Also known as: repetitions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A basis for holding the original publisher of a libel or slander liable for special harm when a third person repeats the statement. Liability arises only when the repetition meets one of three conditions set out in the Restatement.
Ruby Rivera told Ricardo Rojas that a local contractor had bribed a building inspector. Ruby explicitly asked Ricardo to repeat the claim to the contractor's clients. Ricardo did so at a neighborhood meeting, and several clients withdrew their projects, causing the contractor measurable lost profits. The contractor sued Ruby for the losses traceable to Ricardo's statements.
Rina Rahman told a bank officer that her business partner had falsified loan documents. She authorized the officer to share the information with other banks considering the partner's applications. The officer repeated the claim to two additional lenders, both of which denied credit and caused the partner to lose a development deal. The partner sued Rahman for the resulting damages.
Roger Ramirez emailed a colleague that a competitor's product contained a safety defect. The colleague predictably repeated the claim to several attendees at a trade conference the next week. The competitor lost two major contracts after the attendees heard the story. The competitor sued Ramirez for the losses flowing from the conference repetitions.
Riley Rivera faced an attacker who lunged with a knife and threatened to kill her. Riley struck the attacker once with a heavy object, fracturing his skull and causing permanent loss of vision in one eye. The attacker later sued Riley for battery, claiming the blow exceeded necessary force.
A woman challenged a state abortion restriction while pregnant. By the time her case reached the Supreme Court, she had given birth. The Court nevertheless heard the case because the same plaintiff could become pregnant again and face the identical short-lived restriction before full appellate review could occur.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseA federal court applying state tort law had previously followed a federal common-law rule on landowner duties. After the Supreme Court decision, the court abandoned that federal rule and instead applied the state supreme court's formulation of the duty, even though the federal approach had been repeated in many earlier federal opinions.
Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He asserted that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. He further alleged that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that the Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe original publisher is liable for special harm caused by the repetition only if the third person was privileged to repeat the statement, the repetition was authorized or intended by the original publisher, or the repetition was reasonably to be expected.
No. Each communication is classified by its own form. A written or fixed publication remains libel even if it repeats spoken statements that would separately qualify as slander.
Publication occurs as soon as the defendant intentionally or negligently communicates the statement to any person other than the plaintiff. Overhearing by nearby third parties during an open meeting meets this requirement.