Also known as: FRCP 60 · Rule 60(b) · Rule 60(a) · relief from judgment · Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal rule of civil procedure that authorizes a district court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order on enumerated grounds including mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, voidness, or satisfaction of the judgment.
Ridgeway Partners obtained a final default judgment against Regal Apparel after the company failed to answer a contract suit. Regal Apparel later showed that its registered agent had misplaced the summons due to excusable neglect. The court granted relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) and permitted the company to litigate the claim on the merits.
After final judgment dismissed investors' securities claims, Congress enacted a statute directing courts to reopen those judgments. The investors moved under Rule 60(b) for relief. The court denied the motion because the statute impermissibly directed revision of final Article III judgments.
In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents. The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991. The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf. On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations. Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991. On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991. Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseTenants sued a landlord for housing discrimination and demanded a jury. After judgment, the landlord moved under Rule 60(b) to strike the jury demand as untimely. The court denied relief, holding that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial on legal claims remained intact despite the post-judgment challenge.
Petitioner Curtis, a Black woman, brought this action under Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 claiming that respondents, who are white, had refused to rent an apartment to her because of her race in violation of Section 804(a) of the Act. In her complaint she sought only injunctive relief and punitive damages, though a claim for compensatory damages was later added. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the respondents from renting the apartment to anyone else pending trial on the merits. This injunction was dissolved some five months later with the petitioner's consent after she had obtained other housing, and the case went to trial on the issues of actual and punitive damages. Respondents made a timely demand for jury trial in their answer. The District Court denied the jury request and after trial on the merits found that respondents had discriminated against petitioner on account of her race. The District Court awarded $250 in punitive damages while finding no actual damages and denying petitioner's request for attorney's fees and court costs. The Court of Appeals reversed on the jury trial issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in view of the importance of the jury trial issue in the administration and enforcement of Title VIII.
View caseAfter a consent decree resolved employment claims, nonparties filed a separate action attacking the decree. The court treated the filing as a Rule 60(b) motion and denied it, explaining that collateral proceedings are not subject to all exceptions available on direct appeal.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
View caseAfter dismissal of federal claims, a plaintiff filed a second action in state court. The defendant moved under Rule 60(b) to reopen the first judgment. The court denied relief, confirming that the prior judgment retained full preclusive effect and could not be collaterally reopened.
In 1976 the United States brought an antitrust action against petitioners, owners of various department stores, alleging that they had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to fix the retail price of women's clothing sold in northern California. Seven parallel civil actions were subsequently filed by private plaintiffs seeking treble damages on behalf of proposed classes of retail purchasers. These included the action of respondent Moitie in state court (Moitie I) and respondent Brown (Brown I) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Each of these complaints tracked almost verbatim the allegations of the Government's complaint, though the Moitie I complaint referred solely to state law. The District Court dismissed all of the actions in their entirety on the ground that plaintiffs had not alleged an injury to their business or property within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs in five of the suits appealed that judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The single counsel representing Moitie and Brown chose not to appeal and instead refiled the two actions in state court. Although the complaints purported to raise only state-law claims, they made allegations similar to those made in the prior complaints, including that of the Government. Petitioners removed these new actions to the District Court for the Northern District of California and moved to have them dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The District Court denied respondents' motion to remand, holding that the complaints were properly removed because they raised essentially federal law claims. The court then concluded that because Moitie II and Brown II involved the same parties, the same alleged offenses, and the same time periods as Moitie I and Brown I, the doctrine of res judicata required that they be dismissed. Pending the appeal of the dismissals of the refiled actions, the Supreme Court decided Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., holding that retail purchasers can suffer an injury to their business or property as those terms are used in § 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the five cases which had been appealed for further proceedings in light of Reiter. When the refiled actions came before the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the District Court's dismissals on res judicata grounds. It asserted that non-appealing parties may benefit from a reversal when their position is closely interwoven with that of appealing parties. The court concluded that the doctrine must give way to public policy and simple justice. Moitie II was voluntarily dismissed, leaving Brown II as the subject of the petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the validity of the Court of Appeals' novel exception to the doctrine of res judicata.
View caseAfter the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower-court ruling, a party moved under Rule 60(b) to reopen the case. The court denied the motion, holding that the summary affirmance constituted binding precedent that could not be disregarded through post-judgment relief.
In November 1973, Buena Park police officers seized four copies of the film "Deep Throat" from the Pussycat Theatre under four separate search warrants issued on November 23 and 24. On November 26, an eight-count criminal misdemeanor complaint was filed in Orange County Municipal Court against two theater employees, and the Superior Court of Orange County issued an order to show cause why the film should not be declared obscene. The theater owners appeared on November 26, objected on state-law grounds, purported to reserve federal questions, and declined further participation; the next day the Superior Court viewed the film, took evidence, declared it obscene, and ordered all copies seized from the theater. On November 29, 1973, the theater owners Vincent Miranda, doing business as Pussycat Theater, and Walnut Properties, Inc., filed this action in federal district court against four Buena Park police officers, the Orange County District Attorney, and the Assistant District Attorney. The complaint sought a declaration that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutional and an injunction ordering return of the seized films. A single district judge denied a temporary restraining order, and a three-judge court was designated on January 8, 1974; service of the complaint was completed on January 14. On January 15, 1974, the Municipal Court complaint was amended to name the theater owners as additional defendants and to add four conspiracy counts. The three-judge court issued its judgment on June 4, 1974, declaring the obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordering return of the films. Appellants informed the court of the Supreme Court's dismissal of Miller II and of the Superior Court Appellate Department's reversal of an earlier suppression order in the criminal case. On September 30 the three-judge court denied rehearing, reaffirmed its rulings, and amended the injunction to require appellants to petition the Municipal Court for return of three of the four prints. Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court from both the June 4 judgment and the September 30 amended judgment; the Court postponed further consideration of its jurisdiction to the merits.
View caseA motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time. For grounds of mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, the motion must be filed no more than one year after entry of the judgment.
Supporting sources
No. Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is limited to fundamental defects such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or denial of due process. Ordinary legal errors must be addressed by direct appeal rather than a Rule 60(b) motion.
Supporting sources
No. A Rule 60 motion does not affect the judgment's finality or suspend its operation, which is why courts apply the rule narrowly and enforce its time limits strictly.
A court may set aside a final default judgment under Rule 60(b) when the movant shows grounds such as mistake, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, provided the motion is timely.
Supporting sources
Rule 59 motions must be filed within 28 days of judgment and address trial errors or newly discovered evidence that could not have been raised earlier. Rule 60 provides longer time limits for specific grounds after the judgment has become final.