450 U.S. 464, 477–479, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1208–1209 (Stewart, J., concurring)
The petitioner, Michael M., was seventeen and one-half years old when, on June 3, 1978, he and two friends approached Sharon, a sixteen-and-one-half-year-old female, and her sister at a bus stop.1 Petitioner and Sharon had been drinking. They moved away from the others and began to kiss. After petitioner struck Sharon in the face for rebuffing his initial advances, she submitted to sexual intercourse with him.2
In July 1978, a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Sonoma County. The complaint alleged that petitioner had unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under the age of eighteen in violation of section 261.5 of the California Penal Code.3 Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on the ground that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender. The trial court denied the motion, and petitioner was convicted after a jury trial. The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's request for relief.4
Whether California's statutory rape law, which makes only males criminally liable for sexual intercourse with a female under the age of eighteen, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?5
A gender-based classification survives equal protection scrutiny when it bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental objective and reflects real physiological differences between the sexes rather than archaic stereotypes.6
No. The facts establish that on June 3, 1978, the seventeen-and-one-half-year-old petitioner approached sixteen-and-one-half-year-old Sharon at a bus stop, and after drinking and kissing, struck her when she rebuffed him, leading to sexual intercourse that resulted in pregnancy. The statute's purpose is to prevent teenage pregnancy, an important objective given the social, medical, and economic consequences.7 Because only females can become pregnant, the sexes are not similarly situated, and limiting liability to males substantially relates to the goal by providing a deterrent that pregnancy itself provides to females.8 The classification is not based on stereotypes but on physiological reality.9
California's statutory rape law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Powell, J.
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment.11 He stressed that section 261.5 forms only one component of a much broader statutory scheme that shields all minors from the risks of adolescent sexual activity.12 Other provisions criminalize molestation, lewd acts with children under fourteen, and deviant sexual acts with anyone under eighteen, and females may be charged as aiders and abettors.13
Young men and women are not similarly situated with respect to the risks of sexual intercourse and pregnancy because females alone can become pregnant.14 The classification therefore realistically reflects physiological differences rather than invidious stereotypes.15 Stewart concluded that the additional sanction imposed on males is constitutionally permissible when it addresses the most serious aspect of the problem of teenage pregnancy.16
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment.17 He acknowledged the dramatic increase in teenage pregnancies over recent decades and their severe social, medical, and economic consequences for mothers, children, and the state.18 Blackmun viewed the California statute as a sufficiently reasoned legislative effort to address the problem at its inception by deterring sexual activity before conception occurs.19
This approach stands in contrast to state efforts to restrict abortion after pregnancy has already taken place. He noted that section 261.5 is merely one of several California statutes designed to protect juveniles from the hazards of early sexual conduct.20 Blackmun concluded that the gender-based classification passes constitutional muster under the test set forth in Craig v. Boren.21
Joined by White, J. And Marshall, J.
Justice Brennan dissented.22 He maintained that the gender-based classification fails the substantial-relationship test required by Craig v. Boren because California never proved that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective in deterring teenage pregnancies.23 The state offered only a bare assertion about enforcement difficulties without supporting evidence, and the experience of thirty-seven other states with gender-neutral laws contradicted that claim.24
Brennan further observed that the historical purpose of the statute had been to protect female chastity based on outdated stereotypes about the relative innocence of young women rather than any concern with pregnancy prevention.25 Because the state failed to meet its burden, he would have held the statute unconstitutional.26
Justice Stevens dissented.27 He argued that it is irrational to exempt from punishment the very class that faces the greater risk of harm from the prohibited conduct.28 The statutory discrimination rests on nothing more than traditional attitudes toward male-female relationships and the unsupported assumption that the male is always the aggressor.29
Punishing only one of two equally guilty participants violates the fundamental requirement of evenhanded enforcement of the law.30 Stevens concluded that no legitimate justification supports a rule that authorizes conviction of one equally responsible wrongdoer while granting the other complete immunity solely on the basis of sex.31