The aggregate burdens borne by society when a legal rule or remedy is enforced. These burdens include the loss of reliable evidence, impairment of the truth-seeking function of trials, and the expenditure of additional resources when suppression or reversal occurs.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Database Error Suppression Motion
Luis, a delivery driver, was stopped at a lawful checkpoint. Officers relied on a shared database showing an active warrant that had actually been recalled due to a clerical error in another county. They arrested him and found hidden VIN plates in his van. Luis moved to suppress the evidence. The court denied suppression because the officers' isolated negligence produced no culpable misconduct, and excluding the reliable evidence would impose heavy social costs with little deterrent value.
Groundless Securities Claim
Manor Drug Stores filed a Rule 10b-5 action against Blue Chip Stamps based on oral allegations with little supporting evidence. The claim survived dismissal and triggered extensive discovery. The court recognized that allowing such groundless suits to proceed imposes social costs by consuming judicial resources and inflating settlement values without advancing the merits.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores421 U.S., at 737
In 1963 the United States filed a civil antitrust action against Old Blue Chip Stamp Co., a company providing trading stamps to retailers, and nine retailers who owned 90 percent of its shares.
In 1967 the action was terminated by entry of a consent decree. The decree contemplated a plan of reorganization whereby Old Blue Chip would merge into a newly formed corporation, Blue Chip Stamps. The holdings of the majority shareholders would be reduced. The new company would offer a substantial number of its shares of common stock to retailers who had used the stamp service in the past but were not shareholders. The offering was to be proportional to past stamp usage and packaged in units consisting of common stock and debentures.
The reorganization plan was carried out. The offering was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933. A prospectus was distributed to all offerees as required by section 5 of that Act. Somewhat more than 50 percent of the offered units were actually purchased. In 1970, two years after the offering, Manor Drug Stores, a former user of the stamp service and therefore an offeree of the 1968 offering, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Old and New Blue Chip, eight of the nine majority shareholders of Old Blue Chip, and the directors of New Blue Chip.
The complaint alleged that the prospectus prepared and distributed in connection with the offering was materially misleading in its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and future prospects. It further alleged that Blue Chip intentionally made the prospectus overly pessimistic. This was done to discourage the offerees from accepting the offer. The goal was so that the rejected shares might later be offered to the public at a higher price. Class members because of and in reliance on the false and misleading prospectus failed to purchase the offered units. The complaint sought on behalf of the alleged class some $21,400,000 in damages representing the lost opportunity to purchase the units, the right to purchase the previously rejected units at the 1968 price, and some $25,000,000 in exemplary damages.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel reversed the district court. After the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
West Virginia required public school students to salute the flag. Jehovah's Witness families objected on religious grounds and faced expulsion. The Court weighed the state's interest in fostering national unity against the social costs of compelling speech that violates individual conscience and concluded the balance favored protection of dissent.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism.
The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses.
On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days.
The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds.
Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles.
The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
Police interrogated Ernesto Miranda for two hours without advising him of his rights. He confessed to kidnapping and rape. The Court held that admitting the statement would impose unacceptable social costs by undermining the privilege against self-incrimination and encouraging coercive practices that erode public confidence in the justice system.
Miranda v. Arizona384 U.S. 436 (1966)
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape.
On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery.
On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours.
On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for stealing $112 based on a preponderance finding. The Court required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It explained that lowering the standard imposes social costs by increasing the risk of erroneous convictions that stigmatize minors and undermine the moral force of the juvenile justice system.
In re Winship397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Anthony Cooper rejected a favorable plea offer after receiving ineffective assistance from counsel. He was convicted at trial and received a longer sentence. The Court noted that reversing the conviction would force the state to expend substantial resources retrying the case and would impose social costs by requiring victims and witnesses to relive traumatic events.
Lafler v. Cooper566 U.S. 156, 170-172 (2012)
On the evening of March 25, 2003, Anthony Cooper pointed a gun at Kali Mundy's head and fired. Mundy fled and Cooper pursued, firing repeatedly. Mundy was shot in the buttock, hip, and abdomen but survived.
Cooper was charged in Michigan state court with assault with intent to murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and habitual-offender status. The prosecution twice offered to dismiss two charges and recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months on the remaining counts in exchange for a guilty plea. Cooper communicated to the court that he was guilty and willing to accept the offer. He rejected it on both occasions after his attorney advised that the prosecution could not prove intent to murder because the shots struck below the waist.
On the first day of trial the prosecution extended a significantly less favorable plea offer that Cooper also rejected. After a jury trial Cooper was convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months.
At a Ginther hearing the state trial court rejected Cooper's claim that his attorney's advice to reject the plea constituted ineffective assistance. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Cooper knowingly and intelligently rejected the offers and chose to go to trial. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Cooper filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court found that the Michigan Court of Appeals had unreasonably applied Strickland and Hill, granted a conditional writ, and ordered specific performance of the original plea agreement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
How does the exclusionary rule balance its deterrent purpose against social costs?
Courts weigh whether suppression will meaningfully deter police misconduct against the heavy societal burden of excluding reliable evidence. When the police error is isolated or merely negligent, the social costs of suppression outweigh any marginal deterrent gain, so exclusion is denied.
Supporting sources
Why are knock-and-announce violations not remedied by exclusion?
The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule are too attenuated from the seizure of evidence. Suppressing probative evidence obtained under a valid warrant would impose high social costs while providing only marginal additional deterrence, so courts deny suppression.
Supporting sources
When does an intervening warrant attenuate the taint of an unlawful stop?
A valid preexisting warrant is a strong intervening circumstance that breaks the causal chain. Courts balance temporal proximity, the flagrancy of the initial misconduct, and the social costs of exclusion. When the warrant leads to a lawful arrest, suppression is usually denied.
Supporting sources
What social costs arise from reversing convictions after ineffective assistance in plea bargaining?
Reversal forces retrials that consume juror, witness, court, and prosecutorial resources. Victims must relive traumatic experiences, and the state loses the benefit of its prior investment in the prosecution, creating substantial societal burdens.
Supporting sources
social costs
of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation. While passing over the
costs
and risks of its experiment, the Court portrays the evils of normal…
Criminal Law Constitutional ProtectionsConstitutional protections of accused persons · Arrest, search, and seizure [Fourth Amendment]NEXTGENFoundational