holding that unanimity is not constitutionally required in state criminal trials for non-petty offenses and accepted the majority's conclusion that states retain latitude to design their own verdict rules.55 Stewart joined the determination that the essential purposes of the jury trial can be preserved without mandating unanimous verdicts.56
His concurrence confirms that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated, does not freeze every common-law feature into constitutional law for the states.
Justice Douglas dissented. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States to provide the same jury trial required in federal courts, including a unanimous verdict.57 His dissent maintains that full incorporation of the Sixth Amendment brings with it the common-law requirement of unanimity that has long governed federal criminal proceedings.58
Douglas rejected any dilution of federal standards when applying the jury-trial right to the states.59 He insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment carries over the full federal jury protections without reduction.
Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the unanimity issue only insofar as it aligned with his broader critique of incorporation.60 He joined the portion of the opinion addressing Florida's alibi procedure but otherwise rested on his due-process analysis from Duncan.6162 His separate writing emphasizes that the incorporation approach creates pressure to relax federal standards to accommodate the common practice in the States of providing less than a 12-member jury for many offenses.63
Harlan maintained that the proper solution lies in abandoning selective incorporation rather than adjusting the federal right downward.