566 U.S. 156 (2012)
On the evening of March 25, 2003, Anthony Cooper pointed a gun at Kali Mundy's head and fired.1 Mundy fled and Cooper pursued, firing repeatedly.2 Mundy was shot in the buttock, hip, and abdomen but survived.3
Cooper was charged in Michigan state court with assault with intent to murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and habitual-offender status.4 The prosecution twice offered to dismiss two charges and recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months on the remaining counts in exchange for a guilty plea.5 Cooper communicated to the court that he was guilty and willing to accept the offer.6 He rejected it on both occasions after his attorney advised that the prosecution could not prove intent to murder because the shots struck below the waist.7
On the first day of trial the prosecution extended a significantly less favorable plea offer that Cooper also rejected.8 After a jury trial Cooper was convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months.9
At a Ginther hearing the state trial court rejected Cooper's claim that his attorney's advice to reject the plea constituted ineffective assistance.10 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Cooper knowingly and intelligently rejected the offers and chose to go to trial.11 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.12
Cooper filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.13 The district court found that the Michigan Court of Appeals had unreasonably applied Strickland and Hill, granted a conditional writ, and ordered specific performance of the original plea agreement.14 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether a defendant establishes Strickland prejudice when counsel's deficient advice causes rejection of a plea offer and the defendant is later convicted at trial?17
To establish Strickland prejudice where ineffective assistance leads to rejection of a plea offer, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the plea offer would have been presented to the court, the court would have accepted its terms, and the conviction or sentence under the offer would have been less severe than the judgment imposed.18
Yes. Cooper's counsel advised rejection of the 51-to-85-month plea offer on the ground that intent to murder could not be proven because shots struck below the waist.19 But for that advice there is a reasonable probability Cooper would have accepted the offer, the court would have accepted it, and the sentence would have been less severe than the 185-to-360-month term imposed after trial on all counts.20 The subsequent trial did not cure the error because it produced the harsher sentence.21
Cooper established Strickland prejudice from his counsel's ineffective assistance during plea negotiations.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas, And Chief Justice Roberts As To All But Part Iv
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that Strickland prejudice requires a showing that counsel's error deprived the defendant of a substantive or procedural right that the law recognizes or rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable.23 Because Cooper received a full and fair trial resulting in conviction by a jury and a sentence prescribed by law, no such prejudice could be shown.24 Scalia contended that the majority's decision improperly created a novel constitutional right to effective assistance in plea bargaining that finds no support in the Court's precedents, which have always tied the right to counsel to ensuring a fair trial.25
Justice Alito dissented for the reasons set out in Parts I and II of Justice Scalia's dissent.26 He maintained that the Court's holding misapplies ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case law and violates AEDPA requirements.27 Because respondent received a trial free of any identified constitutional error, there is no basis for concluding that he suffered prejudice under Strickland, and certainly not for granting habeas relief.28
Whether the appropriate remedy when ineffective assistance of counsel causes rejection of a plea offer resulting in a more severe sentence after trial is to order the prosecution to reoffer the plea?29
The remedy must neutralize the taint of the constitutional violation.30 It must not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander state resources.31 When the offered plea was for less serious counts or a mandatory sentence limits a judge's sentencing discretion, the proper remedy may be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea so the trial court can exercise discretion whether to vacate convictions and resentence or leave the trial result undisturbed.32
Yes. Because the original offer was for less serious counts than those resulting in conviction after trial, the appropriate remedy is to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement.33 If Cooper accepts, the state trial court may then exercise discretion to vacate some or all convictions and resentence pursuant to the plea or leave the trial conviction and sentence undisturbed.34
The correct remedy is to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement rather than specific performance of the original terms.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas, And Chief Justice Roberts As To All But Part Iv
Justice Scalia dissented that the remedy of ordering the prosecution to reoffer the plea agreement, with acceptance not being conclusive, and then leaving the ultimate remedy to the discretion of the trial court is both absurd and unheard-of in American jurisprudence for a supposed constitutional violation.36 This approach amounts to camouflage because it pretends to involve ordinary plea acceptance when it is actually discretionary specification of a remedy for an unconstitutional conviction.37 Scalia suggested that the majority's squeamishness reveals its underlying recognition that no real constitutional injury occurred.38
Justice Alito dissented that requiring the prosecution to renew an old plea offer would represent an abuse of discretion in at least two circumstances.39 First, when important new information about a defendant's culpability comes to light after the offer is rejected.40 Second, when the rejection of the plea offer results in a substantial expenditure of scarce prosecutorial or judicial resources.41
He expressed hope that lower court judges would implement the holding in a way that mitigates its potential to produce unjust results.42
Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to clearly established federal law under AEDPA so as to permit federal habeas relief?43
Under AEDPA a state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law when it applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court precedent, such as failing to apply the Strickland test to an ineffective-assistance claim arising from plea negotiations.44
Yes. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the ineffective-assistance claim solely on the ground that Cooper knowingly and intelligently rejected the offers and chose trial, without applying Strickland to evaluate counsel's performance or resulting prejudice.45 That failure to apply the correct constitutional standard rendered the decision contrary to clearly established federal law and permitted federal habeas relief.46
AEDPA presents no bar to relief because the Michigan Court of Appeals' adjudication was contrary to clearly established federal law.47
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas, And Chief Justice Roberts As To All But Part Iv
Justice Scalia dissented that the Michigan Court of Appeals recited the Strickland standard with a good deal more accuracy than the majority's opinion.48 Its analysis was at worst ambiguous as to whether it found no deficient performance or no prejudice.49 Because the state court's holding could rest on either ground, AEDPA relief was unavailable unless both holdings were unreasonable applications of clearly established law.50
The Sixth Circuit and the majority therefore violated AEDPA by granting relief without making that determination.51
Justice Alito dissented that for the reasons set out in Parts I and II of Justice Scalia's dissent, the Court's holding misapplies ineffective-assistance case law and violates AEDPA.52 Respondent received a trial free of constitutional error, providing no basis for concluding prejudice or for granting habeas relief under AEDPA.53