490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989)
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board.1 They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law.2
After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees.3 One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board.4 These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department.5
The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings.6 Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers.7 At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae.8 After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights.9 The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981.10
Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees.11 The District Court denied relief.12 Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983.13
A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board.14 They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law.15 The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees.16 The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree.17 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.19
Whether white firefighters who were not parties to prior litigation may challenge employment decisions made pursuant to consent decrees entered in that litigation?20
Yes. The Wilks respondents were not parties to the 1974 and 1975 class-action complaints filed by the Ensley Branch of the NAACP and seven black individuals against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board.23 After the District Court approved the consent decrees in August 1981 over objections and denied intervention motions as untimely, the Wilks respondents filed their own suit in 1983 alleging race-based denial of promotions.24 The consent decrees therefore cannot preclude their independent claims of unlawful discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.25
The white firefighters may challenge the consent decrees in a separate action because they were not parties to the prior litigation.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Blackmun
The Court today holds that white firefighters who had notice of a consent decree entered to remedy past discrimination against blacks may nevertheless collaterally attack that decree in a separate lawsuit.27 The consent decree was entered after years of litigation.28 In that litigation the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board were found to have engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination against blacks in violation of Title VII.29 The decree was designed to remedy that discrimination by providing specific goals for the hiring and promotion of blacks in the fire department.30
The white firefighters had ample notice of the litigation and the proposed decree, and they had an opportunity to intervene and present their objections.31 Their failure to do so should preclude them from challenging the decree in a separate action.32
Whether the failure of nonparties to intervene in litigation precludes them from collaterally attacking a consent decree in a subsequent action?33
The impermissible collateral attack doctrine prevents a nonparty from challenging a judgment in a separate action when the nonparty could have intervened in the original action.34 That doctrine is rejected as inconsistent with the general rule that a judgment is not binding on a nonparty and with Rules 19 and 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35
No. The Wilks respondents had notice of the fairness hearings published in local newspapers and an opportunity to intervene but were not joined as parties under Rule 19.36 The District Court denied the Birmingham Firefighters Association's motion to intervene as untimely.37 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that denial while noting the firefighters could institute an independent Title VII suit.38 Their subsequent challenge therefore is not an impermissible collateral attack.39
The failure of nonparties to intervene does not preclude them from collaterally attacking a consent decree in a subsequent action.40
Related opinions on this issue
I join Justice Stevens' dissent. I write separately to emphasize that the Court's decision today will have the effect of undermining the voluntary settlement of employment discrimination disputes.41 Consent decrees are an important tool for remedying past discrimination.42 They allow employers and plaintiffs to reach agreement on specific remedial measures without the need for further litigation.43 The Court's decision will make employers reluctant to enter into such decrees for fear that they will be subject to collateral attack by nonparties.44 This result is contrary to the strong policy favoring voluntary resolution of Title VII disputes.45
The white firefighters in this case had full notice of the earlier litigation and the proposed consent decree.46 They chose not to intervene.47 Having made that choice, they should not now be allowed to challenge the decree in a separate lawsuit.48
Whether the policy favoring voluntary settlement of Title VII disputes requires that consent decrees bind nonparties who had notice of the litigation?49
No. The City and the Board reached agreement with the black plaintiffs on the terms of the proposed consent decrees that included numerical goals for hiring and promoting blacks as firefighters.52 Although the Wilks respondents had notice through newspaper publication and the fairness hearing, the decrees cannot bind them or immunize the City from their reverse discrimination claims.53 If the City wished to protect itself, it could have joined the white firefighters as parties under Rule 19.54
The policy favoring voluntary settlement of Title VII disputes does not require that consent decrees bind nonparties who had notice of the litigation.55