Also known as:sexual intercourses · coitus · copulation · carnal knowledge
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An act of physical penetration of the sex organs of one person by another. The act includes intercourse per os or per anum with some penetration however slight. Emission is not required.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Felony Murder During Robbery Rape
Sebastian Santos and an accomplice rob a convenience store. During the robbery Sebastian forces the clerk into a back room and commits sexual intercourse by force. The clerk dies from injuries sustained in the struggle. The prosecution relies on the presumption that the killing occurred under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life because Sebastian was engaged in rape during the robbery.
Common Law Rape Elements
Sabrina Shah, not married to Skylar Sullivan, has carnal knowledge of Skylar without her effective consent. The act satisfies the penetration requirement even though no emission occurs. At common law the conduct constitutes rape because the man is not the woman's husband and the intercourse occurs without effective consent.
Sydney Santos suffers severe injuries in an accident caused by Silverline Industries. The injuries impair Sydney's capacity for sexual intercourse with spouse Sofia Stern. Sofia incurs medical expenses and loses Sydney's society and services. Sofia may recover from Silverline Industries for the resulting loss of society and services including the impairment of capacity for sexual intercourse.
MPC Rape by Intoxication
Stephen Shaw administers intoxicants to Sabrina Shah without her knowledge to prevent resistance. He then has sexual intercourse with her while she is not his wife. The impairment of her power to appraise or control her conduct satisfies the elements of rape under the statute. The offense is a felony of the second degree.
Private Consensual Conduct
Two adult men engage in deviate sexual intercourse in the privacy of their home. The state prosecutes them under a statute criminalizing the conduct. The Supreme Court holds that the statute violates the Due Process Clause because it criminalizes private intimate conduct between consenting adults.
Lawrence v. Texas539 U.S. 558 (2003)
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance.
They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)." Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions. The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
A lecturer distributes contraceptive devices to unmarried persons after a lecture on birth control. The state prosecutes under a statute that prohibits distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The Supreme Court holds that the statute violates equal protection because it burdens the decision to engage in sexual intercourse by denying access to contraception.
Eisenstadt v. Baird405 U.S. 438 (1972)
On April 6, 1967, William R. Baird delivered a lecture on birth control at Boston University. As part of the presentation, he showed a film, displayed contraceptive devices in their original packages, and at the conclusion invited members of the audience to take contraceptive articles from the stage. A young woman requested and received a package of Emko vaginal foam from Baird, after which he was arrested and charged with exhibiting and giving away a contraceptive device in violation of Massachusetts General Laws, c. 272, § 21.
Baird was convicted following a bench trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts set aside the conviction for exhibiting the contraceptives on First Amendment grounds but upheld the conviction for giving away the foam by a four-to-three vote. Baird then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded with directions to grant the writ discharging Baird. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the appeal brought by the Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts statute, as interpreted by the state courts, makes it a felony for anyone other than a registered physician or pharmacist to dispense contraceptives intended for the prevention of pregnancy, with distribution authorized only to married persons upon prescription.
What constitutes penetration for purposes of sexual intercourse under the Model Penal Code?
The Model Penal Code defines sexual intercourse to include intercourse per os or per anum with some penetration however slight. Emission is not required. This definition applies to both rape and deviate sexual intercourse offenses.
Supporting sources
How does common law rape differ from Model Penal Code rape regarding the victim's gender and marital status?
Common law rape requires a man who is not the woman's husband to have carnal knowledge of a woman without her effective consent. The Model Penal Code retains the requirement that the victim be a female not the actor's wife but expands the means by which consent can be rendered ineffective, including through force, threats, intoxicants, unconsciousness, or age under ten.
Supporting sources
When does impairment of capacity for sexual intercourse give rise to a tort claim by a spouse?
A spouse may recover for loss of society and services, including impairment of capacity for sexual intercourse, when the other spouse suffers bodily harm from a third party's tortious conduct. The claim must ordinarily be joined with the injured spouse's action for bodily harm.
Supporting sources
Does discovery of a spouse engaged in sexual intercourse constitute adequate provocation at common law?
Yes. Catching one's spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another person is a classic category of adequate provocation that can reduce an intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter if the other elements of heat of passion are satisfied.
Supporting sources
539 U.S. 558 (2003)
…same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. The State of Texas convicted respondents Lawrence and Garner of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of the statute and, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed. The court considered Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U. S. 186, controlling and held that the statute…