422 U.S. 806 (1975)
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him.1
Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself.2 The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense.3 Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law.4 He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution.5 He had a high school education.6 The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling.7 The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself.8
Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense.9 The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors.10 After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor.11 The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel.12 The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense.13 The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta.14 Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected.15 His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected.16
Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office.17 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged.18 The judge sentenced him to prison.19 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself.20 A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion.21 The California Supreme Court denied review.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
Whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so?24
Yes. The Sixth Amendment grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.27 It is the accused who must be confronted with witnesses against him.28 It is the accused who must cross-examine those witnesses.29 Because the right to self-representation is implicit in the structure of the Amendment, a state may not constitutionally force a lawyer upon a defendant who wants to conduct his own defense.
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education.
The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense.
The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.
The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding.30 He was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.31 The trial judge erred in denying Faretta's request to represent himself.32 The defendant must be free to decide whether it is to his advantage to have counsel or to defend himself.33
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Blackmun And Rehnquist, Jj.
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the majority's holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee to an accused the right to dispense with the assistance of counsel and to conduct his own defense.35 He argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to the assistance of counsel. It does not speak of a right to dispense with a lawyer's help.36 Burger contended that the historical evidence does not support the conclusion that there is a constitutional right to self-representation.37 The common law recognized no right to counsel in felony cases.38 The right to self-representation was not a constitutional right.39
He warned that the majority's holding would create serious problems for the administration of justice.40 Self-representation often leads to unfair trials.41 The trial judge is placed in an impossible position.42 The majority's decision will lead to many appeals based on claims that the waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent.43 Burger would affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court.44
Joined by Burger, C.j., And Rehnquist, J.
Justice Blackmun joined the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice and added his own comments.45 He emphasized that the right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right.46 It is designed to protect the accused from the dangers of proceeding without the assistance of a trained advocate.47 Blackmun argued that the majority's decision undermines this fundamental right.48 The language of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel.49 It does not guarantee the right to reject that assistance.50
He noted that the historical evidence is at best ambiguous.51 The practical consequences of the majority's decision are likely to be severe.52 Defendants who are ill-equipped to conduct their own defense will often fail.53 The public will lose confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.54 Blackmun concluded that the majority's decision would make it more difficult for trial judges to ensure that trials are conducted fairly and efficiently.55