Also known as: renovatio · renovationis · renewal · renew
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Latin verb meaning to renew. It describes the revival or extension of a legal right, procedural step, registration, or obligation after its initial creation or expiration.
Rosalind Reed was convicted of fraud after a three-week trial. Her counsel filed a motion for judgment of acquittal twelve days after the verdict. The court considered the renewed motion and set aside the conviction under the governing timing rule.
Ruby Rivera objected to the admission of a business record at a pretrial hearing. The judge ruled definitively that the document was admissible. At trial Rivera did not repeat the objection, yet the ruling remained reviewable on appeal because the initial decision was final.
Ravi Reddy faced an attacker who had already struck him once. Reddy renewed his defensive stance with additional force when the assailant advanced again. The court evaluated whether the renewed force threatened serious bodily harm under the applicable standard.
Roland Rhodes owned waterfront property targeted for redevelopment. After the city renewed its condemnation plan, Rhodes challenged the taking. The litigation turned on whether the renewed public-use justification satisfied constitutional limits.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseRenata Russo received a corporate proxy statement that omitted material facts about a merger. She renewed her challenge by filing suit after the vote. The court examined whether the renewed disclosure claim could proceed without proof of reliance.
In December 1986, First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI), a bank holding company, began a freeze-out merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) eventually merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI owned 85 percent of the Bank's shares, with the remaining 15 percent held by approximately 2,000 minority shareholders. FABI hired the investment banking firm of Keefe, Bruyette & Woods (KBW) to opine on the appropriate price for the minority shares. Based on market quotations and unverified information from FABI, KBW advised the Bank's executive committee that $42 per share would be a fair price. The executive committee approved the merger proposal at that price, and the full board followed suit. Although Virginia law required only that the merger proposal be submitted to a vote at a shareholders' meeting preceded by circulation of a statement of information, the directors solicited proxies for voting on the proposal at the annual meeting set for April 21, 1987. In the solicitation, the directors urged adoption of the proposal and stated they had approved the plan because it provided an opportunity for the minority shareholders to achieve a high value for their shares, which they elsewhere described as a fair price. Respondent Sandberg, a minority shareholder who did not provide the requested proxy, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against VBI, FABI, and the Bank's directors. She alleged violations of section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. She also alleged breaches of fiduciary duties under state law. Sandberg claimed the directors did not believe the $42 price was high or the merger terms fair but recommended the merger only to retain their board seats. At trial, the jury returned verdicts for Sandberg on both counts and awarded her $18 per share after finding she would have received $60 if the stock had been valued adequately. While Sandberg's case was pending, other minority shareholders including respondent Weinstein filed a similar action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That case was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia. After Sandberg's trial, the Weinstein respondents obtained summary judgment on liability through collateral estoppel. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgments, holding that certain statements in the proxy solicitation were materially misleading and that the respondents could maintain their action even though their votes had not been needed to effectuate the merger. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRiley Rivera sought reappointment as a college instructor. The institution declined to renew the position. The court assessed whether the non-renewal implicated a protected property interest under due process.
In 1968 the Board of Regents of State Colleges hired David Roth as an assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for a fixed term running from September 1, 1968, to June 30, 1969. The formal notice of appointment stated that the employment basis was the academic year. It provided that regulations governing tenure followed Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 37.31. Roth was informed before he began teaching that he had no tenure rights and would be rehired for the 1969-1970 academic year only if the University chose to retain him. Under Wisconsin law a teacher could acquire tenure as a permanent employee only after four years of continuous service. The Board of Regents' rules established February 1 as the deadline for written notification of non-retention for nontenured faculty. No reason for non-retention need be given and no review or appeal is provided in such case. In conformance with these rules the University president notified Roth before February 1, 1969, that he would not be rehired. Roth received no statement of reasons and no opportunity to challenge the decision. Roth brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. He alleged that the failure to provide reasons and a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. He also alleged that the non-renewal decision was actually retaliation for statements critical of the University administration that violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment for Roth on the procedural due process claim. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board of Regents petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
View caseA defendant may move for acquittal or renew such a motion within fourteen days after a guilty verdict or after the jury is discharged, whichever occurs later. The timing rule ensures the court can address sufficiency issues promptly while the record remains fresh.
Once the court rules definitively on the record, a party need not renew the objection or offer of proof to preserve the claim of error. The rule eliminates unnecessary repetition when the ruling is final.
Serious bodily harm differs in kind from ordinary harm and includes injuries creating substantial risk of death, permanent loss of an important bodily function, or conduct amounting to mayhem. The actor's intended or likely consequences, not the actual result, determine whether the renewed force is privileged.